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Michael P. Schoderbek
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
ROBERT MORRIS AND REPORTING FOR
THE TREASURY UNDER THE U.S.
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
Abstract: This paper examines the accounting and reporting prac-
tices established by Robert Morris during his term as Superintend-
ent of Finance under the Continental Congress from 1781 to 1784.
Generally known as the financier of the American Revolution, Mor-
ris enacted many important accounting reforms, including his rear-
rangement of the Treasury to speed the settlement of accounts and
the establishment of Continental receivers to collect money from the
states. His most important contribution was the preparation of an-
nual statements of receipts and expenditures of public money of the
Confederation government. These statements, along with a detailed
account on money received from the individual states, were circu-
lated to put pressure on the states to meet their tax quotas. Several
of these accounts are reproduced as exhibits in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Historians have generally regarded Robert Morris as an as-
tute merchant and faithful government servant, his paramount
role being that of financier of the American Revolution
[Sumner, 1891; Ver Steeg, 1954]. When appointed as Superin-
tendent of Finance during the later stages of the war, he was
responsible for furnishing the troops, restoring the public
credit, and injecting economic efficiency into the Confederation
government. In carrying out these duties, he was given a wide
range of power over the funds he was able to raise under the
Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank John Catanzariti, Ri-
chard Fleischman (the editor), Paul Miranti, Jr., Stephen Zeff, and an anony-
mous reviewer for their helpful comments and suggestions on this study.
Submitted August 1998
Accepted November 1998
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restrictive terms of the Articles of Confederation.1  According to
some historians, the financier’s influence during his term as
Superintendent from 1781 to 1784 was probably second only to
that of George Washington [Morris Papers, Vol. 1, p. xvii].
Generally overlooked are Morris’ administrative reforms
and contributions made in establishing reporting practices for
the Treasury. Upon taking office, Morris rearranged the Treas-
ury to speed up settlement of accounts and improve control
over expenditures. He later initiated the preparation of annual
statements of revenues and expenditures as part of his plan to
raise revenues for the war effort. His financial statements, in-
cluding a statement of taxes received from the states, were cir-
culated to the public to put pressure on the states to meet their
tax quotas. The Treasurer’s Reports also served an additional
purpose; to silence some of his critics in the Continental Con-
gress (e.g., Arthur Lee).
The annual reporting practices and accounts established by
Morris served as a model followed into the next century. The
U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1788, required regular statements
of receipts and expenditures (Article I, Section 9). There was no
such requirement under the Articles of Confederation; Morris
published such statements based on his notions of accountabil-
ity to the public and to promote his long-range fiscal plans.
Prior to Morris’ appointment as Superintendent of Finance, ac-
counts of the Treasury’s affairs were issued on a sporadic basis,
if at all [Bullock, 1895, p. 257].
This paper deals with the administrative reforms of the
Treasury for payment of accounts under Robert Morris and the
external reporting practices initiated during his term as Super-
intendent of Finance under the Continental Congress. Also ex-
amined is the establishment of Continental receivers to help in
the collection of taxes from the states. The remainder of the
paper begins with a review of the economic and political cli-
mate prior to Morris’ appointment in 1781 and the previous
organization of the Treasury Department. This is followed by
background on Robert Morris and his plan to reorganize the
Treasury Office for payment of the public accounts. Next is an
examination of the Continental receivers used for the collection
of taxes and the financier’s annual statement of accounts. The
1For a primer on the relationship and relative timing of the Declaration of
Independence, Articles of Confederation, U.S. Continental Congress, and U.S.
Constitution, see Patrick [1995] or Curtis [1861].
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paper then looks at federal reporting requirements drafted into
the U.S. Constitution. The study concludes with a limitations
section and a summary.
FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR THE
CONFEDERATION GOVERNMENT
In 1781, the U.S., operating under the Continental Con-
gress, was in a financial crisis. Public credit had nearly col-
lapsed as reflected by the rapid depreciation of the Continental
bills of credit. These bills of credit circulated as paper money
and were first issued in 1775 to raise revenues for the war
[J.C.C., Vol. II, June 22, 1775, p. 103]. The plan behind this
Continental paper was to allow Congress to pay for current
expenditures, while binding the states to pay for the expendi-
tures by taxation, at which time the paper would be destroyed
[Morris Papers, June 15, 1781]. However, few taxes were col-
lected, and since the bills of credit bore no interest, they began
to depreciate. In 1775, Congress passed a plan for regulating
and funding the bills of credit under which each colony was to
provide the ways and means to sink its proportion of the bills
emitted by Congress in the usual mode of levying taxes in each
colony [J.C.C., Vol. II, July 29, 1775, pp. 221-224]. However, as
later summarized by Congress in 1781, “Unfortunately, the tax
failed, and the sums obtained from loans were greatly in-
adequate to the expenditure; consequently more money was
emitted; and notwithstanding the favourable turn in our affairs
in 1778, depreciation encreased with amazing rapidity” [J.C.C.,
Vol. XIX, April 18, 1781, p. 408]. By the beginning of 1780,
$241.5 million of these bills of credit had been issued [U.S.
Congress, 1859, Statement of the Issues of Continental Money,
Vol. V, p. 764], and their specie value had fallen to two cents
per dollar [U.S. Congress, 1859, Amount of Continental Money
Issued during the Revolutionary War, and Depreciation of the
Same, Vol. V, pp. 763-771].
Efforts to raise taxes from the states to fund the war
achieved little success. The weaknesses of the Articles of Con-
federation are well known in this regard. Under the Articles,
passed by the Congress in 1777 [J.C.C., Vol. IX, November 15,
1777, p. 907], the Confederation government did not have the
authority to tax citizens directly. Article eight provided for the
establishment of a common treasury, “to be supplied by the
several states, in proportion to the value of all land (and im-
provements thereon), within each state.” The state allocations
12
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for funds requisitioned, or quotas, were to be determined by
Congress; but the taxes were to be levied and collected by the
state governments. The problems encountered by these provi-
sions were numerous. Each state thought its allocation unjust
and sought to shift the burden to other states. In addition, the
states experienced difficulties in collecting their own taxes from
the citizens. Between 1777 and 1779, the Congress made four
requisitions upon the states for taxes [Bullock, 1895, p. 158].
These four requisitions totaled $95 million and allowed for pay-
ments in the Continental currency. Based on then current
scales of depreciation, the specie value of these requisitions was
$5,054,972. The amount actually collected was estimated at
$1,856,000 specie value [U.S. Congress, 1832, Money Received
From or Paid to the States, Vol. I, pp. 54-55, 59-62].
This figure was small compared to the domestic and for-
eign loans acquired prior to 1781. In 1776, loan offices were
opened in each state to borrow directly from the citizens
[J.C.C., Vol. V, October 3, 1776, p. 845]. By 1781, approximately
$67 million in interest-bearing, loan-office certificates had been
issued, with a specie value of $11.5 million [U.S. Congress,
1832, Public Credit, Vol. I, p. 27]. This figure, however, greatly
understates domestic borrowing because it excludes commis-
sary and quartermaster certificates. These certificates of indebt-
edness were issued by the army’s purchasing agents as compen-
sation for supplies seized to support the troops. A report to
Congress in February 1781 indicated that approximately $64
million of these certificates were outstanding with a specie
equivalent of $852,822 [J.C.C., Vol. XIX, February 19, 1781, p.
165]. The Confederation also received help from its allies over-
seas, securing $2.2 million from France and Holland in a series
of loans from 1777 to 1780 [P.C.C., Roll 41, p. 23]. This loan
amount does not include secret grants and subsidies supplied
by France and Spain, estimated by Bullock [1895, p. 166] at
$2,588,500.
With domestic and foreign debt mounting, the U.S. was
pressed to pay its interest and other expenditures. Public credit
was substantially ruined and by 1781 the Confederation govern-
ment was in a desperate financial situation. This situation was
second priority to the most urgent need of keeping the war
effort moving. The ineffectiveness and disorganization of the
Treasury Department contributed to the dilemma.
13
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PRIOR ORGANIZATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
The nature of the Confederation hampered establishing an
effective treasury body to manage the nation’s finances from
the outset of the Revolution. Both executive and legislative
power were united under the Continental Congress. Special
congressional committee’s were appointed to handle the
nation’s treasury. The first such committee, consisting of five
members, was appointed in February 1776 [J.C.C., Vol. IV, Feb-
ruary 17, 1776, pp. 156-157]. Creation of the treasury “office”
did not come until April when Congress resolved that:
. . . a treasury office of accounts shall be instituted and
established, and that such office shall be kept in the
city or place, where Congress shall, from time to time,
be assembled and hold their sessions [J.C.C., Vol. IV,
April 1, 1776, p. 244].
Congress was to appoint an auditor general and a “competent
number of assistants or clerks,” who would take an oath of
secrecy before taking office. The Auditor and his assistants
were responsible for “stating, arranging, and keeping the public
accounts,” under supervision of the Treasury Committee. In ad-
dition, the Treasury was to keep on file all contracts, securities,
and obligations, for the “use and benefit of the United Colo-
nies.”
Few details were provided by Congress concerning actually
running the Treasury and settling accounts. These were appar-
ently to be provided later by the Treasury Committee. This first
Treasury was primarily an office to adjust accounts and record
collections. Congress maintained control over all expenditures
and Treasury personnel hiring decisions. Making key decisions
on financial matters and raising capital were not among Treas-
ury Committee’s duties. This was usually done by the Secret
Committee on Commerce or by other congressional commit-
tees.2  Because Congress refused to delegate power, it spent an
inordinate amount of time voting on petty appropriations and
debating new ways to regulate the Treasury Department.
Due to an increase in wartime transactions and a desire to
change the overall slowness in settling accounts, the Treasury
2In 1778, a special committee was appointed to consider the state of the
money and finances of the U.S. [J.C.C., Vol. XI, August 27, 1778, p. 843]. This
committee served as a ways and means committee and reported to Congress
from time to time.
14
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was remodeled around functional areas in 1778 [J.C.C., Vol.
XII, September 26, 1778, pp. 956-961]. The new Treasury con-
sisted of three offices (Comptroller’s, Auditor’s, Treasurer’s) and
two Chambers of Accounts. Congress was to appoint officers to
run each department, and these officers would appoint their
own clerks. For the settlement of accounts, each chamber was
to consist of three commissioners and two clerks. The duties of
the officers and commissioners were prescribed in more detail
in this act. The Auditor received all accounts brought against
the U.S. for money lent, expended, or advanced. After examina-
tion, the Auditor forwarded the account to one of the two
Chambers of Accounts. The clerks in the Chambers of Accounts
authenticated and adjusted the account. After endorsement by
the commissioner, the account was send back to the Auditor.
The Auditor examined the account a second time, hearing any
appeals brought by the parties concerned. After final approval
by the Auditor, the account was forwarded to the Comptroller.
The Comptroller filed all vouchers, recorded the transac-
tions in the public accounts, and maintained the Treasury
books. For payment of accounts, it was the Comptroller’s duty
to notify the payee and issue a draft on the Treasurer. The
Treasurer was responsible for receiving, safeguarding, and
transmitting all monies of the U.S. After payment, the Treas-
urer was required to transmit a copy of the receipt to the
Comptroller. Under this new arrangement, the five-member
Board of the Treasury remained intact to supervise the officers
and commissioners involved in running the Treasury.
This changed in July 1779, when Congress passed the Ordi-
nance for Establishing a Board of Treasury, and the Proper Offi-
cers for Managing the Finances of the United States [J.C.C., Vol.
XIV, July 30, 1779, pp. 903-909]. Under the Ordinance, the five-
member Treasury Board was to consist of two members of Con-
gress and three outside members who were not delegates of
Congress. Most of the other provisions in the earlier act re-
mained in place. One noteworthy change was that the Comp-
troller was eliminated, leaving the Auditor General’s Office, the
Treasurer’s Office, and two Chambers of Accounts. Primary
record-keeping duties were now assigned to the Auditor Gen-
eral, under the supervision of the new Treasury Board. In addi-
tion, the Ordinance provided for six new auditors to examine
and settle accounts of the army.
Unfortunately, the reconfiguration of the five-member
Treasury Board did little to enhance the efficiency of the de-
partment because it did not address the real problems. There
15
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was no authority or accountability at the head of the Treasury
and little cooperation between the various offices. The Treasury
officers acted with all the autonomy of the individual states.
Since these officers were congressional appointments, only
Congress could remove them. As a result, affairs at the Treasury
during this period were characterized by political infighting
and accounts that were slowly or never settled [J.C.C., Vol.
XVII, June 12, 1780, pp. 504-505; J.C.C., Vol. XVII, August 10,
1780, pp. 715-716]. The Treasury Board was never able to
streamline the system of checks and balances required under
the Ordinance. Treasury officials constantly quibbled over their
record-keeping duties [J.C.C., Vol. XIV, December 14, 1779, p.
1380; Letters of Delegates, 1989, October 26, 1780, pp. 267-278].
In one report to Congress, the Auditor General noted:
. . . the machine is so clogged, as to defeat in a great
measure the intention of having the public accounts
speedily settled. There are many accounts the Investi-
gation of which will take up a set of Commissioners
from three to six months . . . they must pass the like
Examination in the Auditors Office . . . and conse-
quently there cannot be more than from two to four of
such [accounts] settled in the course of a year [J.C.C.,
XIII, April 13, 1779, p. 445].
The administrative procedures and conduct of the Treasury
came under intense scrutiny during 1780. Charges were
brought against two members of the Treasury Board, John
Gibson and Ezekiel Forman. These charges were brought by
Francis Hopkinson, the Treasurer of the Loans Department.
The Loans Department and the Treasury interacted out of ne-
cessity due to the many transactions that flowed through their
offices. The two offices often argued over matters such as who
had authority to issue warrants for payments and what consti-
tuted proper documentation [P.C.C., Roll 147, Item No. 136,
June 28, 1780, p. 389; P.C.C., Roll 147, Item No. 136, June 29,
1780, pp. 391-392].
The formal charges brought against the two Treasury
Board members were undue pride and insolence of office, issu-
ing absurd and incorrect orders, a dangerous usurpation of
power, and altering records [P.C.C., Roll 76, October 27, 1780,
pp. 309-316]. Gibson and Forman attempted to deflect the
charges against them by making their own allegations against
the commissioners of the Chambers of Accounts. The charges
brought against the commissioners included neglect of duty, in-
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dolence, inattention to the public interest, incapacity, and partial-
ity [P.C.C., Roll 76, October 27, 1780, pp. 343-347]. As a result
of these charges, relations between the Treasury Board and the
Chambers of Accounts were so strained that until the Auditor
General was appointed to serve as a liaison between the two
parties, all communications had been reduced to writing
[P.C.C., Roll 33, Item No. 26, May 25, 1780, p. 183].3
A congressional committee was appointed to investigate the
charges and the overall “uneasiness” within the Treasury
[P.C.C., Roll 76, July 10, 1780, p. 450]. The resulting congres-
sional hearings focused mainly on character issues or personal
conflicts. For example, in one instance according to Hopkinson,
the door to the Treasury was slammed in his face when he went
to visit the Board over the noon hour about loan-office busi-
ness. The minutes of these hearings also point to incompetent
personnel and careless record-keeping procedures in the Treas-
ury [Letter of Delegates, Treasury Inquiry Minutes, October 25,
1780, pp. 259-262]. In a report to Congress, the committee in-
vestigating the Treasury’s conduct and procedures found:
That the several errors in accts. which have been laid
before your Committee by the Treasurer of loans . . .
are all of such nature as might have been readily ad-
justed without the least injury to the public, had not
the Demon of Discord pervaded the whole Department
[J.C.C., Vol. XVIII, November 24, 1780, pp. 1091-1092].
It ended by noting, “it is the opinion of the Committee, the
Treasury should be under the direction of a single officer, ac-
countable to Congress for the conduct of the Department.” Con-
gress was eager to dispose of the Treasury Board for reasons
besides the jealousies and animosities within the department.
Due to its lack of reports on the nation’s finances, Congress was
constantly in the dark about financial matters. Much of the
financial picture from this period was reconstructed or esti-
mated years later by Morris or Alexander Hamilton.
All of these events, the ruined economy, the internal disor-
der within the Treasury Department, the slowness and errors in
accounts, and the lack of financial reports finally persuaded
Congress to create the office of Superintendent of Finance on
February 7, 1781.
3The friction between the Treasury Board and the Chambers of Accounts is
not well documented, but some letters suggest that jealousies over office space
contributed to the rivalry.
17
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 1999
9Schoderbek: Robert Morris
BACKGROUND OF ROBERT MORRIS
Robert Morris came to America from Liverpool with his
father in 1747 at the age of 13, taking residence in Oxford,
Maryland [Ver Steeg, 1954, p. 3]. His father died in an accident
three years later, leaving a modest legacy to young Robert. At
the time Robert was attending school in Philadelphia, where he
later began work as an apprentice at the mercantile house of
Thomas Willing. Morris advanced quickly to became a full part-
ner of Willing & Morris in May 1757. By 1781, Morris was one
of the most prominent merchants in the colonies and the owner
of ten vessels used in mercantile transactions from Europe to
the West Indies. He was involved in numerous partnerships and
had interests in trade, land, mills, privateering, and securities
[Ver Steeg, 1954, p. 41].
Morris was elected as a member of the Pennsylvania As-
sembly in 1775. That same year he was appointed a member of
the Continental Congress4  and quickly became involved in sev-
eral important congressional committees. One of these was the
Secret Committee (later named the Secret Committee of Com-
merce) to which he was appointed on November 29, 1775
[J.C.C., Vol. III, November 29, 1775, p. 390]. The purpose of this
committee was twofold. First, it was to acquire clothing, mus-
kets, gunpowder, etc. to support the Confederation army; sec-
ond, it had to find the means to pay for these items. Goods were
usually acquired through contracting, and the firm of Willing &
Morris profited from these wartime business ventures. In many
transactions Willing & Morris performed the multiple roles of
contractor, shipping agent, and banker. Willing & Morris was
one of the largest dealers in the Continental bills of credit and
could also lay its hands on gold or silver if the need arose. Thus,
it quickly became the primary procurement arm of the Conti-
nental government. As a matter of routine, Congress would sta-
tion guards at the warehouses of Willing & Morris to protect
the stores belonging to the United Colonies [J.C.C., Vol. III,
December 2, 1775, p. 396].
The U.S. needed someone with Morris’ connections to ar-
range the complex transactions, such as the exchange of to-
bacco to Europe for military wares. Even so, from the outset,
some members of Congress criticized Morris for his business
arrangements. Willing & Morris often mixed goods for private
4Morris was reappointed to Congress in 1776 and was a signer of the
Declaration of Independence [Sumner, 1891, Vol. II, pp. 192-197].
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trade with goods belonging to the public. This practice caused
problems for Morris in 1779, when he was accused by Henry
Laurens of receiving compensation from the Treasury for the
loss of private goods. Laurens accused Morris regarding private
goods carried aboard the vessel Farmer, which was captured by
the British [J.C.C., Vol. XIII, January 19, 1779, pp. 78-86]. How-
ever, after hearing Morris’ testimony and examining documents
of the Secret Committee, a committee appointed to investigate
the matter cleared Morris of any wrongdoing. The committee
investigating the Farmer incident concluded that “ . . . Robert
Morris has clearly and fully vindicated himself; and . . . in the
execution of the powers committed to him by the said Secret
Committee . . . has acted with fidelity and integrity and an
honourable zeal for the happiness for his country” [J.C.C., Vol.
XIII, February 11, 1779, pp. 163-176].
About this same time Morris came under attack from two
of the most notorious dissidents in Congress, Thomas Paine
and Arthur Lee. Paine had initiated a campaign against war-
time profiteering and corruption in the Pennsylvania Packet un-
der the pen name “Common Sense.” Morris was one of Paine’s
favorite targets, along with Silas Deane, who was a political ally
of Morris and an agent for the firm of Willing & Morris.5  Later,
when Morris was Superintendent of Finance, Paine reconciled
with Morris, and in 1782 Morris hired Paine to urge the state
legislatures to raise taxes to pay for the war and national debt.
Paine used his pen in earnest, battling the State of Rhode Island
for refusing to accept an import duty of 5 percent on imported
goods [Fruchtman, 1994, pp. 139-149].
On the other hand, Lee’s “war against the financier,” as put
by Madison [Madison Papers, July 2, 1782], lasted throughout
Morris’ tenure at the Treasury. Lee harbored a deep resentment
over the magnitude of Morris’ powers as financier and despised
his personal values as a profiteer [Potts, 1981, p. 260]. Lee
made constant accusations, mostly unsubstantiated, against
Morris and his contracts with the Secret Committee [Potts,
1981, p. 256]. Although the charges never led to any sanctions,
the allegations of using his public position for private gain fol-
lowed Morris throughout his career.
5Deane, Franklin, and Lee had been appointed commissioners to France to
seek loans from the French court and to acquire military wares to support the
war. For an analysis of the commissioners’ accounts, see Carstens and Flesher
[1987].
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REORGANIZATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Notwithstanding the aforementioned criticism, the choice
of Robert Morris to fill the newly created position of Superin-
tendent of Finance was unanimous [J.C.C., Vol. XIX, February
20, 1781, p. 180]. Morris did not accept the post immediately.
He knew that in order to implement fully his proposed adminis-
trative reforms and to liquidate the public debt, he would need
complete control. This included control over hiring of all Treas-
ury secretaries, clerks, etc., and “Absolute Power” to dismiss all
persons concerned in the expenditure of public monies [Morris
Papers, March 13, 1781]. When asked for clarification by
Congress, Morris stipulated that absolute power included the
right to dismiss in the offices of the Quartermaster General,
Commissary General, Paymaster General, the Medical Depart-
ment, and virtually every department that settled accounts in
his office, excepting the Secret Service [Morris Papers, March
26, 1781]. At first some members of Congress balked at grant-
ing these broad powers. Morris insisted that they were critical
to “prevent the dangerous affects of inattention or corruption”
and to provide for a “proper and early settlement” of accounts.
Congress ultimately conceded to Morris the powers he re-
quested, and Morris accepted the position on May 14 [Morris
Papers, May 14, 1781].
One of Morris’ highest priorities was to reorganize the
Treasury and to put competent men in place for the payment of
accounts. Only when proper record-keeping procedures were
established and accounts were settled in a timely fashion, could
he focus on other important matters, such as raising tax rev-
enues from the states, pursuing loans from overseas, creating a
mint, and establishing the Bank of North America. His first
move was to hire Gouverneur Morris, a former Congressman
from New York,6  to serve in the position as “Assistant to the
Superintendent of the Finances of the United States of North
America” [Morris Papers, July 6, 1781]. Gouverneur Morris was
6Gouverneur Morris, no relation to Robert Morris, was from a distin-
guished Welsh family that arrived in New York in 1688. Their close alliance
with the Crown elevated the family to a prominent role in New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania politics during the 18th century [Mintz, 1970, pp. 3-6;
Kline, 1978, pp. 6-16].
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a political ally of Robert Morris and had published several
insightful articles on finance in the Pennsylvania Packet.7
Robert Morris submitted his plan for reorganization of the
Treasury to a congressional committee on August 27, 1781
[Morris Papers, August 27, 1781]. According to Morris (p. 111),
the Treasury office naturally consists of three branches:
1st the Liquidation of Accounts, 2dly. Keeping the pub-
lic Books, and 3ly. the Custody of public Money. These
branches, altho distinct, ought however to be so con-
nected as that the different parts may form one whole.
His plan provided for a comptroller, a register, a treasurer, and
auditors and clerks to assist these officers and the Superintend-
ent of Finance. The comptroller had primary authority over the
liquidation of public accounts, to see that they were expedi-
tiously and properly adjusted. For settlement, the comptroller
would first submit the account to one of his clerks. According
to Morris (p. 112):
Every account ought to be first stated in one certain
form, so that a person once acquainted with that form,
could go through the public Accounts with equal Facil-
ity.
The clerk’s job was to correct any arithmetic errors, determine
the validity of the vouchers, and judge the propriety of the
charges. After noting any objections, the clerk would pass the
account with his comments to the auditor. The auditor would
listen to testimony from the party and the clerk, making any
final adjustments if need be. He would then pass the audited
account back to the comptroller. As a measure of internal con-
trol, the clerks were to be appointed by the comptroller, and the
auditors were to be appointed by the Superintendent. Morris
reasoned that, “It would not be proper that the Appointment of
Auditors should also be in the Comptroller, as that Officer
would then be uncheckd . . . ” [p. 113].
If the party was not satisfied with the judgment of the audi-
tor, he had the right to appeal his case to the comptroller
within a reasonable time. Congress later determined that a
7After his work at the Treasury was done, Gouverneur Morris went on to
have a distinguished career in public service. He played a major role in draft-
ing the Constitution at the Convention of 1787 [Mintz, 1970, p. 181], and later
served as minister to France during the French Revolution [Mintz, 1970, p.
222].
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reasonable time for appeal was 14 days [J.C.C., Vol. XXI, Sep-
tember 11, 1781, p. 949]. The comptroller’s decision, however,
was final. If the comptroller and the Superintendent rejected
the party’s claim, a final alternative was to apply directly to
Congress [Morris Papers, March 21, 1782, March 26, 1782]. The
adjusted account was then delivered to the Superintendent of
Finance, who prepared a warrant for payment. The warrant had
to be countersigned by the register, who also recorded the
transaction.
The treasurer was responsible for receiving and safeguard-
ing the monies of the U.S. and making payment for warrants
drawn by the Superintendent of Finance. He was to issue or
take receipts for all money transactions and to render his ac-
counts quarterly to the comptroller. The register had primary
record-keeping responsibilities. “He should keep all the Public
Accounts, both of Receipts and Expenditures, and every war-
rant drawn on the Treasurer.” According to Morris, the register,
or “Book Keeper,” “ . . . ought to be a very good Accountant,
faithful, Just, accurate, attentive and industrious.”
Morris’ plan addressed several deficiencies inherent in the
old system. The office of the Auditor and the two Chambers of
Accounts were eliminated, centralizing power in the comp-
troller’s office for the settlement of accounts. This eliminated
duplication in efforts which had caused disputes among
Treasury personnel. The change generated more attention to
internal control and the importance of record keeping, as evi-
denced by the addition of the office of the register.
The plan was approved by Congress in the same general
form proposed by Morris. On September 11, 1781, Congress
issued An Ordinance for Regulating the Treasury, and Adjusting
the Public Accounts [J.C.C., Vol. XXI, September 11, 1781, pp.
948-951]. With the enactment of this Ordinance, the old
Treasury Board was dissolved and a new system for the settle-
ment of accounts and accounting for transactions under the
U.S. Continental Congress was implemented.
MORRIS’ TAX COLLECTION EFFORTS AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTINENTAL RECEIVERS
After the Ordinance to regulate the Treasury was approved
by Congress, Morris needed to fill the open posts in the
Treasury Office. Congress appointed Joseph Nourse as Register
of the Treasury [J.C.C., Vol. XXI, September 19, 1781, p. 974].
Nourse had previously served on the Board of War before
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joining the Treasury as Assistant Auditor General in 1779.
Nourse’s job was to keep track of revenues and expenditures
and to prepare statements of accounts. On the same day as
Nourse’s appointment, Michael Hillegas was named Treasurer.
Hillegas had served as Treasurer under the old Treasury Board
since inception of the office in 1776, and thus provided conti-
nuity in the handling of public monies. The position of Comp-
troller took longer to fill because the first choice, Congressman
William C. Houston of New Jersey, declined the office. Con-
gress settled on James Milligan, who had served as Auditor
General under the prior Treasury Board [J.C.C., Vol. XXI, Octo-
ber 13, 1781, p. 1050]. Thus, all the men appointed to serve
under Morris had prior experience in the Treasury.
With competent men in place to settle accounts under his
supervision in Philadelphia, Morris turned his attention to-
wards Treasury business affecting the individual states. Gener-
ating tax revenues was imperative. It was also time to reign in
the loan offices which had begun to outlive their usefulness. As
noted earlier, these offices had been opened to borrow from the
public (see FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR THE CONFEDERATION
GOVERNMENT). The loan-office business essentially dried up
in 1779 when Congress demanded specie instead of depreciated
Continental bills of credit in exchange for loan certificates.
Also, the loan officers, in order to make interest payments on
outstanding loans, were issuing outdated certificates in lieu of
monies. Morris ordered this practice stopped and requested
that all blank certificates be returned to the Treasury for de-
struction [Morris Papers, October 13, 1781].
With public creditors relentless in requesting payment,
Morris stepped up efforts to collect tax revenues from the
states. Morris continued to face the problems caused by the
Articles of Confederation. Only states could levy specific taxes,
and a portion of these would be applied to the state’s quota. The
state’s quota would go into the “common treasury.” Unfortu-
nately, taxes were usually collected locally by officials who were
loyal to their own communities. There was little left over for the
Confederation government. Alexander Hamilton, in a letter to
Morris [Hamilton Papers, August 13, 1782, pp. 135-136], sum-
marized the problems incurred in New York:
The Legislature first assesses, or quotas the several
counties. The members cabal and intrigue to throw the
burthen off their respective constituents. . . . The super-
visors, of whom are upon an average of sixteen in each
county, meet at the notification of the county clerk,
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and assign their proportions to the sub-divisions of the
county; and in the distribution play the same game.
According to Hamilton, the state was composed of 14 counties.
Of these, five “are in the hands of the enemy,” two have re-
volted, and two others are desolated. In terms of actually col-
lecting the taxes, Hamilton [August 13, 1782, p. 136] noted:
It now remains for the collectors to collect the tax, and
it is the duty of the supervisors to see that they do it.
. . . The collector is entitled to the trifling of sometimes
four — sometimes six pence out of each pound he col-
lects. . . . The supervisors have no interest at all in the
collection; and it will on this account appear not ex-
traordinary, that with continual delinquencies in the
collector[s] there has never been a single prosecution.
After taxes were collected, they were remitted to the county
treasurer, who, according to Hamilton (p. 137), also had “no
sufficient inducement to incur the odium of compelling them
(i.e., the collectors) to do their duty.” Finally, the county
treasurer paid what he received into the state treasury.
Morris was determined to change this arrangement with
the states, notwithstanding the Articles. In November 1781,
Congress requisitioned an additional $8,000,000 from the states
[J.C.C., Vol. XXI, November 2, 1781, p. 1090]. The act recom-
mended that the states fill the requisitions by levying taxes
“separate from those laid for their own particular use,” and that
taxes were to be paid to the Commissioners of the loan officers
(as before), or to “such other person as shall be appointed by
the Superintendent of Finance.” Congress also recommended
that the “receivers” be given power to recover money from the
collectors, and that the funds received were subject “only to the
orders of Congress, or the Superintendent of Finance [p.
1091].” Conceptually, this act gave Morris power over the col-
lection process. He could now bypass the state treasurers and
the loan officers who were appointed by the individual states.
Morris could appoint his own receivers to represent the inter-
ests of the Confederation. In April 1782, Morris [April 13, 1782]
instructed his receivers:
You must use the most strenuous and unremitting
Efforts, by all the lawful and just Ways and Means in
your Power, to urge the Collection of Taxes within that
State; as also from Time to Time to impress the Legis-
lature with the Necessity of laying such Taxes as may
be necessary to comply with the Requisitions of Con-
gress.
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Morris also requested that the receivers update him on all de-
velopments regarding state tax levies, the state’s economic pic-
ture, and even the “character and disposition” of the state’s
high-ranking public officials.
Morris sent instructions to his receivers regarding their du-
ties, including directions on handling bank notes and a request
for weekly transmissions on receipts of money [Morris Papers,
February 12, 1782]. However, Morris used his receivers for
many duties besides the collection of taxes. For example, they
were asked to place advertisements in local newspapers solicit-
ing bids for government contracts [Morris Papers, October 10,
1782] and subsequently to execute contracts [Morris Papers,
December 12, 1782]. As transactions increased, the receipt of
specie caused problems for the receivers due to its bulk and the
threat of robbery [Morris Papers, June 15, 1782, letter of W.C.
Houston]. To obviate the need to transfer specie, Morris had
government contractors draw on the receivers for payment by
the Treasury Department [Morris Papers, September 14, 1782,
letter of W.C. Houston; Morris Papers, October 3, 1782].8  The
receivers’ compensation was also deducted from their cash re-
ceipts. Receivers were paid on a commission basis, which var-
ied from .00125 to .005 of monies collected [Morris Papers,
March 10, 1783].
In addition to keeping Morris informed about tax receipts,
Morris requested that at the end of every month, the receiver
should “cause to be published in one of the News papers of the
state,” the names, dates, and amounts of monies received by the
taxpayers for the support of the war [Morris Papers, April 13,
1782]. Morris had these receipts published for two reasons. A
first was to inflict social pressure on the state and its residents,
including pressure on individuals to pay taxes, collectors to re-
mit taxes to the receivers, and state assemblies to levy taxes
[Ver Steeg, 1954, p. 101]. In a letter to W.C. Houston, the re-
ceiver for New Jersey, Morris [October 29, 1782] noted:
Your Publications of Receipts from the Collector would
stimulate Curiosity and besides that, when Persons of
Influence in the Counties have paid it would be well to
hint to them an Enquiry why others have not paid.
8The hazards of safekeeping and transferring specie were also experienced
by receivers of public monies for the district land offices created under the
Land Act of 1800 [Schoderbek, 1994]. The Secretary of the Treasury, Albert
Gallatin, followed Morris’ example by having departments of the U.S., such as
the Surveyor General, regularly draw on the receivers for payment.
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Social pressure was only one reason for the publication of
tax receipts. According to Morris [February 12, 1782], it was
“proper and necessary that, in a free Country the People should
be as fully informed of the Administration of their Affairs as the
Nature of things will admit.” This was Morris’ view on govern-
ment accountability, and the beginning of his policy on finan-
cial disclosures that would lead him to disclose comprehensive
statements of accounts. These accounts, along with the subsid-
iary statement of tax revenues received from the states, are
discussed next.
THE FINANCIER’S STATEMENTS OF
ACCOUNTS OF THE U.S.
Morris was persistent in his efforts to open a stream of
permanent revenues from the states. It was his view that the
injustice suffered by unpaid creditors of the government was
morally wrong. It was the states’ duty “to comply with the Req-
uisitions of their Sovereign Representative” [Morris Papers, May
9, 1782]. Morris constantly harassed governors of the states and
the President of Congress for revenues to pay for the war and
meet outstanding interest. He initiated the practice of preparing
annual operating statements of revenues and expenses as part
of his efforts to persuade.
His first operating statement covered the period from the
day of his appointment on May 14, 1781 to December 31,
1781.9  It was a partial-year statement because he did not want
to include Treasury transactions from the previous administra-
tion. When Morris accepted the position as financier, he noted
“ . . . the adjustment of all past transactions and of all that re-
lates to the present system may be compleated by the Modes
already adopted” [Morris Papers, May 14, 1781]. While he was
mostly referring to liquidation of the public debt, he did not
want to be held accountable for transactions adopted before he
took office. The 1781 statement was for a partial year and did
not encompass the complete spectrum of transactions. It is
omitted here in favor of his statement for 1782. Most notably,
the statement for 1781 did not include any tax revenues from
9This first operating statement in the handwriting of Joseph Nourse is
titled A General View of Receipts and Expenditures of Public Monies, by Author-
ity from the Superintendent of Finance, from the Time of his Entering on the
Administration of the Finances, to the 31st December, 1781 [P.C.C., Roll 155,
Item 142, Vol. II, pp. 23-24].
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the states as there was no collecting going on when he took
office. However, the format as well as the principles upon
which these statements worked are substantially the same.
Morris’ operating statement for 1782, entitled A State of the
Receipts and Expenditures of Public Monies upon Warrants from
the Superintendent of Finance, from the 1st of January 1782, to
the 1st of January 1783, is reproduced in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 is
divided into two pages, with the receipts in part A and the
expenditures in part B.10  The first item in part A represents the
fund balance of receipts over expenditures from the prior year
in the amount of $292,453.69.11
The third item is the taxes that were paid into the Treasury
by the Continental receivers. These taxes, totalling $302,734.84,
are from the $8,000,000 requisition of November 2, 1781. The
subsidiary account for these tax receipts is presented in Exhibit
2. This account has both a debit and a credit side. On the credit
side appears a breakdown by state of the taxes paid to the
Treasurer, Michael Hillegas.12  Of the 13 states, seven had remit-
ted taxes to the Treasury, with Pennsylvania being the largest
contributor. Note that while the amount paid into the Treasury
was $302,734.84, the amount actually collected by the receivers
was $422,161.63. The difference represents the amounts still in
the receivers hands and due to the Treasury. A breakdown of
the amounts payable by each receiver is provided directly un-
derneath the first schedule. One state, New York, had two re-
ceivers (Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Tillotson). Some of
the states, such as Massachusetts and Virginia, had fairly large
sums not yet remitted to the Treasury. Both schedules in Ex-
hibit 2 make reference to account numbers for each state. The
account referred to as No. 6 for the State of New Jersey is
provided in Exhibit 3. This schedule shows all the separate re-
mittances from the receiver for New Jersey to Treasurer
Michael Hillegas, as well as the balance due of $687.36.
10The original handwritten statement of Joseph Nourse has the receipts
and expenditures on the same page, with receipts on the left and expenditures
on the right [P.C.C., Roll 155, Item 142, Vol. II, pp. 121-122]. In all other
respects the statements are the same.
11Note that at the time this statement was prepared in 1783, the conven-
tion of using dollars signs had not been adopted.
12In some cases there may be insignificant arithmetic errors in the totals
(i.e., $302,734.84 should be $302,734.64). The totals provided by the register
will be cited in the paper.
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Returning to Exhibit 1, after the tax receipts are bills
drawn on foreign banks, including bills in the neighborhood of
6,330,995 livres (equivalent to $1,080,447.77) on Ferdinand
Grande.13  Loans from France and Holland were typically depos-
ited in these foreign banks so Morris could draw on them, using
up their lines of credit in the process [Morris Papers, December
3, 1781]. Under sundry accounts are the proceeds from miscel-
laneous sources. For example, there is the sale of extra cannons
for $4,413.30 and the sale of flour and beef for $7,074.73 by
Levi Hollingsworth, a Philadelphia merchant and flour factor
[Morris Papers, February 25, 1782, May 6, 1782, June 1, 1782;
June 1, 1782 (letter from L. Hollingsworth)].
The largest sundry item was from the sale of goods for
$42,889.41 which arrived on board the ship Herr Adams on
September 10, 1781 [Morris Papers, September 11, 1782]. Also
aboard the Herr Adams was cloth for uniforms delivered to
John Moylan, the Clothier General of the Continental army
(third line from bottom). Both of these were procured in
Amsterdam by Colonel John Laurens and were financed by a
donation of six million livres from the French court [Morris
Papers, July 26, 1781, letter from B. Franklin]. Unfortunately,
Franklin and Comte de Vergennes, the French minister, had a
prior agreement that the goods would be purchased in Paris.
Indeed, many of the goods were manufactured in Britain and
could not be brought into the country. To salvage the whole
situation, Thomas Barclay, American counsel to France, ex-
changed the British material for the clothing which was then
shipped on Herr Adams and turned over to Moylan [Morris Pa-
pers, March 4, 1782, letter from B. Franklin].
The final revenue discussed here is the receipt of $20,560
from the discharge of German prisoners. During this time, it
was customary for countries at war to pay for the subsistence of
their soldiers held prisoner by the enemy. However, the British
refused to pay for the Hessians [Morris Papers, May 1, 1782].
Congress tried different strategies, including trying to enlist
them in the Continental army or having them work as inden-
tured servants (J.C.C. June 5, 1782, pp. 317-318). Few prisoners
wanted to fight for the American side, so they were allowed to
13Grand was a banker in Paris who had earlier conducted secret business
with the commissioners before the Franco-American alliance [Carstens and
Flesher, 1987].
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buy their freedom for $80 each if they swore an oath of alle-
giance to the U.S. [Morris Papers, July 11, 1782].
Morris classified the expenditures in part B of Exhibit 1
into 18 accounts.14  The majority of these accounts are for de-
partments of the military, such as the Quartermaster General’s
Department and Military and Ordnance Stores Department.
The number of transactions in these accounts are too numerous
to include here. An account that is more manageable, the Hos-
pital Department, is reproduced in Exhibit 4. Most of the trans-
actions involve the Purveyor General, Dr. Thomas Bond, who
handled the disbursements for supplies and salaries for the hos-
pitals. The specific entries in the expenditure accounts follow
the same format, beginning with the date of entry, which is
usually the same as the date the warrant was issued. The next
column references the blotter or wastebook, which were books
used to record the original entry or detail on account transac-
tions. The next two columns include the person to whom the
warrant was issued and a description of the transaction. This is
followed by an additional account reference and the amount of
the transaction.
For comparison, the Marine Department account is shown
in Exhibit 5. The purpose of the Marine Department was to
procure vessels and supplies for the Continental navy. The Ma-
rine Department was one of the five executive departments. As
such, the salaries of Marine Department employees, such as
Joseph Pennell, paymaster of the navy, are included in account
No. 13, “Civil List.” The Treasury was another one of the
executive departments, so the salaries of its officers and
clerks also appear under “Civil List.” Account No. 15, “Contin-
gencies,” contains several hundred transactions, mostly miscel-
laneous expenditures. For example, there is a payment of $70
for the purchase of firewood for Congress and $79.74 to rent
office space for the Treasury Department [P.C.C., Roll 155, Item
142, Vol. II, pp. 321-325]. The total expenditures listed in part B
for 1782 is $2,278,396.06, which is greater than the total re-
ceipts in part A by $404,713.09. This difference is a plugged
number at the bottom of part A and represents unfunded ex-
penditures.
14These 18 accounts are on microfilm in Papers of the Continental Congress
[P.C.C., Roll 155, Item 142, Vol. II].
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Morris prepared his statements of revenues and expendi-
tures for several reasons. First, he wanted to use them to apply
pressure on the states to ante up and fill their tax quotas. Mor-
ris had 500 copies of his statements for 1781 and 1782 printed
[Morris Papers, November 25, 1782, April 3, 1783].15  The copies
were distributed to both the governors and receivers of the indi-
vidual states [Morris Papers, April 7, 1783]. Morris also circu-
lated the account of taxes received and paid to the Treasury
(Exhibit 3) so each state would know how much the others had
paid. Upon receipt of his statements, William Whipple [Morris
Papers, April 23, 1783], the receiver for New Hampshire, re-
sponded that at the next meeting of the legislature:
I shall then lay before that body the accounts You have
Published, and endeavour to draw their attention to
the situation of the Public debt — which I hope they
will now consider as an object of the first Magni-
tude . . .
Morris sent his statements to General Washington. He also sent
them to Benjamin Franklin in France, possibly to help secure
more foreign aid from the French [Morris Papers, January 11,
1783, April 7, 1783].
Preparing operating statements was also a response to the
oversight committees formed to investigate civil departments.
These committees were formed partly in response to the persis-
tent agitation of Arthur Lee. Lee, having been reelected to the
Continental Congress in December 28, 1781, continued his ef-
forts to discredit Morris [Potts, 1981, p. 253]. Lee distrusted all
mercantile men from Philadelphia, and he viewed Morris’
power as financier a threat to the “liberties of the country”
[Potts, 1981, p. 260]. The settlement of Lee’s account from his
service as commissioner to France was also a source of friction
between Lee and Morris. Lee’s account had been settled under
the old Treasury, and he had the misfortune of being paid with
a loan-office certificate. Loan-office certificates were not being
redeemed at that time because of a lack of funds [Morris Papers,
October 7, 1782, letter from J. Nourse; Morris Papers, October
9, 1782]. Morris refused to make payment on Lee’s certificate
until funds had been provided for the “general Mass of Loan
Office Certificates.” Lee complained to Morris that all the other
15The printed versions of these statements can be found in P.C.C., Roll 150,
Item 137, Vol. III, p. 319 (1782 statement) and p. 337 (1783 statement).
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foreign ministers had been paid in money certificates (bills of
exchange), and it was therefore Morris’ duty to correct this
“Manifest injustice” by redeeming his certificate for cash [Mor-
ris Papers, November 2, 1782, letter from A. Lee]. The situation
was not resolved until Congress passed an act permitting the
exchange of Lee’s certificate of $9,850.55 for £2,238.17.9
[J.C.C., Vol. XXII, November 18, 1782, pp. 727-728].
On June 17, 1782, following a motion by James Madison,
Congress resolved that committees should be formed to exam-
ine the proceedings of the Department of Finance as well as the
other civil departments.16  The first such committee, appointed
on July 2, included James Duane, Samuel Osgood, Abraham
Clark, Arthur Lee, and Thomas McKean [J.C.C., Vol. XXII, July
2, 1782, p. 370]. This committee met on an irregular basis and
changed members several times [J.C.C., Vol. XXIII, November
21, 1782, p. 748]. It does not appear to have accomplished
much although Lee used every opportunity to badger the finan-
cier about Treasury affairs.17  On January 6, 1783, a new com-
mittee headed by Nathaniel Gorman was selected to investigate
the Department of Finance [J.C.C., Vol. XXIV, January 6, 1783,
p. 37]. After a six-month investigation which included an ex-
amination of the Superintendent’s accounts of 1781 and 1782,
the committee issued a report to Congress on June 17, 1783
[J.C.C., Vol. XXIV, June 17, 1783, pp. 396-399]. The report
spoke favorably about the success of Morris’ administrative re-
forms, including the “order and economy which has been intro-
duced” into the Treasury and the “great savings of public
money.” In the report [p. 397] it was noted:
In the course of this enquiry, the committee have
found that since the appointment of the Super-
intendant of finance, the public accounts of receipts
and expenditures have been regularly kept; that many
of the accounts which preceded this institution have
already been settled, and most of the others put on a
train of adjustment.
16The other departments under review were the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the Department of War, the Department of Marine, and the Post Office
[J.C.C., Vol. XXII, June 17, 1782, p. 334].
17Morris had the following entry in his diary on August 20, 1782: “The
Hon: Arthur Lee Esqr. came this morning as a member of a Committee of
Enquiry, staid one hour and no other Member of that Committee appearing he
then retired and I complained of loosing my time so uselessly” [Morris Papers,
August 20, 1782].
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The report was clearly supportive of Morris and served to si-
lence some of his critics. Thus, his statements of receipts and
expenditures, while consistent with his notions of government
accountability and instrumental in his tax-raising plans, served
other purposes as well.
FRAMING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
After Morris’ statements for 1781 and 1782, he prepared a
statement of receipts and expenditures covering the first six
months of 1783 (P.C.C., Roll 149, Item 137, pp. 635-636). But
by the end of 1783, Morris was already preparing for his depar-
ture from the Treasury. The war over, he was eager to return to
his mercantile concerns. Morris resigned his position as Super-
intendent of Finance in November 1784 [Ver Steeg, 1954, p.
187]. He prepared a final statement of receipts and expendi-
tures covering his complete administration which was submit-
ted to Congress on March 26, 1785 [Sumner, 1891, Vol. II, p.
208].
Congress then appointed a three-member Treasury Board
to supervise the nation’s finances. With Morris’ reporting
mechanism in place, the new Treasury Board continued the
practice of preparing statements of revenues and expenditures.
These statements were prepared on a quarterly basis and signed
by Joseph Nourse,18  who remained Register of the Treasury for
the duration of the Continental Congress.19
The significance of Morris’ statements well outlasted the
Continental Congress. In drafting the U.S. Constitution, a
clause was inserted requiring the preparation of operating
statements. Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 states:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Ex-
penditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time [Documentary History, p. 311].
18These quarterly statements prepared by Joseph Nourse are scattered
about in P.C.C., Roll 154, Vol. II. As an example, the statements for the first,
second, third, and fourth quarters of 1785 are on pages 49, 231, 283, and 57
respectively.
19After the Continental Congress was disbanded, Nourse was reappointed
as Register of the U.S. Treasury by President Washington. He served in this
same position until 1829 [Appleton’s Cyclopaedia of American Biography, 1887-
1888, Vol. IV, p. 541].
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Among the framers of this reporting requirement were James
Madison and Gouverneur Morris, both of whom had been
schooled by Morris on the relation between taxation and fed-
eral reporting [Prescott, 1968, p. 734]. Under the Articles of
Confederation, there was no such reporting requirement.
An appropriate question is, why did the framers require
statements from “time to time,” when Morris had published the
statements annually? The debates surrounding the 1787 Con-
vention shed light on this question.20  Madison thought that
one-year time intervals were too short for accurate and mean-
ingful financial statements. In the Virginia debates, he rea-
soned:
Because if the accounts of the public receipts and ex-
penditures were to be published at short, stated peri-
ods, they would not be so full and connected as would
be necessary for a thorough comprehension of them,
and detection of any errors. But by giving them an
opportunity of publishing them from time to time . . .
they might be more full and satisfactory to the public,
and would be sufficiently frequent [Elliot, 1863, Vol.
III, p. 460].
Madison additionally thought that this provision went farther
than the constitution of any state in the union, or perhaps in
the world.
George Mason, also from Virginia, felt that the public had
the right to know about the expenditures of its money, but was
worried about potential damage to national interests. Mason
argued, “In matters relative to military operations and foreign
negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes” [Elliot, 1863,
Vol. III, p. 459]. He concluded that, although from “time to
time” was an ambiguous expression, it allowed flexibility to
avoid conveying sensitive information in statements of receipts
and expenditures.
The New York contingent felt differently about this “time
to time” clause. In its convention, a delegate from Duchess
County, Melancton Smith, noted that “from ‘time to time’ might
mean from century to century, or any period of twenty or thirty
years” [Elliot, 1863, Vol. II, p. 347]. The problems caused by
20Robert Morris was a delegate from the State of Pennsylvania to the fed-
eral convention, but he did not play an active role in the proceedings or draft-
ing the Constitution [Farrand, 1913, p. 206].
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some of the Antifederalists in New York and other states in
adopting the Constitution is well known. New York grudgingly
ratified the Constitution by a vote of 30 to 27 and submitted a
list of 32 subsequent amendments. One of these proposed
amendments related to the statements of receipts and expendi-
tures. It read:
Provided, That the words from time to time shall be
construed, as that the receipts and expenditures of
public money shall be published at least once in every
year, and be transmitted to the executives of the several
states, to be laid before the legislatures thereof [Elliot,
1863, Vol. II, p. 407].
In Fall 1788, the first federal Congress met in New York
City. In addition to setting up the new government, it had to
deal with the constitutional amendments proposed by the indi-
vidual states during ratification. Most of these amendments
concerned states’ rights and individual liberties. The debates in
the House and Senate culminated in December 1791 when the
states ratified ten amendments to the Constitution, comprising
the Bill of Rights [Patrick, 1995, p. 247]. But New York’s pro-
posal on the publication of receipts and expenditures was not
among those amendments adopted.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study involving Robert Morris and matters concerning
finances of the Revolutionary War has several limitations. First,
this paper looks at Morris’ contributions in the area of account-
ing with primary emphasis on his operating statements. His
many other contributions during his term as financier, such as
the establishment of the Bank of North America, the creation of
the Morris notes, and his plans for a mint generally fall within
the realm of finance and have been examined elsewhere
[Sumner, 1891; Ver Steeg, 1954]. Also, the various books and
journals used internally by the Treasury to record, classify, and
summarize transactions are not examined. This system, which
utilized “wastebooks” and “blotters,” was largely in place before
Morris took office. This study has focused on the accounting
innovations of Robert Morris, mainly his statements of receipts
and expenditures and the subsidiary accounts that comprised
these statements.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the accounting practices estab-
lished by Robert Morris during his term as Superintendent of
Finance under the Continental Congress from 1781 to 1784.
Although known mostly by his reputation as a merchant and as
financier of the American Revolution, Morris enacted many im-
portant administrative reforms. Among them were his plans for
the settlement of accounts and the establishment of Continental
receivers to collect money from the states. He initiated the
preparation of annual statements of receipts and expenditures
of funds for the Confederation government. These financial
statements, including a statement of taxes received from the
states, were printed and circulated. Morris believed circulation
was required for public accountability and for pressuring states
to meet their tax quotas. An additional outcome of the circu-
lated statements was to silence some of his outspoken critics in
Congress, most notably his nemesis Arthur Lee of Virginia.
Morris supervised the department for just over three years,
but his establishment of reporting practices at the Treasury was
a lasting contribution. The Treasury Board that succeeded Mor-
ris continued his reporting practices, and when the U.S. Consti-
tution was drafted in 1787, a clause was inserted in Section 9 of
Article 1 requiring a regular statement of receipts and expendi-
tures of public money to be published from time to time [Docu-
mentary History, p. 311]. His contribution was indeed lasting!
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PRACTICES
Abstract: Using an environmental contingency approach, Johnson
and Kaplan [1987] argued that virtually all management accounting
practices used at the time of their study had been developed by 1925
in response to increased uncertainty caused by geographical expan-
sion and large-scale operations. During the 1821 to 1860 subperiod,
the Hudson’s Bay Company had significant uncertainty which was
largely a result of the dynamic environment of its fur-trade opera-
tion. Consequently, it should have developed management account-
ing practices in response to uncertainty. Moreover, the management
accounting practices should have been less extensive in the
subperiods before and after 1821 to 1860, as these subperiods had
less uncertainty. The Company’s accounting and related records
were examined for 1670 to 1914, and provided evidence to support
the contention of Johnson and Kaplan that management accounting
practices evolved positively with uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 12] argued that by 1925
virtually all management accounting practices used at the time
of their study had been developed. Those practices had evolved
in the 19th and early 20th centuries to serve the information
and control needs of manufacturing and retail managers facing
a higher level of uncertainty caused by increasingly complex
and geographically dispersed operations. Complexity, Johnson
and Kaplan argued, had increased as these organizations grew
in size to capture economies of scale available with new tech-
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nologies and expansion from single to multiple activity opera-
tions.
The Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 62] argument was prem-
ised on the environmental contingency approach; management
accounting practices develop in response to the uncertainty.
Accordingly, the fur-trading operation of the historical, Lon-
don-based Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) should have de-
veloped management accounting practices for information and
control purposes as it faced substantial uncertainty while trad-
ing for furs in the frontiers of North America. Uncertainty was
greatest, it will be shown, from 1821 to 1860, but less in the
earlier (1670 to 1774) and later (1880 to 1914) subperiods.
Drawing upon the contingency approach as did Johnson and
Kaplan [1987], it is expected that given the extensive uncer-
tainty, the HBC’s management accounting practices would have
been the most developed for the 1821 to 1860 subperiod. Conse-
quently, as there was less uncertainty for 1670 to 1774 and for
1880 to 1914, management accounting would have been less
developed during those subperiods.
As for the organization of the paper, the next section briefly
describes the setting for the study. The subsequent section re-
views in more detail the HBC’s uncertainty. Then, the HBC’s
specific management accounting practices are described for
each subperiod. The penultimate section discusses the associa-
tion between uncertainty and management accounting prac-
tices. The final section contains some concluding comments
about the different ways management accounting practices
were used.
THE SETTING
The HBC is the world’s oldest commercial entity that con-
tinues its original line of business [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992,
p. 9]. Economists have judged the fur-trading HBC to have been
one of the few companies in the world to have earned an eco-
nomic rent, or, in other words, to have been uniquely successful
[Schoemaker, 1990, p. 1180]. The HBC is also unique in that
from 1670 to 1914, accounting and related documents have
been preserved and made accessible to researchers through the
Hudson’s Bay Company archives (HBCA).1  Because of the es-
1The HBCA are located at the Manitoba Archives in Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada. The archives cover the entire company history except for the last 30
years, which are still confidential. Researchers access the 1670 to (approxi-
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tablished business practices that prevailed during the study pe-
riod, a large part of the instructions between superiors and
subordinates was carefully recorded in letters. In addition, trad-
ers and other officers were required by the Committee (or, as it
was called in the latter part of the 19th century, the Board of
Directors) to maintain narrative journals of their daily business
activities, thereby adding to the archive’s richness.
In 1670, the HBC was incorporated by a royal charter from
England’s King Charles II to Prince Rupert and his 17 fellow
adventurers. The charter provided a monopoly on trade and
commerce for Rupert’s Land, consisting of the lands whose riv-
ers and streams drain into the Hudson Bay. The HBC soon
established posts (e.g.; Albany, Moose, and York) at the mouths
of rivers flowing into the Hudson Bay. This pattern was known
as a “factory system,” meaning that the HBC had opted for the
trading methods used by other English merchants in Africa and
Asia [Ray and Freeman, 1978, p. 30]. With this system the bulk
of the trade was conducted at coastal establishments rather
than from aboard ships. For the first hundred years, the ap-
proach to fur acquisition was to wait for the aborigines at the
bayside posts and then to convince them to return annually.
Early competition came from the French colony in Canada
known as New France. Confrontation was often violent as the
HBC posts were being captured by the French colonists. In
1713, the Treaty of Utrecht confirmed the British possession of
the Hudson Bay. Without direct French competition, trade im-
proved and the HBC experienced profitability and even prosper-
ity, which was indicated by a constant succession of dividends
and by the accumulation of a substantial reserve of capital
[Rich, 1960a, p. 58]. Although excluded from the Bay, the
French of Montreal did not withdraw from the fur trade. In-
stead, they intercepted the aborigines inland, away from the
Bay and up the Moose and the Eastmain Rivers [Rich, 1960a, p.
503], shortening the aboriginal trade trips. After 1730, the
French competed from the southwest as La Verendrye and his
sons developed a series of posts to intercept the aborigines from
the west on their way to the Bay [Rich, 1960a, pp. 517-524].
These posts were supplied from Montreal via the Great Lakes.
mately) 1914 materials via microfilm which can be borrowed. These materials
are in relatively good condition; nearly everything can be read although some
materials take more reading time than others. Most post-1914 materials are
restricted in their use because they have not been catalogued and microfilmed.
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There were a number of reasons, in addition to decreased
competition, for improved performance during the 1713 to
1763 subperiod. The HBC captains were more skilled with navi-
gating the Atlantic Ocean and the Hudson Bay, and the HBC
Committee understood more about trading with the aborigines.
Although food and clothing were primarily received from Lon-
don and from aborigines through trade, some HBC employees
had become competent at hunting and fishing.
France lost its Canadian territories with the British con-
quest of Canada in 1763 [Rich, 1960a, p. 660]. This encouraged
“the rush of the English into Rupert’s Land” from the U.S. and
England [Rich, 1960b, p. 13]. These “peddlers” were able to
form partnerships with French Canadians and one another, and
to expand the trade to the south and west of the Bay to such an
extent that the HBC’s trade was dramatically harmed [Rich,
1960b, p. 18]. Increasingly fewer aboriginal furs reached the
bayside posts. In 1774, the HBC reacted by finally establishing
a post inland named Cumberland House. More inland posts
were set up in subsequent years.
By 1783, a group of Montreal traders formed the North
West Company (NWC) to reduce costs and competition among
themselves, and to compete more effectively with the HBC
[Rich, 1960b, p. 119]. The NWC was reorganized in 1787 to
include the entire resources of the Montreal traders [Rich,
1960b, p. 122]. The organization of the NWC and the expansion
of the HBC inland led to intensified competition between the
two companies. By 1816, their competition further intensified
with the depletion of beaver in many areas; they competed
head-to-head farther west, into present-day Saskatchewan and
Alberta, and later still farther west and north.
Major changes resulted from the move inland. There was a
longer lag, now a minimum of two or three years as opposed to
one or two, from shipment of trade goods and supplies to the
eventual sale of furs in London. There was also the challenge of
“living off the land” as supplies were expensive to transport
inland. The HBC responded to the challenges by introducing in
1810 “a Radical Change in the System of Carrying on the
Trade” [HBCA, reels 6 and 39]. In effect, the Committee as-
signed more responsibility to senior managers for coordinating
operations. Creating two areas and appointing two superintend-
ents for managing them was recognition that more detailed
coordination was needed. Furthermore, the introduction of in-
centives for officers was also recognition of the need to comple-
ment existing management methods. Another attribute of the
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“retrenching system” of 1810 was a push by the Committee for
better information. This need led to a system of annual reports
being submitted by managers to superiors which required man-
agers who could write well and to understand, if not to keep,
accounts [Burley, 1993, p. 66].
The result of this transformation was more competition
and even hostility between the HBC and the NWC. Both compa-
nies were suffering seriously when, as a solution, they merged
in 1821, retaining the HBC name. Ultimate control remained in
London with a new group of owners, also called the Committee.
The Committee hired an inland governor, or governors2 , and
geographically divided the operations into departments, dis-
tricts, and posts. Generally, districts were managed by chief
factors, while posts within districts tended to be managed by
chief traders.
In 1870, the HBC gave up its right to Rupert’s Land to the
Canadian government in exchange for land and cash. The influx
of settlers was made easier by the modernization of communi-
cations and transportation. Steamboats, railways, and the tele-
graph replaced the HBC transportation network of crude boats.
At the same time, the settlers contributed to an infrastructure
that allowed the HBC to stop providing its employees with food
and clothing.
UNCERTAINTY OVER TIME
High uncertainty was defined by Duncan (1972, pp. 318-
321) as complexity in a dynamic environment. More specifi-
cally, he measured high uncertainty in terms of a large number
of parts3  that differ and which change in unpredictable ways.
This description parallelled the manufacturing and retail firms
discussed by Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 95]; those firms had
expanded in size and into additional businesses and products,
as well as geographically. The consequence was many more
2After the amalgamation of the HBC with the NWC in 1821, there were two
governors. George Simpson was the governor for the larger Northern Depart-
ment. However, he had at least some responsibility for all departments. In
1826, he became governor of the Southern Department and, therefore, head of
all departments. Nevertheless, it was not until 1839 that he was officially
awarded the grand title of governor-in-chief [Williams, 1973, p. xii].
3Duncan actually used the terms “factors and components.” As the word
“factor” is used in another way in this research, the synonym “part” is used
instead.
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parts which were increasingly different. Also, as the managers
of these firms did not fully understand them, the parts were
perceived to change for reasons not fully understood.
The HBC also experienced a high level of uncertainty.
Based in London, it operated a multifaceted, dispersed fur-trad-
ing business in North America. Although trading per se was not
particularly complicated, the same was not the case with the
long and difficult trip to bring trade goods to the aborigines
and then return to London with the furs. Furthermore, the
simple act of trading was complicated by there being neither a
monetary system nor an infrastructure. Consequently, the
HBC’s fur-trading operation had many different parts that were
not always predictable.
During the period 1670 to 1914, uncertainty was affected
by the HBC’s strategy and operating context. Of course, strategy
and context were interrelated; nevertheless, they each affected
the level of uncertainty. After the commencement of operations
in North America, there were two major turning points in re-
gard to uncertainty. The first occurred in 1774 when the HBC
pursued its new strategy of inland trade rather than continuing
from the handful of posts on the shore of the Bay. This change
in strategy increased uncertainty. However, uncertainty de-
creased with the second turning point, the modernization of
communications and transportation. These two turning points
divide the entire study period into three subperiods with re-
spect to uncertainty. Uncertainty was greatest from 1821 to
1860, compared to the prior (1670 to 1774) and subsequent
(1880 to 1914) periods. The demarcation between subperiods
recognizes that there were transitions which do not fit well with
the subperiod on either side. More specifically, although the
move inland occurred in a small way in 1774, it took until 1821
before changes were implemented in response to the new strat-
egy. Similarly, modernization started gradually in 1859, but the
momentum was not significant until the 1880s. The uncertainty
for each subperiod will now be discussed
1821 to 1860: Uncertainty increased after 1774 as the HBC ex-
panded inland from the Bay. Following the merger with the
NWC in 1821, the HBC traded over half a continent, from Lab-
rador on the Atlantic Ocean to Vancouver Island on the Pacific
Ocean, from the Canada-U.S. border on the south to Great
Slave Lake on the north, including parts of the present states of
Washington and Oregon. The mode of transportation among
the dispersed employees and posts (1,983 and 172 respectively
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in 1821) was the birch-bark canoe, and later crude (York) boats.
Uncertainty was increased by the time lag between the shipping
of the outfit of trade goods and supplies and the eventual re-
ceipt of monies from the sale of the furs. This lag might be two
or three years to account for the shipment from London to a
Canadian port, offloading, and freighting, often more than
1,000 miles by rivers and lakes, to inland posts. From there the
trade goods were exchanged for furs. A reverse trip was neces-
sary to transport the furs to market in Europe. At each stage
uncertainty could increase because of natural disasters, and at
each market there were variations with actual prices and costs.
In this context, uncertainty can be categorized to include
inland travel on rivers and lakes, trade conditions, and living off
the land. These categories of uncertainty relate to major group-
ings of parts or activities in the fur-trade operation. The uncer-
tainty relates to the nature of the HBC’s business which
changed over the study period. These discussions are summa-
rized in Exhibit 1.
Inland travel was particularly complicated. The ships from
London had to be unloaded; then the trade goods and supplies
either stored in warehouses or directly loaded into canoes or
boats for shipment to posts. The trips took weeks or months,
and for each day there were demanding tasks in order to ma-
neuver man-powered canoes and boats along rocky-bottomed
rivers and lakes. These trips often required portages or the car-
rying of the canoes, boats, and their contents around rapids or
waterfalls, or from one water system to another. Portages were
physically demanding on the men, but as the operations ex-
panded to 200 boats and 1,200 men [Glover, 1949, p. 19],
horses were used for the task. Roads were built at the portages
along with stations for maintaining the horses and men to expe-
dite portaging.
Predictability with inland travel was problematic for sev-
eral reasons. First, employee actions were unpredictable; i.e.,
behavior of the employees with canoes and boats could not be
observed. Efforts and diligence were unknown. Second, there
was environmental uncertainty from random events; i.e., the
arrival times at the various posts could not be predicted with so
many weather and environmental factors interfering with
schedules. Moreover, exact distances between posts were uncer-
tain. Third, there was the opportunistic behavior of employees;
i.e., the out-of-sight employees could misuse equipment, trade
goods, or supplies.
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EXHIBIT 1
Uncertainty at the HBC
Components of High Perceived Uncertainty
Subperiod Significant Parts Differences Predictability
1670-1774 Inland travel Not applicable Not applicable
Trade conditions Many Not predictable because
* no monetary of aboriginal languages,
 * system customs
* barter economy
Living off the land Not applicable Not applicable
* no infrastructure
* largely London
 * supplies
* little obtained
 * locally
1821-1860 Inland travel Many Not predictable because
* loading of natural dangers,
* daily trips weather, frontier
* portages conditions, and
 * (manpower, isolation
 * stations, horses)
* 200 boats
* 1200 voyagers
Trade conditions Many More unpredictable
* no monetary because of additional
 * system aboriginal languages,
* barter economy customs
Living off the land Many Very unpredictable
* no infrastructure because of variations
* few London in weather, migration
  * supplies patterns, and soil
* most supplies  fertility
 * obtained
 * locally
1880-1914 Inland travel Many fewer Predictable
* railroad
* steamboats
Trade conditions Fewer More predictable,
* monetary aborigines more
 * system exposed to European
* cash economy languages and customs
Living off the land Not applicable Not applicable
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Trade conditions had many different parameters because of
the lack of a monetary system. A large number of furs were
traded for an even larger number of European trade goods. As
there was a barter system, there were no market prices for furs
and trade goods. Predictability was further complicated by dis-
tance and the large number of different aboriginal groups who
differed in languages and customs. Moreover, the behaviors of
traders could not be observed to ensure they acted in the best
interests of the HBC.
Food and clothing could not be economically sent from
London because of high transportation costs, and there was no
infrastructure in North America to supply them. Consequently,
living off the land was necessary. Food and clothing had to be
supplied locally at hundreds of posts either by HBC employees
or through trade. Hunting, fishing, and farming were pursued.
There was transformation uncertainty as employee behavior
could not be observed. Weather was always crucial for these
primary activities; it varied significantly because of seasons and
according to geographical location. Furthermore, hunting and
fishing were precarious because of unpredictable migration
patterns. In addition, the short growing season and infertile
soil, especially at some northern posts, yielded poor and uncer-
tain crops.
1670 to 1774: Overall there was less uncertainty during this
earlier subperiod. One reason was that there was no inland
travel, with all its different and often unpredictable parts, be-
cause all trade was conducted at bayside posts. There was also
less uncertainty in regard to living off the land. Food and cloth-
ing were relatively inexpensive to ship when all posts were at
the bayside. To supplement and add variety to the European
food, a few crops were grown at some of the semi-Arctic
bayside posts. In addition, HBC employees fished and hunted,
and aborigines were hired to do the same.
However, the 1670 to 1774 subperiod demonstrated uncer-
tainty similar to the 1821 to 1860 subperiod in regard to trade
conditions. Trade was complicated by the lack of a monetary
system, in conjunction with aboriginal languages and customs,
multiple goods, and multiple fur varieties. One difference was
that there were fewer different aboriginal groups at the bayside
posts. North American aborigines had developed a system of
middlemen for transporting furs to bayside posts. The distant
aborigines who did the trapping would trade with others who
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would take the furs to the bayside posts or trade with still
others who made the trip [Innis, 1956, pp. 119-122].
1880 to 1914: This subperiod also had less uncertainty than
during 1821 to 1860. Uncertainty of inland travel was drasti-
cally reduced by the modernization of communications and
transportation. The first significant change came with the intro-
duction in 1859 of a steamboat on the Red River, which flows
from the U.S. into the present-day Canadian province of
Manitoba. This boat greatly increased the speed, reliability, and
volume of goods that could be delivered in a single trip. Steam-
boats were introduced on the Saskatchewan River in 1874,
making it the baseline for transportation in the region of the
present-day Canadian provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
and Alberta [Innis, 1956, p. 344].
In 1878, the American Northern Pacific Railway was ex-
tended to Winnipeg, in effect rendering steamboats obsolete on
the Red River [Barris, 1977, p. 41]. The transcontinental Cana-
dian Pacific Railway, however, had a much greater impact
when it linked the eastern and western extremities of Canada in
1885. Rail was not only cheaper than the York boats and steam-
boats, it was also faster and more reliable. Modernization sig-
nificantly reduced the HBC’s uncertainty with inland travel.
Uncertainty with trade conditions also declined signifi-
cantly during 1880 to 1914. With modernization, the barter sys-
tem was replaced with a cash economy complete with competi-
tive prices. The development of better communications made it
possible for traders to obtain the current market price of furs
offered for auction in London. In this respect the mail service
and the increasing circulation of newspapers were important,
but it was the introduction of the telegraph which revolution-
ized the information flow to the posts. Completed in 1887, the
telegraph broke the HBC’s monopoly on information [Ray,
1990, p. 66].
Less importance was placed on living off the land during
this subperiod. An infrastructure developed for providing food
and clothing [HBCA, reel 733, transcribed by Bowsfield, 1977,
p. 85]. Farmers were settling the prairies and producing grain
crops and other farm products. Small businesses that produced
an increasing variety of food and clothing products started in
the major urban centres of Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary,
Edmonton, and Winnipeg. The HBC did not have to be
self-sufficient any longer. In-house production was replaced,
allowing the HBC largely to withdraw from responsibilities for
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feeding and clothing employees. The earlier uncertainty with
these responsibilities was eliminated.
In summary, the 1670 to 1914 period exhibited three types
of uncertainty – inland travel on rivers and lakes, trade condi-
tions, and living off the land. Within the context of Duncan’s
[1972] definition, each uncertainty type was rated as high for
1821 to 1860. Lower uncertainty was assessed for all categories
of uncertainty for the 1880 to 1914 subperiod. However, for
1670 to 1774, trade conditions were judged to demonstrate high
uncertainty, while inland travel and living off the land were
deemed to have lower uncertainty. Consequently, there is evi-
dence supporting the contention that uncertainty was greater
for the HBC during 1821 to 1860 than in either the prior (1670
to 1774) or the subsequent (1880 to 1914) subperiod.
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
HBC’s management accounting practices for the three
subperiods were described in depth elsewhere (i.e., respectively,
Roy and Spraakman [1996], Spraakman and Davidson [1998],
Spraakman and Wilkie [1998]). Although the use of manage-
ment accounting practices varied among the three subperiods,
four management accounting techniques were used virtually
throughout the period from 1670 to 1914 — operating state-
ments, budgets (i.e., outfits and indents), inventory records,
and standards. These methods will be described below, but note
that each technique is comparable to contemporary practice.
During the 1670 to 1914 study period, each functioned as a
component of various management accounting systems.
OPERATING STATEMENTS
1821 to 1860: The purpose of the accounting records in the
1821 to 1860 subperiod was set out in an 1843 memorandum
by the HBC’s London-based accountant, Edward Roberts
[HBCA, reel 508]. “Directions for Keeping Accounts” described
the purpose of the “country accounts” as furnishing the cost of
the furs from each district. These costs, in conjunction with
recent fur prices provided by the Committee, allowed for the
calculation of profit for each district. Subsequently, the district
results were combined into department totals. This memoran-
dum stated that profitability indicated the “merit” of managers.
As revenues in the country accounts were calculated using past
prices, actual profits calculated by the London office had to
await the sale of furs at public auctions, typically six months to
54
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/12
Accounting Historians Journal, December 199946
two or more years after the end of the outfit year [e.g., HBCA,
reel 480].
The country accounts were prepared with debits and cred-
its on the basis of an outfit, the annual shipment of trade goods
and supplies for the trade expedition with the aborigines, rather
than for a set calendar period. What was called a balance sheet
was merely a means of closing the district books at the end of
the outfit. The balancing figure was the profit (or loss). Exhibit
2 contains an example of the balance sheet for the Severn Dis-
trict [HBCA, reel 1M590]. The same format was used for de-
partments [e.g., HBCA, reel 1M690] and irregularly for posts
[e.g., HBCA, reel 1M567]. Each line, except the balancing
(profit) line, was the summary of one or more books or records,
which will be described subsequently.
EXHIBIT 2
Severn District Balance Sheet, Outfit 18234
(Left side) Pounds Shillings Pence
To inventory 1st June 1713 16 8
To received from York Factory 886 13 9
To servant wages 391 — —
To balance 1711   3  10
4702 14 3
(Right side)
By supplies to York Factory 24 9 10
By servants book debts in the
district 215 19 6
By advances to servants not
residing in the district 50  19 4
By inventory in the district 570  7 1
By inventory at Skallop Creek 591 9 2
By returns of furs 3249   9   4
4702 14 3
Source: HBCA [reel 1M590].
The debit entry, “inventory 1st June,” was the beginning
inventory of trade goods and supplies. This count was done
after the winter trapping and trading season at about the time
the furs were being transported to York Factory or Montreal for
shipment to London. Items for each category of trade goods
and supplies were physically counted and then valued at cost
plus a percentage markup for transportation and storage
[HBCA, reel 1M567].
4Note: 12 pence were equal to 1 shilling, and 20 shillings were equal to 1
pound.
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The 1832-1833 “Store Balance Book” was an example of the
Northern Department’s meticulous inventory records [HBCA,
reel 1M846]. In brief, over 56 double pages, there was a com-
plete reconciliation of beginning inventory, importation of
trade goods and supplies (i.e., the current year outfit), distribu-
tion, and ending inventory. Furthermore, the store balance
book reconciled the stock of supplies held in the districts and
depots of the department with the distribution of supplies for
each outfit.
The next debit item in Exhibit 2, “received from York Fac-
tory,” was the district’s cost of the trade goods and supplies
received in the current outfit year from London via York Fac-
tory or Montreal. The HBC controlled the movement of trade
goods and supplies with invoices. There were the “Invoice
Books of Shipments” to record what was shipped from London.
Each package was numbered and the contents recorded with
the value [HBCA, reel 367]. Invoices were also employed with
the subsequent shipment of trade goods and supplies from
ports, such as York Factory, to districts and posts. These in-
voices were recorded in “Charges to Districts, Account of the
Charges, Affixed to Outfit Invoices” [HBCA, reel 1M688].
Shipped items were listed with quantities, unit prices, and cost
per item. Packing sheets were used as aids to ensure that all
items were included [HBCA, reel 1M689]. “Bills of Lading”
were also used for checking the contents of canoes and boats
[HBCA, reel 1M690] as they recorded items of trade goods and
supplies, their destination, and the person responsible for them.
Check marks beside the listed items imply a verification system
for ensuring the items were loaded. A standard (percentage)
advance was added to the cost of each item to compensate for
the actual transportation and storage costs [HBCA, reel 195].
Another debit in Exhibit 2 was the wages paid to employees
or servants. This cost was supported by various supplementary
documents. First, there was a contract between the employee
and the HBC, which specified obligations for both parties. Sec-
ond, cash payments to employees were recorded in a depart-
mental journal called “Servants Bills,” and additional headings
“Cash Advances in Montreal” and “Cash Advances in London”
were used to record advances when employees were at those
locations [HBCA, reel 1M689]. A review of those documents
found a system of check marks that implied a later transfer to
other documents. There was also the use of debits and credits
to transfer advances when the recipient was transferred to an-
other district. Third, employee payments were reconciled with
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the document, “York Employee Balances” [HBCA, reel 1M687].
The 1823 edition contained a list of employees, recorded
charges (debits) and wages (credits), and a reconciliation.
Fourth, to keep track of employees, there was also an “Engage-
ment Register” [HBCA, reel 1M853] which sequentially num-
bered and listed employees in alphabetical order. It included
the following employee specifics – name, age, parish, capacity,
where engaged, date, term, years engaged for service, date con-
tract expires, deserted, dead or home date, wages, and amount
of extra services.
The last debit item in Exhibit 2 was the balance. This was
the profit (if a debit) or loss (if a credit, which would be shown
on the right side). It was a calculated number equal to the total
of the credits less the debits. In effect, the balance equalled the
estimated sales value of the furs less the cost of trade goods,
supplies, and employees.
The credit item in Exhibit 2, “inventory in the district,” was
the ending inventory. For each district, it was the summation of
the actual inventories at all posts. For the example in Exhibit 2,
the ”inventory at Skallop Creek” was shown separately, prob-
ably because of the large amount at that location. As an offset
to wage payments, the credit entry for “servants’ book debts”
was equal to all sales to employees during the outfit year. Two
documents were used to accumulate these debts. One was “Ac-
counts of Sales to Servants, In the General Shope York Factory
Summer” [HBCA, reel 1M688]. The 1822 edition was typical in
recording the charges to employees from York Factory and
other districts/posts. There were no totals, and the check marks
implied that the charges were transferred to other accounts.
The second was the “Register of York Factory and its Depen-
dencies” [HBCA, reel 1M688]. It listed employees and spanned
more than a single year. For each employee there was an item-
ization of goods received with notation of where, post or dis-
trict, received [e.g., HBCA, reel 1M688].
Exhibit 2 also shows credit entries for “supplies to York
Factory” and “advances to servants not residing in the district.”
These were the means of reflecting that the costs of inventories
and employees were reduced because, respectively, of the part
returned or the employees who were working elsewhere. The
last credit item in Exhibit 2, “returns of furs,” equalled the
value of furs received by the district in exchange for trade
goods. As revenue, it was also equal to the number of furs by
type multiplied by the unit prices, which were based on the
previously mentioned recent fur prices supplied by the Commit-
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tee. The calculation of total revenue was supplemented by post
documentation. Each post maintained a “Debt book” [e.g.,
HBCA, reel 1M689], which listed each aboriginal trapper, the
goods he received, and furs supplied. The quantities, unit cost,
and cost of items received of a trade good were also recorded.
Amounts were subtracted for the value of furs that the ab-
origine provided the company. Subtotals were prepared for
each page, carried forward, and totaled. Furthermore, the “Fur
Returns” schedule kept track of furs by type by district. The
schedule for the outfit year ending June 1, 1844 showed 40
categories of fur against 13 districts [HBCA, reel 1M813].
1670 to 1774: In this earlier subperiod, the HBC had a detailed
system for post accounting which recorded entries to all ledger
accounts in terms of a prime beaver pelt called a “made bea-
ver.” The values of trading goods, supplies, and furs were con-
vertible into made beaver. In addition to ledger accounts and
other documents for tracking the flow of trading goods and
supplies, there was a made-beaver-denominated “balance
sheet,” which in effect was also a profit and loss statement
similar to that in Exhibit 2. On one of the two sides of the
balance sheet, there were beginning inventories of trade goods
and supplies, trade goods and supplies received, cost of employ-
ees, and profit if one existed. On the other side, there were the
ending inventories, value of sales, and the loss if one existed.
The made-beaver approach to accounting, described by Ray
and Freeman [1978], was in effect at least from 1692 [e.g.,
HBCA, reel 1M406]. It worked well in determining the relative
profits of posts when a monetary system did not exist and when
all posts had nearly the same transportation costs, as they were
all located on the coast of the Bay. The financial crisis in the
early 1800s forced the HBC to abandon its rigid made-beaver
accounting system in favor of a system that incorporated varia-
tions in transportation costs caused by different distances from
the Hudson Bay.
The 1810 reorganization placed more importance on ac-
counting records. First, they were to be denominated in pounds
sterling, rather than the more than the century-old made-beaver
practice. Second, accountants were appointed with responsi-
bilities that included preparing accurate accounts, correctly re-
cording inventory of goods on hand at the end of the year at the
factory and at each trading house within the limits of the fac-
tory, and correctly recording debts due by aborigines and em-
ployees.
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1880 to 1914: The 1821-1860 approach to accounting was con-
tinued with the only significant change being the use of pre-
printed forms, despite an influx of settlers which induced the
HBC to expand into sales shops to serve the retail market. The
1887 balance sheets (i.e., operating statements) and related
documents were being prepared for posts, districts, and depart-
ments on 31 pre-printed forms, many of which included more
than one page [HBCA, reel 3M224]. Improved communications
and transportation had led the HBC to demand some monthly
reports from posts and sales shops.
Then, in 1889, the HBC’s auditor made suggestions for im-
proving financial reporting. This forward move was prompted
by the increasing role played by cash in the purchase of furs
from trappers and in the purchase of trade goods and supplies
from North American suppliers. The auditor believed that the
wide variety of items included in inventory led to inaccurate
information; e.g., “[a] large increase of payments might indicate
a new policy of purchasing supplies elsewhere than in England,
or might mean that a greater portion of the furs shipped had
been purchased for cash” [HBCA, reel 508]. His contention was
supported by item 70 of the HBC’s 1887 “Rules and Regula-
tions,” which listed the inventory subcategories to include such
heterogeneous assets as trading goods, supplies, country-made
articles, country articles, livestock, outstanding balances, build-
ings and land, and ships and steamers [HBCA, reel 3M224].
The auditor’s recommendations led to the division of the
inventory account into cash, goods held for barter, furs and
country produce, livestock, ships and steamboats, and other
assets. The purpose was to differentiate between the amount of
assets and liabilities for current accounts, for barter, and for
other purposes [HBCA, reel 508].
In 1891, Commissioner Chipman proposed that the Board
of Directors change the accounting from outfits to fiscal years
[HBCA, reel 508]. This suggestion was accepted and had a sub-
stantial impact on reporting [HBCA, reel 3M230]. With outfit
years, the books were not being closed until after the sale of
furs in London, which was one year or more after the calendar
end of the outfit. This time lag also meant that the accounting
reports for districts had to be completed at the London office,
which, therefore, had to maintain and complete those financial
records. The resulting accounting system was complicated, ex-
pensive, and late in providing information for effective decision
making.
Using a fiscal year meant that the books could be closed in
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Canada. There was no need to wait for the furs to be sold.
Unsold furs were merely valued as inventory. When sold, the
revenue would accrue to the respective post or district in the
year they were actually sold. No district or post accounting
reports needed to be prepared at the London office, which was
than able to simplify its accounting processes by keeping only
one continuous account with the fur trade. Winnipeg became
the accounting office for all fur posts and sales shops. Exhibit 3
shows the pre-printed format for the 1910-1911 operating state-
ment, now called the trading account instead of a balance sheet
[HBCA, reel 3M280].
EXHIBIT 3
 Trading Account
Trading Account _________District Outfit 1910, Form No. 20
To inventory of goods
To goods from depot and mills
To goods and country produce purchased
To goods from other posts, etc.
To freight on goods
To interest on goods ________
By supplies or expense accounts
By supplies or servant accounts
By supplies to other posts, etc.
By inventory of goods ________
Net cost of goods sold
By cash sales
By credit sales
By bartered for furs, country produce _________
Gross profit (Per cent. Of C.L.)
Add Gain on: live stock, bad debts recovered,
fur purchased, Indian debts recovered _________
Less Expenses as per Form No. 14
Repairs and improvements (annual depreciation)
Loss on articles at fixed prices (goods depreciation)
Loss on: bad, doubtful debts, Indian debts _________
Apparent gain
__________________
Furs purchased
Cash
Freight, insurance, packing, etc.
Bartered for goods
Credit Indian
Credit Customer _________
Cost
Tariff valuation _________
Gain exclusive of profit on goods bartered
__________________
Source: HBCA [reel 3M348]
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BUDGETS AND INVENTORY RECORDS
1821 to 1860: There was, as noted, a long time lag and many
separate activities between the shipment of trade goods and
supplies from London and the eventual sale of the furs. The
coordination of the various activities or parts was necessary for
profitability, and the HBC had a detailed budgeting system for
coordination. The word “budget” was not used by the HBC,
instead they had the “indent,” which was comparable to a bud-
get. Simpson, HBC governor for the entire 1821 to 1860
subperiod, expressed his thoughts on indents during his first
winter (1820-1821) in North America with the pre-merger HBC.
He had been placed in charge of what was then called the
Athabasca Department, consisting of five districts. Two of the
districts were small and emerging (McKenzie River and New
Caledonia), while the other three (Peace River, Athabasca Lake,
and Great Slave Lake) were more developed with each consist-
ing of four separate trading posts.
Simpson specified the trading goods, supplies, and comple-
ment of employees [Rich, 1938, pp. 141-169]. This indent con-
tained nearly 500 different items that were tentatively requested
in various quantities, allocated to the five districts, and further
allocated within three of those districts to 12 posts. Trading
goods were listed in alphabetical order from “augers” to “worm
gun” and “worsted, assorted colours.” (Actually, the last entry
was “plough shear” which seems to have been overlooked and
then entered at the end.) He also specified 16 food items, from
butter to tea, although the managers and employees were ex-
pected to obtain the majority of their food supplies themselves
or through trade. Ten different supply items for canoes were
specified, as were seven leather and fur items for posts to make
their own clothing. The employee complement was specified at
three levels — clerks, interpreters, and men.
The physical count of inventories was the starting point for
an indent.5  From inventory records, the clerks prepared a
“scheme distribution;” i.e., a planned distribution of trade
goods and supplies to posts from existing inventories for the
current year and the next to meet expected trade. When the
outfit for the current year arrived, a “scheme indent” was devel-
oped specifying the expected post needs for the next two years.
5This discussion on the development of the various indents from the inven-
tory records was summarized from May [1987, pp. 47-68].
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Subsequently, the “master indent” was prepared as the basis for
the importation of trade goods and supplies for the next two
years. The master indent was specific in terms of items and size
(small, large, etc.), quantities, supplier/vendor, and cost. For
example, the 1825 York Factory (i.e., Northern Department)
indent specified 600 three-point blankets at a cost of 15 shil-
lings each for a total cost of £450 [HBCA, reel 374]. The post
indents were compiled into district indents, which were accu-
mulated into department indents.
The 1831-1832 “Scheme Distribution and Invoice Book” for
York Factory was a vivid example of the care that went into
inventory planning and distribution. Its purpose was to allocate
trading goods and supplies to districts and shops. The total of
that distributed equalled that available. The following catego-
ries were specifically placed along the horizontal of this docu-
ment: beginning inventory, importation of trading goods and
supplies, a list of the various districts, general shop (employees’
residence), officers shop, contingency, and total [HBCA, reel
1M835]. Along the vertical, trading goods and supplies were
listed in alphabetical order, comparable to the “Store Balance
Book.”
1670 to 1774: The first two indents were merely lists of articles
based on the past experience of Groseilliers and Radisson in
trading for furs with the aborigines in New France. For the
1672 outfit, the Committee again depended on Groseilliers and
Radisson, along with the help of Gillam, the captain on an
earlier voyage, and Bayly, an early bayside trader [Rich, 1960a,
p. 70]. These indents recognized that careful consideration was
important because what was shipped had to be appropriate as
replacements and took at least a full year [Rich, 1960a, p. 153].
The Committee began early to prepare a “Sheame of what
goods are necessary to buy against the next Shipping.” At their
meeting in 1681, a subcommittee was appointed to determine
the:
. . . quantity of the Several Species of Goods and other
Provisions that are to be furnished for the next
Expedicion and accordingly to bespeake and agree for
them and Mr. Stone is to present to them a paper of all
things that were Sent the last Voyage for their guide
and direction [transcribed by Rich, 1945, p. 109].
In this way, the Committee became capable of reconciling
shipments with inventories and trade [Rich, 1960a, p. 156]. For
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example, a 1684 letter to bayside trader Sergeant from the
Committee demonstrates its increased sophistication with re-
spect to trade and implies that indents were being prepared by
bayside traders [transcribed by Rich, 1948, p. 122]. The Com-
mittee says, “(t)he Invoice of Goods you say is wanting in the
Countrey we Judge is very Extravagant for your Advicer has
done it without consideration as in some things we will touch
upon to make you sensible of the rest.” It goes on to say, with
an example of short guns, that with existing inventory there will
be enough guns for more than two and a half years of sales at
the quantity sold in a year if the full amount of the request is
shipped, and that two years of inventory is the maximum that
will be tolerated. In addition, by 1703, the Committee was ask-
ing for two-year indents. There was resistance, as seen in the
letter from John Fullartine at Albany to the Committee [tran-
scribed by Davies, 1965, p. 7]. Nevertheless, indenting was done
for two years and extended when operations were moved inland
after 1774.
Similarly, from the earliest years, the HBC was concerned
with tracking inventory. The Committee’s minutes for 1671-
1674 indicate that records were maintained of trade goods, sup-
plies, and furs loaded on ships, unloaded, and transferred [tran-
scribed by Rich, 1942, pp. 3-5]. The following was an example
of those instructions:
That the Accountante & husbande (warehouseman)
forthwith make out perfecte invoices & gett billes of
Ladeing Signed by the two comanders for all goods &
provisions that are Laden aboard the two shippes to
bee delivered to the governour together with his in-
structions, copies of all which are to bee kept here, &
to See that the Shippes bee forthwith cleared at the
Customehouse here [transcribed by Rich, 1942, p. 115].
Nixon, who became a bayside trader in 1679, was urged by
the Committee to handle trade goods systematically, to return
defective or unattractive goods, and to see that his warehouse
keeper sent home annual lists of the stock on hand at the end of
each season [Rich, 1960a, p. 109]. Furthermore, in 1683, the
Committee sent instructions to Sergeant that he send home
yearly a list of all employees (“Serveants in the Bay and their
severall Employments”) and a list of all trade goods and sup-
plies (“an exact Account . . . of what remaines of all sorts of
provissions and Stores as well as of Goods & Merchandizes in
every of our Factories”) in order to better manage operations
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(“that we may the better know what to sende”) [transcribed by
Rich, 1948, p. 79]. By 1692, there was growing evidence of
meticulous record keeping. For example, in a letter to trader
Geyer at York, the Committee asked: “There is a Box of Indian
paint mentioned in Capt. Edgcombes Journall, wch.we never
Received. We desire to be informed of it” [transcribed by Rich,
1957, p. 138].
However, it was not until 1810 that there were significant
changes to the recording of inventories. An additional list was
required of the quantity of goods of every denomination at all
locations, in physical and monetary terms. The records were to
be accurate and not estimates. Inventory counts were to be
done at the end of each season and valued at cost plus an
advance to cover the expenses of storage and transportation of
ten percent for the principal (bayside) posts of Churchill, York,
Severn, Albany, Moose, and Eastmain, 20 percent for the trad-
ing houses within the districts of the aforementioned bayside
posts, and 30 percent for those of the two new inland posts,
Saskatchewan and Winnipeg. Note, these advances were
changed in 1813 to 2, 5, and 71⁄2 percent respectively; the
Committee’s justification was that:
We found the rates formerly proposed would be too
high, only part of the men’s time is employed in hous-
ing and transporting the Goods, the rest being occu-
pied in distributing the Goods to the [aborigines] and
collecting, packing the Furs to the bay-side all of which
operations must of course be performed after the time
of taking the remains. We have therefore considered
about 1/6 of the men’s wages as expended in this part
of the business and calculated the percentage accord-
ingly as we are satisfied that this is near enough to the
truth to answer all the purposes of the Regulation
(HBCA, reel 39).
1880 to 1914: The modernization of communications and trans-
portation provided the HBC with significant advantages in the
1880s. Previously, it had to finance a two-year inventory com-
pared to three months with the railway [den Otter, 1990, p. 10].
In 1885, when the CPR was completed, the HBC established
semiannual rather than annual indents, thereby saving money
as well as time [Ray, 1990, p. 73]. Later, the telegraph enabled
trade goods and supplies to be ordered directly as required
[Innis, 1956, p. 360]. The indents were primarily for ordering
items from England, which was a decreasing part of the trade
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goods and supplies since most ordering could be done easily
from local or North American suppliers as needed. Communi-
cations and transportation innovations permitted more reliable
and frequent shipments of trade goods and supplies at a lower
cost per unit than the previous system [den Otter, 1990, p.11].
The improved turnover was greatest at posts along the railway
lines [Ray, 1990, p. 89].
The Board was unwilling to forego the substantial control
that accompanied the annual outfits, not even to be more re-
sponsive to customers through more frequent ordering. The
need for both responsiveness and control was achieved by es-
tablishing a quota of capital employed6  for each post or sales
shop. In this way, the ordering would be held in check by
pre-approved limits according to a circular from the commis-
sioner [HBCA, reel 3M230]. Apparently, control over ordering
by using capital employed was successful. The HBC was able to
expand into sales shops, maintain the same fur-trading busi-
ness, and increase profits with basically the same capital em-
ployed. This success was expressed in a memorandum to the
commissioner [HBCA, reel 3M230].
Inventory was still counted annually (June 1). However, as
the 1880 to 1914 subperiod proceeded, and as a larger portion
of trade goods and supplies could be ordered and obtained rela-
tively quickly, a decreasing portion received the detailed track-
ing that was done between 1821 and 1860. Less importance was
placed on its recording because inventory was maintained for a
shorter period of time as replacements could be more easily
ordered. Two and three years of careful inventory planning
with a series of indents were no longer necessary.
STANDARDS
1821 to 1860: To be viable, the HBC had to trade for furs that
were worth more than all costs incurred. Ensuring that rev-
enues exceeded costs was complicated by the long time lags and
the multitude of costs that had to be incurred before revenues
were received from the sale of furs. The actual recording of
costs was onerous but necessary if the exchange rates between
trade goods and furs were to be sufficient to cover and exceed
6Capital employed was defined as starting inventory plus inventory re-
ceived (including that from other districts), cash, and employee wages, less
cash provided to the HBC, employee debts, and transfers of inventory to other
districts.
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all those costs. In this regard, Simpson wrote the following in
1823 to the Committee:
. . . according to the present classification of goods
with the various percentages there on much time is
lost, inconvenience experienced and numbers of errors
committed in making up the accounts as very few of
our clerks are competent to go into the necessary frac-
tional calculations with accuracy, we are therefore of
opinion that it would simplify and facilitate the busi-
ness greatly if a general average percent of inventories
and transfers for each district was adopted founded on
the actual cost and expenses of transport and shall be
glad to know if such would meet your approbation
[HBCA, reel 195].
This request was not unexpected. In 1822, the Committee
had requested a schedule of advances or markups for use in
calculating the value of inventories at posts. Those advances
were based on the “information & data within our reach, and is
probably an approximation to the true cost” [transcribed by
Fleming, 1940, p. 323]. The result was a “Schedule of Advance”
on the landed cost of trade goods and supplies [also see HBCA,
reel 508]. The markup percentage was dependent upon the dis-
tance from port (e.g., York Factory or Montreal) and to some
extent on the characteristics of the product.
Moreover, standard costs were implicitly included in each
post’s “Standard of Trade,” which related all other furs and all
trade goods to a made beaver. Individual post standards were
adjusted for local conditions, distance from York Factory or
Montreal, and changes in European fur prices. These standards
provided explicit instructions on the amount of furs to be ob-
tained from the trade goods in an outfit. In Exhibit 4, Innis
[1956, pp. 318-319] provided an example of how the standard of
trade worked for an aboriginal trapper with furs to trade.
In addition, the HBC used nonfinancial standards. With the
information on performance, Simpson, through agreement by
the chief factors in council, set travel and transportation stand-
ards in physical terms. For example, he constantly experi-
mented with routes, the design of boats, and load weights to
reduce the cost per pound shipped. Innis [1956, p. 292] noted
that careful planning increased the loads of York boats on the
North Saskatchewan River from 50 packs or pieces in 1822, to
60 in 1825, and 80 in 1833. Simpson also saved the HBC thou-
sands of pounds every year through abolishing the custom of
officers (chief factors and chief traders) travelling ahead with
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EXHIBIT 4
Trading Furs for Goods
Furs, by Type and Quantity Value of Furs
Beaver, whole or full grown, 30 =  30 whole beaver
 , half or cub, 11 =  5.5  
Otters, prime, large,  1 =  2  
  ,  , small,  1 =  1  
Fox, black prime,  1 =  2  
 , red,  3 =  1.5  
 , white,  4 =  2  
Martens,  9 =  3  
47  
The trader gives the aboriginal trapper credit for 47 whole beaver with 47
quills, signifying the value in trading goods. The trapper perhaps will choose
the following selection of trade goods.
A gun 11 quills
3 yards of cloth  9 
3 lbs. of powder  6 
8 lbs. of shot  4 
1 large blanket  8 
1 hatchet  2 
1 file  1 
1 3-gallon kettle   6 
47 
Source: Innis [1956, pp. 318-319].
their families in light canoes rather than staying with the rest of
the brigade, which travelled at the speed of the heavily loaded
freight canoes and boats. Simpson insisted that officers travel
with the freight, thus ensuring more direct control over the
movement of trade goods and supplies. This practice was speci-
fied in the 1828 standing rules and regulations for the Northern
Department [transcribed by Fleming, 1940, pp. 220-221].
1670 to 1774: The standard of trade existed from the HBC’s
beginning [Rich, 1960a, p. 75]. As the pre-contact aborigines
had no conception of the use of money, the HBC had to estab-
lish an institutional framework that permitted barter on an ac-
countable basis. To accomplish that end, a rigid standard was
established by the Committee with the assistance of Radisson
and Groseilliers. This system also prevented competition among
HBC posts and the extravagant offering of trade goods for furs.
The standard of trade encouraged a pattern of aboriginal life in
which fur hunting and the annual trade journey to the Bay
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became essential parts; certainty of trade conditions was neces-
sary [Rich, 1960a, p. 76].
Establishing the standard of trade was complex, and
though the official standard was rigid, the Committee expected
traders to be flexible. Variations were assumed as long as, in
the end, the specified trade goods produced the required furs.
This expectation was expressed in a 1688 letter from the Com-
mittee to bayside trader Geyer at Port Nelson:
We would have you keepe, to the Standard, that Mr.
Radisson agreed to, but with all to give the [aborigines]
all manner of Content and Satisfaction and in Some
goods Under Sell the French that they may be
incouraged to Come to our Factory’s and to bring their
Nations Downe [transcribed by Rich, 1957, pp. 14-15].
From 1670 to 1810, the standard of trade was basically
unchanged despite many variations to the relative prices of
goods and furs over time [Rich, 1939, p. xxi]. The official Com-
mittee-imposed standard of trade was abolished in 1810, in re-
sponse to the move inland that had begun in 1774 [HBCA, reel
6]. The singular standard which had existed for 140 years was
replaced with a unique standard of trade for each post. In ef-
fect, it was the standard of trade developed in 1810 that lasted
for decades thereafter. It was just as demanding as the rigid
Committee-imposed standard, but it became flexible or adjust-
able for costs which differed with distance from ports.
1880 to 1914: The standardized costs started to cause the prices
of some products to be out of line with those offered by com-
petitors. This problem was expressed in an 1871 letter from
Cyril Graham to the head of Committee [HBCA, reel 733].
HBC’s standard of trade was replaced and held in check by
market prices. Products continued to be assigned costs by a
technique called “cost-landed” which included invoice cost plus
all freight and charges [HBCA, reel 3M230]. These costs were
easy to ascertain as common carriers such as steamboats and,
especially, railways were used.
Without the standard of trade, and as barter was replaced
with cash prices, the amounts to pay for furs became problem-
atic. In a circular dated 1887, the Committee announced that
the prices paid for furs (i.e., the fur-buying tariff) would be set
at 20 percent less than the average price obtained at the last
London sales [HBCA, reel 3M232]. The announcement went on
to say that higher prices could be paid for higher quality furs,
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but other prices would have to be lower in order for the average
to be 20 percent less than the recent sales prices.
In summary, the standard of trade was no longer needed as
market prices existed for furs and trade goods. Standards were
used for the cash purchase of furs. Similarly, operational stand-
ards were not necessary for transportation costs as market
prices existed where previously the HBC managed its own
transportation network.
DISCUSSION
It was expected that the HBC would use management ac-
counting more extensively when subject to more uncertainty
and less extensively when there was less uncertainty. A number
of steps were followed in assessing the evidence. First, the un-
certainty facing the HBC for the 1670 to 1914 period was di-
vided into three groups of parts or activities in the fur-trade
operation – inland travel, trade conditions, and living off the
land. The uncertainty inherent in these activities was dependent
on the infrastructure and the strategy of the HBC. Infrastruc-
ture development varied from complete frontier without settle-
ments and without a monetary system to railways and tele-
graph with pioneer settlements and a monetary system.
Strategy also varied during this period. During its first century,
the HBC pursued a sedentary strategy of waiting by the Bay for
the aborigines to come to trade. With the move inland, the
strategic focus was inland trading and, after the merger with
the NWC, consolidation or cost cutting was added to that strat-
egy for 1821 to 1860. Then, from 1880 to 1914, the strategy can
be best expressed as modernization; the HBC used the develop-
ments in communications and transportation to improve opera-
tions.
Uncertainty was extensive from 1821 to 1860. Inland travel
across half the continent in canoes and crude boats included
substantial uncertainty, as did trade with aborigines when there
was no monetary system and when the traders had to live off
the land. There was more certainty during 1670 to 1774 before
inland travel was necessary and before living off the land re-
placed the annual supply shipments from London. Similarly,
uncertainty declined between 1880 and 1914. Inland travel was
simplified with developments in communications and transpor-
tation. Trade conditions became more certain and less prob-
lematic with the introduction of a monetary system. Living off
the land was no longer essential as settlement brought farmers,
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manufacturers, and merchants to supply food and clothing.
Second, four important and dominant management ac-
counting techniques were tracked over the entire 1670 to 1914
period – operating statements, budgets, inventory records, and
standards. All were used during the entire study period to vary-
ing degrees, and all four were used extensively between 1821
and 1860. For the 1670 to 1774 subperiod, budgeting (i.e., in-
dents and outfits) and inventory records were less important
and less developed because there was not the logistical uncer-
tainty associated with the inland strategic move. Operating
statements called balance sheets were comprehensive and
highly developed, but rigid, because of the made-beaver quanti-
fication. The use of standards was mixed. Standards were less
developed for operational activities because there were no re-
quirements associated with inland travel. However, the stand-
ard of trade was well developed and crucial.
Similarly, the 1880 to 1914 subperiod demonstrated less
need for management accounting. The improvements in com-
munications and transportation made possible the manage-
ment of the dispersed HBC posts and sales shops with fre-
quently prepared operating statements, which were called
trading accounts. With the use of return on capital employed,
the HBC was able to evaluate relative performance. And as
there was a cash economy, there was less need for a standard of
trade. There were markets which set per unit prices for revenue
and cost items. The detailed indents and outfits were no longer
necessary because trade goods and supplies could be ordered as
needed. Also, with the ease of obtaining inventory, the detailed
inventory records were not needed for keeping track.
In short, management accounting techniques were most
developed during the subperiod of highest uncertainty, 1821 to
1860, and less developed for 1670-1774 and 1860-1914 when
there was less uncertainty. This pattern is summarized in Ex-
hibit 5.
CONCLUDING ACCOUNTS
With contrasting conditions of uncertainty because of vari-
ous strategies and contexts, the HBC drew upon different
strengths of the four management accounting techniques. Nev-
ertheless, during each subperiod the HBC used all four tech-
niques. The first subperiod, waiting by the Bay from 1670 to
1774, saw management accounting being used to reconcile all
transactions. Trade goods and supplies were shipped, and the
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EXHIBIT 5
 Management Accounting Use Under Different
Uncertainty Conditions
 Management Accounting Techniques
Inventory Operating
Uncertainty Budgeting Records Statements Standards
1670 to 1774
Inland travel  Lower
Trade conditions  High
Living off the land  Lower
Use of Technique Lower Lower  High  Lower
1821 to 1860
Inland travel  High
Trade conditions  High
Living off the land  High
Use of Technique High High High High
1880 to 1914
Inland travel  Lower
Trade conditions  Lower
Living off the land  Lower
Use of Technique Lower Lower High Lower
Note: Uncertainty was rated as high or lower. Similarly, the use of each man-
agement accounting technique was rated as high or lower.
 Committee knew if the furs returned were appropriate. It was
in the second subperiod (1821 to 1860), after expanding inland
and after the earlier system for reconciling was found to be
inadequate in view of the extensive uncertainty being faced,
that management accounting was used to plan carefully and
profitably the multiyear shipment of trade goods and supplies.
This subperiod was the most profitable and one of careful con-
solidation, which demonstrated that managerial effort and dedi-
cation were needed to make management accounting effective.
The system was basically in place by 1810 or shortly after, but it
did not work until the appointment of Simpson as governor of
the Northern Department in 1821.
In the 1880 to 1914 subperiod, as the HBC pursued mod-
ernization, the operating statement, called the trading account,
was primarily used for managing the posts and sales shops.
This minimal accounting could be done as the uncertainty of
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the earlier subperiod had been reduced. The business was rela-
tively simple. There was a cash economy, prices and costs were
known, and communication and transportation had never been
better. In this context, the HBC truly pursued management by
numbers.
The evidence was consistent with Johnson and Kaplan’s
[1987] contention that management accounting practices
evolved positively with uncertainty. Management accounting
practices of the HBC were most developed in the 1821 to 1860
subperiod, when uncertainty was the greatest, to assist manag-
ers through information to manage a multitude of uncertain
activities or, in other words, a large number of different and
unpredictable parts. Management accounting was less preva-
lent in the other two less uncertain subperiods (1670-1774 and
1880-1914), with fewer and more predictable parts, because
managers had less need of it.
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MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICE
AND PRICE CALCULATION AT BOULTON
AND WATT’S SOHO FOUNDRY: A LATE
18TH CENTURY EXAMPLE
Abstract: When deciding upon the price to charge for one of their
products, the managers of the Soho Foundry in Birmingham placed
great reliance upon the data stored in their accounting system. By
the last decade of the 18th century, the nature of the steam engine
business was changing rapidly and reputation alone was insufficient
to attract customers. Also, as more industrialists decided upon
steam as a source of power and competition to supply their needs
increased, more attention had to be paid to price structures. The
increasing standardization of products meant that a price list could
be determined. The partners showed some reluctance to come to
terms with the pricing issue, insisting that the quality of their prod-
uct was of more importance than its price. This paper addresses the
processes undertaken at the Soho Foundry to establish price lists for
engines and parts. It shows that prices were based on the cost of
previous machines, this cost being calculated using predetermined
rates as shown in the engine books. The paper concludes with the
observation that continual reliance on historical data was one of the
factors contributing to the firm’s loss of its competitive edge.
INTRODUCTION
The 18th century in Britain was a time of transition in
managerial practices. In the course of half a century, manufac-
turing in a number of industries moved from cottages and small
workshops to great factories employing hundreds of people
[Pollard, 1965]. Change came about as each manufacturing or-
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ganization responded to the challenges and the opportunities
offered by new technologies and markets. The entrepreneurs of
the time faced administrative as well as technical problems as
their businesses evolved. Accounting often assumed new dimen-
sions as it assisted entrepreneurs in coping with and adjusting
to change.
In spite of, or perhaps because of, Pollard’s [1965, p. 248]
claim that cost accounting played an insignificant role in mana-
gerial decision making during the Industrial Revolution, there
has developed a growing body of literature about the manage-
ment accounting practices employed by the newly emerging
businesses as each developed an accounting that suited its par-
ticular needs. Chatfield [1977, p. 101] tended to support
Pollard’s limited view of cost accounting when he asserted that
a major use for cost data was to assist and moderate price
estimates given by engineering firms. Certainly this was an im-
portant use of cost information, but it was by no means the
only one. It is certainly a view not held by Robert Hamilton, the
author of An Introduction to Merchandize, published in 1777
[see Mepham, 1988a,b for a discussion of this text]. According
to Mepham, in addition to discussing practical costing tech-
niques, Hamilton emphasized the use of cost to assist manage-
rial efficiency [Mepham, 1988b, p. 55].
Since Pollard, there have been a number of studies which
have lent support for a wider view of the involvement of ac-
counting as a managerial tool during the Industrial Revolution
in Britain. For example, McKendrick [1970] discussed Josiah
Wedgwood’s use of cost information by highlighting an incident
where the calculation of costs by Wedgwood served as a check
on the profits reported by the firm’s bookkeeper. Wedgwood
also used cost data to moderate prices during periods when
trade was slack.
Edwards [1989] reviewed cost accounting developments in
Britain to 1830 and concluded that a wide range of managerial
decisions were supported by accounting data, a conclusion also
reached by Fleischman and Parker [1990, 1991, 1992, 1997] in
their investigations of the use of cost data for managerial pur-
poses over a number of firms. Their 1991 article reported a
survey of costing practices in 25 firms active during this period
in which they found significant use of cost techniques as an aid
to management. On the level of an individual firm, Fleischman
et al. [1995] examined in some detail the cost investigations of
James Watt jnr in the negotiation of a piece rate for the
moulders at Boulton and Watt’s (B&W hereafter) Soho Foundry
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in 1802. This incident was also referred to by Williams [1994]
in a discussion of the character of James Watt jnr.
Further evidence of the wider use of management account-
ing can be found in Walsh and Stewart’s [1992] examination of
the management accounting used by Robert Owen at his New
Lanark (Scotland) cotton mill during the first part of the 19th
century. They concluded that Owen had given accounting a role
in the transformation of his workers from contractors to em-
ployees.
Other examples of this expanding literature are to be found
in Edwards and Baber [1979] with their discussion of cost ac-
counting at the Dowlais Iron Company, Stone’s [1973] descrip-
tion of the Chorlton Mills of Manchester, Beckett’s [1977] case
study of a factory in the 1740s, and Jones’ [1985] extensive
discussion of the use of cost accounting in Wales in the 18th
century. A number of other articles explored different facets of
the active use of management accounting during this period,
adding to the weight of evidence refuting Pollard’s view [see, for
example, Edwards and Newell, 1991; Edwards and Boyns, 1992;
Fleischman and Tyson, 1993; Williams, 1997; Fleischman and
Tyson, 1998].
This paper is concerned with the accounting activities of
the B&W organization at Birmingham, a firm which is well
known for its efficient operation [see, for example, Roll, 1930;
Pollard, 1965; Fleischman and Parker, 1991; Fleischman, 1993;
Williams, 1994, 1997; Fleischman et al., 1995]. This paper aims
to add to the literature by exploring in depth one aspect of
B&W’s use of cost data, specifically its use of past costs in the
development of a pricing policy for steam engines in the late
18th and early 19th centuries. It will also demonstrate the
firm’s reliance on this information in order to remain competi-
tive in the face of an expanding market. The paper also adds to
the work of Roll [1930] by providing detail of the material used
by B&W in the development of its price list.
This paper adopts a microhistorical approach to the study
of the development of B&W’s prices because it is concerned
with the actions and the thoughts of the individual actors. The
term “microhistory” encompasses the study of an incident or
individual in-depth rather than a group of people or an aggrega-
tion of events [for a further discussion of the term see
Ginzburg, 1980, 1993]. It is not suggested that the process of
price development used by B&W was typical of manufacturers
in general. The study of the practice of accounting in a particu-
lar situation, however, does lead to a greater understanding of
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accounting in its wider context. There is a danger when concen-
trating at a microlevel of obscuring the wider issues. A
microhistory approach to the study of business practices in
18th century Britain, when there appeared to have been no
standard management accounting practices, can do much to
broaden our understanding, as each firm devised its own ac-
counting information system in accordance with the precepts
and views of its proprietor(s). Sharpe [1990, p. 35] points out
how:
. . . once a grasp of the society in question has been
established, the isolated social event or individual . . .
can be used to provide a pathway to a deeper under-
standing of that society.
Microhistory allows us to explore the reaction of individu-
als to the discipline imposed by the practice of accounting. The
comprehensiveness of the cost data accumulated at the Soho
Foundry has been mentioned by Roll [1930], Pollard [1965],
and others as being well in advance of other firms. However,
this assertion is based on existing, limited archival evidence. It
may be that other firms may have used similar systems. Never-
theless, an understanding of the solutions B&W developed in
response to its competitive environment provides an interesting
study on its own. The series of documents described in the
latter part of this paper illustrates a progression in corporate
reasoning as the partners attempted to position their firm in an
increasingly competitive market.1
The manufacture of steam engines in the closing decades of
the 18th century was a highly competitive business. B&W had
to contend with other manufacturers who either pirated their
design [Tann, 1980] or who made the older Newcomen engine
which, although not as efficient as Watt’s design, was feasible
where coal was readily available [Hills, 1993]. Expanding cot-
ton manufacture and its demand for power stimulated the mar-
ket for steam engines. The impending expiration of Watt’s
patent in 1800 also stimulated interest in the market by poten-
tial manufacturers who were aware of the demand for these
machines [see, for example, Briggs, 1982; Hills, 1993]. Even
though the B&W organization tended to compete on quality
1The Birmingham Central Library holds the exceptionally well preserved
and very extensive Boulton and Watt archive. In all of the examples, original
spelling and formating have been maintained as far as possible.
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and reputation2 rather than price, it was concerned with the
competition and did pay attention to costs when working up a
price for a potential customer. It is the aim of this paper to
examine the calculations undertaken in the process of price
determination at B&W’s Soho Foundry, a purpose-built, steam
engine factory.
The first part of the paper provides a brief discussion of the
B&W firm and the events that led to the establishment of the
Soho Foundry. The second part of the paper describes the de-
liberations of the partners as they were confronted with the
need to establish a standard price list. The discussion illustrates
their use of cost information in this process.
THE STEAM ENGINE BUSINESS
The original partnership of B&W, formed in 1775, was es-
tablished to act as consulting engineers in the erection of steam
engines designed by James Watt [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935;
Tann, 1981; Law, 1990]. The steam engine developed by James
Watt3 was more efficient and economical than the other engines
then available [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935; Law, 1990]. Ini-
tially the partnership supplied drawings of an engine and super-
vised its construction. Most of the parts of these custom-built
engines were made by subcontractors who bore a large part of
the risk. Matthew Boulton4 and James Watt selected appropri-
ate specialists for particular pieces, more on the basis of the
quality of their work than cost, because of a concern for the
firm’s reputation [Tann, 1981]. However, as time went by, in
order to maintain the high quality of the product, more and
more parts were made in Boulton’s Soho Manufactory. By the
early 1790s, over 50% of the value of the engines was made by
the partners [Tann, 1981]. The nature of the business was
2In a letter to John Southern dated April 24, 1799, James Watt jnr wrote
“ . . . it is not our wish to vie with others in lowness of estimates, but in good-
ness of workmanship, being well convinced by long experience that the best
Engines are the cheapest in the end” [B&W 33/5].
3James Watt (1736-1819) was born in Greenock, Scotland. He developed
improvements to the steam engines then in use by using steam to exert a
positive force on the piston and condensing the steam outside the cylinder.
These improvements were patented in 1769, with the patent being extended in
1775. Watt formed the partnership with Boulton to exploit these ideas.
4 Matthew Boulton (1728-1809) was an established manufacturer of buck-
les and other metal ornaments in Birmingham, England. His manufactory was
established at Soho, just outside Birmingham.
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changing as well, with customers being more interested in pur-
chasing a complete engine rather than being bothered with the
close involvement in its construction that had been necessary to
this point [Dickinson, 1936]. Other incentives that inclined the
partners towards manufacture in their own right included the
attraction of a greater share of the profits, which hitherto had
been taken by the external subcontractors. Even though these
subcontractors were selected because of their ability, they were
not solely concerned with the manufacture of steam engine
parts which led to problems with quality control as well as a
lack of standardization5 between subcontractors. This, together
with the difficulties involved in coordinating the subcontrac-
tors, encouraged the partners’ new direction [Tann, 1981].
By late 1794, B&W had come to the view that it would have
to manufacture complete steam engines and not depend on
subcontractors. In October a new partnership under the name
of Boulton, Watt & Sons was formed to manufacture steam
engines at a new foundry in Birmingham [Roll, 1930;
Dickinson, 1935; Tann, 1981]. The partners were Matthew
Boulton, and his son Matthew6, James Watt, and his sons James
jnr 7 and Gregory8.
SOHO FOUNDRY
The Soho Foundry was intended from the outset to be run
as a separate business by Matthew Robinson Boulton, James
Watt jnr, and Gregory Watt. Construction began in 1795 and
was completed in the next year [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935;
Gale, 1962; Tann, 1981]. The Foundry was designed to manu-
facture complete engines and was unique in that, unlike other
factories at the time which produced a varied number of prod-
ucts, its sole purpose was the manufacture of steam engines
[Roll, 1930; Gale, 1962]. The new factory did not replace
5Most of the engine cylinders were made at the Wilkinsons’ Bersham Iron-
works, but an argument between the partners John and William Wilkinson and
the resultant closure of the works ended this source of supply. Cylinders cast
and bored by the Coalbrookdale Company were reasonably satisfactory, but
this firm was unable to meet the demand. Cylinders produced elsewhere were
unsatisfactory [Rolt, 1962].
6(1770-1842)
7(1769- 1848)
8Gregory Watt (1777-1804) was a half-brother to James jnr. Always suffer-
ing poor health, he died of consumption at the age of 27 [Rolt, 1962].
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Boulton’s Soho Manufactory which continued to assemble en-
gines and make parts for a number of years.
In its first year of operation, the Soho Foundry accepted
orders for 31 engines and by 1800 had produced 169 [Tann,
1981]. Matthew Robinson Boulton seems to have been very
much involved in the initial planning for the Foundry, while
James Watt jnr, judging from the amount of calculations and
costings in his handwriting, seems to have been more con-
cerned with managing daily operations [Dickinson, 1936].
The Soho Foundry had three main operating departments.
The Foundry Department cast engine parts, the Smithy Depart-
ment manufactured parts from wrought iron, and the Fitting
Department machined the parts and fitted the engine together.
Each of these departments was treated as a profit center. The
products of both the Foundry and the Manufactory were sold
by one organization, but the records distinguish between the
products of each. The Soho Foundry was operated as an inde-
pendent entity and was expected to make a profit, as were each
of its operating departments.
PRICES
Originally, the older Watt and Boulton charged a yearly
premium for their engines rather than a straightforward price
because they supplied the knowledge to build the engine rather
than the individual parts [Tann, 1981; Hills, 1993]. When first
introduced, the premium was equal to one-third of the savings
in coal usage which resulted from the more efficient B&W en-
gine compared to the older atmospheric steam engine [Tann,
1981]. This was an ingenious and profitable procedure as the
partners tended to sell the majority of their engines to the
mines in Cornwall where coal was very expensive and the sav-
ings due to the Watt engine considerable. As the organization
supplied more and more engine parts, it charged for those parts
supplied. The yearly premium or royalty was based on the ac-
tual number of strokes made by the engine as measured by a
counter designed by Watt9 [Rolt, 1962; Tann, 1981]. Eventually
9Watt snr carried out a number of experiments to determine the relative
efficiency of various sizes of engines and developed a calculation to enable him
to determine the premium payable on any one engine. To decide the actual
premium in any one year, it was necessary to determine the amount of work
done, so he invented a device to count the strokes of the engine [Dickenson,
1935; Rolt, 1962]. Eventually, the premium was calculated by using a formula
based on horsepower [Fleischman and Parker, 1992].
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the royalty became fixed at £5 per horsepower per year for
rotative10 engines used outside London and £6 for engines used
in London [Jones, 1973; Tann, 1981; Fleischman and Parker,
1992].
By the 1790s, engine purchasers were given the opportunity
to commute the premium by discounting it to a lump sum.
According to Tann [1981], the majority of new purchasers ac-
cepted this offer. A letter to Watt jnr from John Southern [B&W
19/6] shows an example of the calculation for the commutation
of a premium. By the time the organization was supplying the
whole engine and steam engines had become a commodity, it
was obvious that the pricing system was inadequate. Roll [1930,
p. 312] quoted a table titled “Prices for Rotative Engines” which
he believed relates to August 1795. This table shows a compari-
son of the amount the firm could expect from a number of
different-sized engines based on parts supplied plus the pre-
mium over five years compared to a fixed price based on the
cost of the engine plus a markup of 50%. The amounts calcu-
lated by the two methods were very similar, so a change to a set
price would not reduce profitability and would reduce the work
required to collect the premium.
Need for Change: Determining the price to charge seems to have
been a continual problem to Watt jnr and Matthew Robinson
Boulton. Increasing competition, from manufacturers such as
Matthew Murray and Richard Trevithick [Hills, 1993], coupled
with the fact that the annual premium was never popular with
the customers, meant the partners had to pay strict attention to
pricing. It was no longer sufficient to trade on quality alone.
The change from charging a premium based on usage to a set
price required a change in methods of calculation. To this end,
engine cost became the basis for price calculation.
There was a common pricing structure for the engines built
by B&W, whether they were built at Soho Foundry or as-
sembled at the Soho Manufactory. The prices charged did not
include transport, which was paid by the purchaser. After test-
ing, the engines were disassembled for transportation and usu-
ally shipped by canal barge.
10Originally steam engines had a reciprocating motion, but by using a sun
and planet gear this was transferred into a rotational force. Referred to as
“rotative” engines, this was an important innovation since it meant that steam
engines could be coupled directly to other machinery.
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The considerable correspondence and price calculations
still existing are an indication of the partners’ concern for
prices. The first word came from the elder James Watt in a
letter to Matthew Robinson Boulton:
Soho June 1st 1796
Mr M. R. Boulton
Dear Sir
As your father & myself considering the general sub-
ject of premiums it appeared to us that they might with
propriety be charged as follows taking Mr Southern’s11
estimate of 12 horse engine for an example
neat cost materials £308
manufacturing profit 20 pr% 68
Premium 50 pr Ct on neat cost 154
Boiler 60
10 pr% on Do 6
———
£596
———
or if you think that is too little
materials & 20 pr% 376
premium 50 pr% 188
Boiler + 10 pr cent 66
———
£630
We think that we have no title to 50 pr % on boilers
not being made by ourselves, there is little besides the
risk of bad debts - however we wish to leave the whole
open till we are all at home, & I think it cannot be
satisfactorily settled till there is a view of this years
transactions & profit, at present it is better to ask
something too much than too little.
Small engines should pay a greater percentage than
larger ones, otherwise will be attended with loss, as
requiring so much trouble, we should look now to the
conclusion of the patent & when all settle prices settle
also what we can probably work for when that is re-
quired.
11John Southern (1758-1815) joined B&W as an assistant draughtsman in
1782 and remained with the firm until his death in 1815. He was a trusted and
valued friend and employee and he was admitted as a partner in 1810. South-
ern is reputed to have invented a device for measuring changing cylinder pres-
sures in 1796 [Roll, 1930; Dickinson, 1935; Rolt, 1962].
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I have no news since my last & remain
Dear Sir
Yours affectly
James Watt
[B&W D/1]
While having an appreciation of the direct cost of manufac-
ture, the letter indicates that Watt was unsure about indirect
costs with the markups of 50% on cost as well as an allowance
for manufacturing profit. The “neat cost materials” referred to
the cost of the various engine parts which included material
plus direct labor [as detailed in the Engine Books B&W 231].
The alternative calculations provide an interesting comparison
by allowing a markup on the profit already added to the cost.
Each of the operating departments at the Soho Foundry
was expected to make a profit. The transfer price from each
department included a markup to which the organization
added another allowance for profit to the accumulated cost.
Pollard [1963] suggested that this practice had its origins in the
traditional practice of subcontracting with each department
treated as if it were an independent unit. This relationship was
illustrated in the discussions leading to the fixing of piece rates
for the moulders described in Fleischman et al. [1995] and Will-
iams [1994]. Whatever its origin, this practice was an efficient
way of managing the operation with responsibility for profit-
able operation being given to the managers. Documents from
MPB 285/28 [quoted in Williams, 1997, p. 177] show a com-
parative profit and loss account for the Smithy, Foundry and
Fitting Departments for the Soho Foundry for 1798. The
Smithy made a loss while the other two departments made
gains.
The steam engine business was very profitable for the firm,
and prices it charged were considered by some higher than
perhaps they should have been. The young partners were obvi-
ously sensitive to this public opinion as the following extract in
a letter from Watt jnr to M. R. Boulton (July 10, 1798) shows
[B&W E7]:
. . . opposition we experienced from Murray12 at Leeds,
that attempted by Hawkes here & the report generally
12Matthew Murray manufactured engines in Leeds. Boulton and Watt had
suspicions that Murray had infringed the patent but took no action against
him until after 1800 when they opposed his patent application [Tann, 1980].
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prevalent & generally accredited of the enormity of our
profits upon Rotative Engines [emphasis added], make
me think seriously that we ought at an early period,
perhaps at the close of our books in Sepr to adopt a
new Tarif of Prices. If the present premium on
Rotatives were reduced to 30 per %, we might keep it
at that rate for a few months & then reduce it farther if
judged eligible. It should also be an object of consider-
ation, whether the Londoners should not be put upon
the same footing with their neighbours in the Country.
Perhaps 25 per % might be advisable for Colliery En-
gines, in order still to keep up some distinction be-
tween them & others as arising from the very great
difference of the value of savings. It will be prudent in
us whilst we yet may, to secure the trade in our own
hands, by removing in part the incitement to rivalship
& bringing matters to that state, in which we can still
carry on the business with a reasonable profit after the
expiration of the patent.
The move to lower the prices was caused by a desire to
reduce potential competition. This is reinforced by Watt’s com-
ment about colliery engines. Collieries had the advantage of
cheap coal which made the less efficient but cheaper atmo-
spheric engines more cost effective and a viable alternative to
the B&W product. The letter implies a reluctance by Watt jnr to
let go of the “enormity of our profits on Rotative Engines,” with
an almost fatalistic acceptance that the good times were draw-
ing to a close, requiring the firm to bow to the inevitable lower-
ing of prices and profits.
Development of a Price List: By 1798, 14 engine sizes were of-
fered to the market [Roll, 1930]. Each was customized to the
requirements of the customer but was assembled from standard
components, allowing a standard price to be set. Whether to
charge a different price to customers in London was a question
the firm struggled to answer and one that was unresolved for
some time.
James Watt jnr proposed a differential price structure in a
letter to Boulton jnr several months later [MBP 353/61]:
Horses Country London Addl
Boiler
4 £350 £366  £32
6  379  398 38
8  473  497 45
10  523  548 60
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12  560  588 68
16  727  763 90
20  800  840  110
24 1040 1092  132
30 1120 1176  160
32 1156 1214  172
M R Boulton
Scarborough
Soho 11 Sepr 1798
Above you have a synopsis of the new Estimates.
They may reckoned to take place in all Engines sent
from hence after the end of the present Month.
In framing these, the old estimates have been left
quite out of the question & we have proceeded upon
what appeared to be the real costs by Foreman’s books
[emphasis added13]. These we have determined by tak-
ing out all those of a size that have been made since
the prices were raised & the steam cases added; we
have then deduced an average cost and added about 5
per % to cover deficiencies & to provide for trifling
additions either in the way of improvements or ex-
traordinary size of Rotative Shaft & c. The Boilers have
been taken as they stand charged in Foreman’s books
(where a profit of 16 per % is already laid on by the
Manufactory, which considering the little trouble we
have with them is enough on that score) and their aver-
age amount has been added to the sum obtained as
above for metal materials. This has been assumed as
the full cost & to it has been added 33 per % for the
country prices & 40 per % for London.
An example will make this more clear.
The Average Cost of the MM of a 4 Horse Eng. £220
5 per % about £ 10
Foreman’s charge for Boiler 32
——
Total manufacturing cost £262
Country premium 33 per % 88
——
New Country Price £350
====
If the boiler is not to be furnished by us you deduct
its cost as stated in the fourth column & we remain in
13Foreman was the accountant/bookkeeper for the Engine Manufactory; he
did have an oversight over the accounting records for the manufacture of
engines whether made at the Foundry or Manufactory.
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proportion of the percentage charged for Premium.
This appeared the simplest mode of proceeding - The
London prices have been calculated at 40 per cent. It
was thought advisable not to bring them down at once
to the country prices, but to lessen the disparity gradu-
ally; the one is therefore reduced 17 & the other 23 per
% -
Perhaps upon comparing these with the old prices,
you may not think we have taken off enough; neither
do I. But it may be well to go to work gradually, to try
these for half a year & then perhaps to come down to
25 per % on the Country & 33 on the [London]
I have also to add, that Southern otherwise engaged,
these estimates have been taken somewhat grossly and
will admit of revisions and corrections when we are all
together. For the present, they are on the safe side.
[Signed] J Watt junr.
These prices were based on costs in the Manufactory, but
applied to those engines produced by the Foundry as well. The
term MM refers to metal materials; i.e., the cost of the various
parts and the assembly of the engine. Watt’s calculations show
some inaccuracies, which is rather surprising for one who was
usually very meticulous.
The partners showed further concern with public opinion
as well as the effects of increasing competition. Boulton & Watt
engines enjoyed a considerable reputation for quality, but they
were expensive. There were other manufacturers in the market,
who, the partners felt, did not offer products comparable in
quality, but whose engines nevertheless met most of the cus-
tomers’ needs at a lower price.14 The cotton manufacturers, a
major group of potential buyers, were interested in value for
money and were prepared to seek alternative solutions to their
power problems. Consequently, the firm had to contend with
water power as well as other engine makers.
Matthew Robinson Boulton reiterated the concern with
public opinion when he wrote to James Watt jnr, who was in
London (December 18, 1798), that he would:
14Von Tunzelman [1978, p. 54] presented a comparison of steam engine
prices which indicated that B&W were considerably more expensive for larger
size engines; e.g., in 1804 they charged £1,083 for a 20-hp. engine whereas
Fenton, Murray & Wood charged £600 and Goodrich £750. For engines up to
10 hp., B&W appear to have been competitive.
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. . . if possible get an estimate [of brass air pumps] &
forwarded by this evening’s coach & shall accompany
it with a new list of prices of Engines - we find that
considerable embarassment will ensue unless the re-
duction of our estimates is made very gradually the
whole reduction proposed to take place before March
21st 1799 viz from 45 pr% to 33 on London & frm 33 to
25 pr% on country we think should be effected by
monthly deductions - without this precaution we shall
have much difficulty in stearing clear of Disputes upon
this subject & certainly not succeed in accomplishing
the alteration witht exciting public attention. . .
[B&W 38/4]
A second letter to Watt, written later that day, lists the
proposed prices with the further proviso that the premium be
reduced on a monthly basis and stresses the need for gradual
reductions, perhaps hoping that no one would notice. He wrote:
I send you herewith the prices referred to in my letter
of this morning & we propose them for the ensuing
month to be stated at one pr % less or at 34 & 28 pr %
upon metal Maters & similar reductions to take place
monthly till we arrive at the permanent standard - Per-
haps it may be judged expedient to make a larger de-
duction from the London prices in order to bring them
sooner to the same standard as the country. From your
recent transactions with the Londoners you will be en-
abled to judge whether this distinction has or is likely
to create any disatisfaction & of course to decide upon
the propriety of extinguishing it more rapidly . . .
[B&W 38/4]
Watt jnr’s reply came from London a few days later when
he expressed some disquiet over the price reductions. He re-
sponded that he could not:
. . . help thinking that the proposed monthly reduction
will be troublesome & create some confusion with re-
spect to orders transmitted by Lawson, or any other
itinerant agent. The further reduction to be made at 4
pr % in one instance & 10 in the other is so small, that I
do not fear its having the effect you apprehend, more
especially as the last very considerable reduction was
not attended with such consequences & appears indeed
to have escaped observation. I should either propose to
continue the estimates you now give, for six months, &
then take 4 pr % from the Country & 5 pr % from the
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London price. The remaining 5 might remain upon the
London Engines until this time twelvemonths. I pre-
sume you have not yet made new Estimates, nor do I
think you can, until several Engines have been made
with the proposed alterations, which I hope you are
now carrying into effect. They will add to the price
considerably, unless deductions can be effected in
other matters . . .
[B&W E/7]
The problem seems to have been to find a way to make the
inevitable price reductions unobtrusively. Watt’s last comment
sounded a note of caution by suggesting that cost cutting might
become an issue as new changes were made to the engines they
had on offer.
Four months later, on the eve of the expiration of the en-
gine patent, the issues of the firm’s image, its prices, and its
competitive environment were highlighted by Watt jnr in a let-
ter to John Southern (April 24, 1799) when he wrote:
I think the estimates you propose sending to Mr
Tewsbury very proper, and I also think it very right
that the topics you state should be urged at some
length, particularly that our prices now, comprehended
nothing but a manufacturing profit & will not be ef-
fected by the expiration of our exclusive privilege. That
it is not our wish to vie with others in lowness of esti-
mates, but in goodness of workmanship, being well
connvinced by long experience that the best Engines
are the cheapest in the end. . . .
[B&W 33/5]
Even though the generally held view was that B&W engines
were the best available, Watt jnr was well aware that many
potential customers were prepared to compromise quality if
substantial cost savings were to be made. Watt held a very
short-term view because engines using high pressure steam
would soon become available and offer greater output for lower
overall cost [Hills, 1993]. The B&W engines, while strongly
built, did not change with advancing technology.
Use of Cost Information: In attempts to set a price for the differ-
ent sizes of engines, Watt continually referred to the cost of
engines already built as they were listed in the engine book
rather than base cost on a “standard” engine for each capacity.
The engine books are large books consisting of a printed list of
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all the parts required by a particular engine under the headings
“Cast Iron,” “Wrought Iron,” “Brass,” “Miscellaneous,” and “Fit-
ting.” The list is very detailed and as there were slight differ-
ences between engines, the detailed list of parts for a particular
customer could be specified. When working up a cost for a
particular engine, standard rates were used for the different
parts. These standard rates seem to have been determined as a
result of negotiations with employees and did not result from
an imposed standard [see Williams, 1994; Fleischman et al.,
1995 for a discussion of this process in relation to the Foundry
Department]. The standard rates appear to have been constant
for a number of years. Comparisons between the “standard”
cost of an engine and actual costs were made elsewhere; yet,
the engine book data were used for price development. There
appears to have been no attempt to use actual cost, even though
actual cost was available, nor is there any explanation for this
procedure.
The costs used in the following calculations come from the
engine books. These two examples are taken from a document
entitled “Calculations for new Estimates 4th June 1801” and
illustrate the calculation of price based on past cost. The docu-
ment, in Watt jnr’s handwriting, includes calculations for eight
different size engines:
Example 1:
4 Horse
18 Novr 1800
Bryson & son 267
add Cisterns for feed Apps }
& hot water } 2
Additional price of Boiler }
2/- pr Cwt on 13 Cwt } 1 ,, 6
—————
270 ,, 6
25 pr %  67,, 11
—————
£ 337,, 17
—————
But as a greater proportional profit should be laid on
these small Engines to Compensate for the trouble of
drawings &c it may stand in the Provisional Ests at
£ 350.
[B&W 7/VI/14]
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At this time 4-horse engines were not very common, and it
was felt that a small engine might create extra cost in its design
and assembly. Indeed, the elder Watt had made this very point
in his letter of 1796, quoted above:
Example 2:
14 Horse
1800
20 Aug Rigby & Chadwick 500. 4. 4
Deduct for Crank Fly Wheels }
£30 }
do Extra size of Br 10 }  40. 16
—— ——— £460. 4
10 Decr Huddart & Co 489. 16
Deduct for Crank & fly wheels
30
Do for stop pipe 5. 5 35. 5
—— ——— £454.11
1801
21 Jany Hibbert & Smethurst 486. 4
deduct for Dbl Crank Motion 21
Stop pipe & bonnet 5. 4  25. 4
—— ——— 461.15
—––——
3|1375. 15
458.11
Add for Cisterns 2.11
Addl for Boiler 33cwt at 2/- 3.16
—––——
463. 17
25 pr % 114. 19
—––——
£578. 16
Call it £600 as before
[B&W 7/VI/14]
The second example shows the calculation of a base cost
for these three engines by removing from the calculation the
cost of unique parts by taking an average, adding the cost of
additional items, and then adding a markup. The standard costs
for each individual engine manufactured were recorded in the
90
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss2/12
Accounting Historians Journal, December 199982
Engine Books. As an example of the origin of the costs used in
the price calculations, the Engine Book for February 1800 -
February 1802 [B&W 232] lists the costs (summary) for the
Rigby & Chadwick engine mentioned above as:
Cwt Qrs Lbs £ S D
Cast Iron 192  2 5 210 171/2  11/2
Wrought Iron  16  1  11  73  71/2 111/2
Copper Brass &c 4  2 4  53  21/2  11/2
Boiler  35  25  73 19  41/2
Stores 5  81/2  61/2
Patterns 19  71/2
Carriage 4 171/2
Fitting 59  51/2  41/2
——————
500  41/2  41/2
The price calculations, and there are many still in exist-
ence, all show the same attention to detail with succeeding
price calculations being based on the average engine book cost
of previous engines of the same size.
As time went by, the products the firm offered became
more standardized; yet, reference to past cost was continually
made in the calculation of the price of engines. The markup
eventually declined to 25%, and then to 20%, with no extra
premium for London.
Monitoring Price: As successful businessmen, the partners were
obviously concerned to make sure that costs were covered and
a profit made. Watt jnr monitored costs and prices to ensure
that this continued to be the case. For example, a document
entitled “List of Engine Materials and Premiums from 30th
Septr 1798 to Do 1799” [B&W MII/7/2] compares the price with
the actual cost of all the engines built by both the Foundry and
the Manufactory during that period. Differences between the
actual profit and the computed profit based on a percentage
applied to engine book or “standard” cost were calculated and
the differences noted. In all cases a reasonable profit was made;
however, overall actual profit was lower than the expected
profit. This particular document makes no attempt to explain
the reason for the differences. However, the document reflects a
sophisticated awareness of the use of accounting data as a con-
trol tool. Perhaps complete correspondence between estimates
and actuals was an unreachable ideal because of the problems
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of estimating overhead. Nevertheless, managerment spent a
considerable effort in refining its attempts.
Price of Engine Parts: Price calculations were not limited to the
price of whole engines because a comprehensive list of prices
for individual spare parts was built up. Generally these prices
were based on the standard or engine book rates for making
that part plus a markup of 20 - 25% [B&W 7/IV]. In order to
calculate new prices, reference was continually made to the
cost of parts made previously. The comprehensiveness of this
process is illustrated in a document relating to the calculation
of the cost of a cast-iron beam rather than a wooden beam for a
40-horse engine in 1802. There appears to have been an inquiry
as to the extra cost, a cast-iron beam having technical advan-
tages over a wooden one:
Beam Extra Materials A & G Murray March 1802
Cast Iron Beam 56.11.16 20/- 56.17.101/2
Turning & fitting Do 9.12.101/2
Part expence of pattern 6.12.161/2
2 Wrot Iron Cutters for Caps 1.14.121/2
16 Steel wedges 11.111/2 1.15.131/2
—————
Blacking & weighing 1.15.131/2
—————
£ 75.17.171/2
—————
==================================================
Calculation of the difference between a Cast Iron Beam & a
Wooden Beam for a 40 Horse
Materials of Cast Iron Beam as above 75. 17.171⁄2
Main Gudgeon 5.11. 21 say 11 at 20/-
Outer end Do 1.13. 22
Inner end Do 1.13. 24 cwt
Caps for Do 1.12. 16 say 11 at 20/- 11 17.171⁄2
Boring & Turning Gudgeons & Caps 6. 16.171⁄2
Do Main Gudgeon 17.161⁄2
Part Expence of patterns 1. 13.161⁄2
—————
£ 94. 14.171⁄2
The following are from Messrs Wormauld & Cos
Wooden Beam - charged at the present prices - 1802
cwt
Main Gudgeon 4.10.110
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Saddle plate & Glands for intr extd  1. 3. 11
Gland for Centre of Beam  3. 0. 11
Sad & Plate & Glands for outer end  1. 1. 16
————
10. 0. 17 @ 20/- 10. 13.101⁄2
7 Pins & Nuts inner and back end
saddle plates 151 at 7d 4. 18.111⁄2
2 Beam Straps Nuts &c 205 at 7d 5. 19.171⁄2
Wrought Iron Gland for
back end of motion  22 at 7 . 12.101⁄2
end of beam  176 at 7d 5. 12.181⁄2
Turned pin for outer end saddle plate 47 2. 17.101⁄2
Turning Centre Gudgeon 12.161⁄2
Patterns 1. 11161⁄2
Weighing blacking &  10. 11161⁄2
—————
 30. 16.181⁄2
—————
Difference of Cost £ 63. 17. 111⁄2
15. 13. 111⁄2
—————
79. 10. 111⁄2
[B&W 7/IV/60]
Note that the difference in cost includes the markup of 25%
rounded down to achieve an even value, a common practice.
This customer would then have been asked to pay an extra £79
to have a cast-iron beam fitted instead of a wooden one. It
should be noted that there was no allowance for timber in the
calculation of the price of the wooden beam because it was
usual for the customer to supply the beam and the firm to
supply the appropriate fittings.
The document continues with the calculation of other parts
based on “extracts from the printed Daybook. . . . ” The stand-
ard costs of past work were used in many calculations and
estimates relating to future work. The record of past costs
formed an important database to be used in the calculation of
all prices.
CONCLUSION
The Soho Foundry was a new venture, designed from its
inception to build steam engines. Consequently, the factory was
built to ensure smooth and efficient working. The factory that
was built and staffed with dedicated, highly skilled, and innova-
tive people operated for many years. The Soho Foundry was
designed to operate in the same way as its products. As a steam
engine was designed to produce power, so too was the factory
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designed to produce steam engines smoothly and efficiently. As
steam engines were designed to be self-governing, so too the
factory, with accounting providing an essential part of this gov-
ernance.
The accounting system was set up to reflect the organiza-
tion of production. It was designed around profit centers and
recorded the flow of materials and work from one department
to another. Product was transferred using predetermined trans-
fer prices. Because the Soho Foundry was a pioneering venture,
it is important not to judge workable solutions found to the
problems that arose in the light of present knowledge and prac-
tice because of the differing contexts. The accounting processes
extant at the Soho Foundry in its early years continued for
many years, so it is reasonable to assume that they supplied the
perceived needs of that time. Certainly the existing number of
documents showing calculations still indicates that the ac-
counting system provided a database that was used by Watt in
the managerial process. Yet, it does not appear to have been
used to produce budgets or other forecasts.
In price calculations no reference was made to the prices
charged by the competition. All calculations were based on pre-
vious engine-book cost. B&W engines were in a unique situa-
tion, having been the first to use a condenser, leading to greater
efficiency and cost saving. Because of this uniqueness, the firm
traded on its reputation for quality but pursued with equal
vigor those firms that pirated their designs and tried to under-
cut their prices [Roll, 1930; Tann, 1980]. However, the impend-
ing ending of their patent in 1800 and the subsequent expected
expansion in competition forced its attention to the pricing
structure. The letters of the partners show their concern with
public opinion, yet imply a reluctance to engage their competi-
tors. Their celebration of their reputation for quality and con-
tinual reliance on historical data failed to encourage risk tak-
ing, and the firm soon lost its innovative edge. Compound and
high-pressure steam engines gradually captured a greater share
of the market [Law, 1990; Hills, 1993].
Cost accumulation was an important activity and was a
basis for further activity. Costs were used as a basis for prices
and as a check on profitability. As the above examples show,
prior costs were referenced when preparing quotations for the
supply of engines and the development of a standard price list.
They were also referred to when working out prices for non-
standard engines or parts. Accounting information was crucial
in establishing a base line for these calculations. The accumu-
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lated facts of the past then became a basis for the actions of the
future.
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Abstract: Institutional efforts in the U.S. to develop a conceptual
framework for business enterprises can be traced to the Paton and
Littleton monograph in 1940 and later to the two Accounting Re-
search Studies by Moonitz and Sprouse in 1962-1963. A committee
of the American Accounting Association issued an influential report
in which it advocated a “decision usefulness” approach in 1966,
which was carried forward in 1973 by the report of the American
Institute of CPAs’ Trueblood Committee. All of this laid the ground-
work for the conceptual framework project of the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB), which published six concepts
statements between 1978 and 1985. A seventh concepts statement is
likely to be published in 2000. It is still not clear how the FASB’s
conceptual framework has influenced the setting of accounting
standards, and some academic commentators are skeptical of the
usefulness of all normative conceptual framework projects.
THE BEGINNINGS1
The earliest attempts to develop a “conceptual framework”
in the U.S. accounting literature were by William A. Paton and
John B. Canning. In his Accounting Theory [1922], Paton pre-
sented “a restatement of the theory of accounting consistent
with the conditions and needs of the business enterprise par
excellence, the large corporation” [pp. iii-iv], and in the final
Acknowledgments: The writer is grateful to Allister Wilson, Tom
Dyckman, Larry Revsine, Chuck Horngren, Denny Beresford, and Jim
Leisenring for comments on an earlier draft. The responsibility for what re-
mains is solely the writer’s. A similar version of the article was originally
published in Spanish in Vol. 28, No. 100 (1999) of the Revista Española de
Financiación y Contabilidad. The editor is grateful to Professor Zeff for allow-
ing AHJ to publish the article in English.
1For a review of the early efforts by the American Accounting Association
and the American Institute of (Certified Public) Accountants, see Storey [1964]
and Zeff [1972, pp. 129-178; 1984].
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chapter he discussed a series of basic assumptions, or “postu-
lates,” that underpin the structure of modern accounting. In
The Economics of Accountancy [1929], Canning was the first to
develop and present a conceptual framework for asset valuation
and measurement founded explicitly on future expectations.
Paton’s book was an expansion of his doctoral dissertation done
at the University of Michigan, and Canning’s was his doctoral
dissertation accepted by the University of Chicago. Through
these works, Paton and Canning influenced many other writers
over the years [for Canning, see Zeff, 2000].
Probably the first institutional attempt to lay the founda-
tions of a conceptual framework was the “Tentative Statement
of Accounting Principles Affecting Corporate Reports,” issued
in 1936 by the executive committee of the American Accounting
Association (AAA) and published in The Accounting Review.2
The main reason for preparing the “Tentative Statement,” a
paean to historical cost accounting, was to provide authorita-
tive guidance to the recently established Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). In fact, the SEC’s accounting staff
frequently cited the “Tentative Statement” with favor, as well as
the revisions thereof issued in 1941 and 1948 and the eight
supplementary statements issued between 1950 and 1954. The
final revision of the Statement, issued in 1957, proved to be too
venturesome beyond established practice for easy acceptance
by the SEC.
An outgrowth of the AAA’s 1936 “Tentative Statement” was
perhaps the most influential monograph in the U.S. accounting
literature, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards,
written by Paton and A. C. Littleton, two of the foremost ac-
counting academics of their day, and published in 1940 by the
AAA. Above all, it was an elegant explication and rationalization
of the historical cost accounting model that was already widely
accepted in the U.S. It met with general acclaim and was used
for many years in accounting courses throughout the country.
The Paton and Littleton monograph, as it came to be known,
probably did as much as any single publication to perpetuate
2The most comprehensive review and analysis of the evolution of the ef-
forts to formulate a conceptual framework in the U.S. is Storey and Storey’s
The Framework of Financial Accounting Concepts and Standards [1998], which
should be consulted by any serious student of the subject. Reed K. Storey, the
senior author of this study, was a long-time member of the FASB’s research
staff and was a major contributor to the board’s conceptual framework project.
For a skeptic’s view of conceptual framework projects, see Macve [1997].
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the use of historical cost accounting in the U.S. Their mono-
graph also popularized the use of “matching” costs and rev-
enues, widely known as the matching convention. Reed K.
Storey [1981, p. 90], who devoted most of his professional ca-
reer to guiding the research for the Accounting Principles
Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, wrote:
The [Paton and Littleton] monograph was a startling
exception to the general proposition that academic
writing has had little effect on accounting practice. . . .
Generations of accountants learned to use it as scrip-
ture. . . .
During the 40 years since the Paton and Littleton
monograph, accounting practice has developed sub-
stantially along the lines specified in the monograph,
and rationalization and theory consistent with the
monograph have been widely used and have been com-
mon in authoritative pronouncements.
Two years before the Paton and Littleton monograph ap-
peared, the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) published
A Statement of Accounting Principles, by Thomas H. Sanders,
Henry Rand Hatfield, and Underhill Moore — two accounting
academics and a law academic — which was, in large measure,
a defense of accepted practice. The monograph had been com-
missioned in 1935 by the Haskins & Sells Foundation in order
that the fledgling SEC, which had declared an interest in pre-
scribing the form and content of financial statements in regis-
tration statements, might be provided with some authoritative
guidance on best accounting practice. In 1938-1939, the AIA be-
came even more active in providing guidance to the SEC when
it authorized its Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) to
issue Accounting Research Bulletins. In one of its first deci-
sions, the committee rejected the option of developing a com-
prehensive statement of accounting principles — a kind of
“conceptual framework” — because the project would take per-
haps five years to complete, during which time the SEC might
lose patience with the committee and instead begin to make its
own accounting rules [Zeff, 1972, p. 137]. Several times in the
1940s and 1950s during the tenure of the CAP, proposals to
develop a set of basic accounting concepts were expressed, and
in the 1940s the Institute’s research department actually issued
an eight-page review of basic accounting principles [AIA, 1945].
However, none of these initiatives was taken up by the commit-
tee as part of its program of work [Zeff, 1972, pp. 141-143].
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Also during the 1940s and 1950s, both within the Institute’s
committee and between the committee and the SEC’s account-
ing staff, an accumulated frustration arose from disagreements
on a number of controversial accounting issues, including de-
ferred tax accounting, historical cost v. current value, the pro-
priety of general price-level adjustments, and the treatment of
unusual items in the profit and loss statement. Representatives
on the committee from the major public accounting firms dif-
fered philosophically on the pervasive issue of whether to im-
pose a greater degree of uniformity or to permit flexibility in
the choice of accounting methods [see Zeff, 1984, pp. 458-459].
This continuing discord reflected unfavorably on the work of
the committee. Believing that a stronger research component
was needed to support the committee’s deliberations, the
Institute’s incoming president, Alvin R. Jennings [1958, p. 32],
proposed establishment of a research foundation that would
“carry on continuous examination and re-examination of basic
accounting assumptions and to develop authoritative state-
ments for the guidance of both industry and our profession.” At
the same time, Leonard Spacek [1957, p. 21], the pugnacious
managing partner of Arthur Andersen & Co., was publicly criti-
cizing the accounting profession for not establishing the prem-
ises and principles of accounting. Pressure began to build for a
better approach to establishing “generally accepted accounting
principles” (GAAP) than was being done on a case-by-case basis
by the CAP. It was hoped that a program of fundamental re-
search could enable the committee to resolve some of its deep
disagreements and also to persuade the SEC of the merit of
new approaches. Jennings thereupon set up a Special Commit-
tee on Research Program to study and make recommendations
on the Institute’s role in establishing accounting principles, in-
cluding especially the research component.
ERA OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
The Institute’s Special Committee on Research Program
was composed of leading figures from the ranks of auditors,
preparers, and academics, and also included the SEC chief ac-
countant. In its path-breaking report published in 1958, the
committee proposed the establishment of both an Accounting
Principles Board (APB) to replace the CAP and an accounting
research division to support the APB. The committee identified
four broad levels at which financial accounting should be
addressed: postulates, principles, rules or other guides for the
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application of principles to specific situations, and research
[Report to Council of the Special Committee on Research Pro-
gram, 1958, p. 63]. The term “postulates” had been little used in
the accounting literature. The committee asserted that postu-
lates “are few in number and are the basic assumptions on
which principles rest. They necessarily are derived from the
economic and political environment and from the modes of
thought and customs of all segments of the business commu-
nity” [p. 63]. It added that “a fairly broad set of co-ordinated
accounting principles should be formulated on the basis of the
postulates” [p. 63]. The first priority of the research division
was to commission studies on the accounting postulates and
broad accounting principles. The committee said that “the re-
sults of these [studies], as adopted by the [Accounting Prin-
ciples] Board, should serve as the foundation for the entire
body of future pronouncements by the Institute on accounting
matters, to which each new release should be related” [p. 67].
Thus was born the first institutional program to establish a
conceptual framework — with principles predicated on postu-
lates — although the term “conceptual framework” itself did
not come into vogue until the 1970s.
The Institute accepted the committee’s recommendations,
and in 1959 the APB succeeded the CAP. An accounting profes-
sor at the University of California at Berkeley, Maurice
Moonitz, was appointed the full-time director of accounting re-
search, and he proceeded to commission the research studies
on postulates and broad principles. Moonitz assigned to himself
the project on postulates, and he collaborated with his Berkeley
colleague, Robert T. Sprouse, on the research study dealing
with broad principles.
Moonitz’s The Basic Postulates of Accounting, Accounting
Research Study No. 1, was published in 1961, and it consisted
of an exposition and explanation of three tiers of accounting
postulates, treating the environment, the field of accounting,
and the imperatives (such as going concern, objectivity, consis-
tency, the monetary unit, materiality and conservatism, and
disclosure). It was not clear from Moonitz’s study whether he
favored historical cost accounting or a version of current value
accounting; thus, many readers found his study to be too ab-
stract and general to engage their interest and critical thought.
The follow-up study by Sprouse and Moonitz, A Tentative Set of
Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, Account-
ing Research Study No. 3, which was published in 1962,
evinced no such neutrality. Drawing on Moonitz’s postulates,
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the authors argued that less reliance should be placed on the
realization concept “as an essential feature of accounting” [p.
15] and that the use of current values should be expanded,
which, in view of the SEC’s long-standing antipathy to depar-
tures from historical cost accounting, immediately became con-
troversial if not objectionable. Sprouse and Moonitz advocated
the use of current replacement costs for merchandise invento-
ries and for plant and equipment, as well as the use of dis-
counted present values for receivables and payables to be
settled in cash. In the early 1960s, the use of present values of
expected future cash receipts was virtually unknown in U.S.
financial reporting, and current values (except in “lower of cost
or market”) were hardly to be found. Sprouse and Moonitz also
recommended that the holding gain or loss from revaluing in-
ventories should be taken to profit [p. 30]. Nine of the 12 mem-
bers of the project advisory committees for the postulates and
principles studies commented on Sprouse and Moonitz’s rec-
ommendations in a section appended to their study, and the
reactions of eight of the nine ranged from tepid to dismissive.
Three of the sternest critics were the SEC chief accountant and
two previous SEC chief accountants. The APB itself, which was
charged with deciding whether to adopt the two research stud-
ies or not, issued a famous statement in which it discarded the
two studies as “too radically different from present generally
accepted accounting principles for acceptance at this time”
[APB, 1962].
Moonitz and Sprouse had thought their assignment was to
develop a rational argument for a sound approach to financial
reporting. Most members of the APB and other leaders of the
accounting profession, by contrast, looked upon basic research
as an instrument for rationalizing the status quo (in the tradi-
tion of the Paton and Littleton monograph), rather than as a
normative argument for fundamental change in accounting.
Above all, the SEC was at that time a conservative regulator,
which regarded departures from the “objectivity” of historical
cost accounting as possessing the potential to deceive the read-
ers of financial statements. In the 1960s, the SEC saw its mis-
sion chiefly as one of guarding against misleading financial
statements rather than of improving the information content of
the statements. As a result of the APB’s rejection of the postu-
lates and principles studies, the cause of basic accounting re-
search as a foundation stone for pronouncements on specific
subjects suffered a severe setback, and the board instead began
to deal with specific issues, much as had the CAP before it,
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without a body of underlying concepts on which to draw.
One of the project advisory committee members, Paul
Grady, a retired partner of Price Waterhouse & Co. who was a
protégé of the former doyen of the accounting profession,
George O. May, argued that a summary of GAAP would be
timely. He believed, much as did his academic mentor, A. C.
Littleton, that theoretical explanations should be derived induc-
tively from practice. The APB commissioned Grady to under-
take such a study, and in 1965 the Institute published his Inven-
tory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business
Enterprises (Accounting Research Study No. 5), which, he
hoped, would be kept up to date by periodic supplements. The
study was in great demand overseas, for it was seen as an au-
thoritative compilation of accepted U.S. practice. Although
Grady’s study undertook to identify basic concepts, objectives,
and principles implicit in current pronouncements, it offered
little to portend an improvement in practice. At the least, his
study purported to show that accounting rested on basic con-
cepts, objectives, and principles, contrary to the view held by
skeptics.
In the mid-1960s, the APB responded to the recommenda-
tion of a special committee that the board “enumerate and de-
scribe the basic concepts to which accounting principles should
be oriented” and “state the accounting principles to which prac-
tices and procedures should conform” [emphasis supplied; Zeff,
1972, p. 196]. This was, at last, a charge that the board should
adopt a normative stance toward the development of basic con-
cepts, and not just synthesize accepted practice. It was intended
that the final product would be an Opinion of the board, carry-
ing status as a mandatory pronouncement. The board and one
of its committees labored for five years, during which its mem-
bers had great difficulty reaching agreement on the normative
propositions. In the end, it was easiest to achieve agreement on
a mostly descriptive statement, which was published as State-
ment No. 4 in 1970 under the title, Basic Concepts and Account-
ing Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business En-
terprises. As a Statement, instead of an Opinion, the document
was not mandatory and its contents could be ignored. The issu-
ance of a mostly descriptive statement greatly disappointed
those who had hoped that the board finally would provide a
blueprint for principled improvement in financial reporting. A
member of the APB, George R. Catlett of Arthur Andersen &
Co., dissented to the Statement “because in his view it fails to
provide what purports to be ‘a basis for guiding the future
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development of financial accounting’” [APB, 1970, p. 105].
Nonetheless, even as a descriptive statement, the document was
comprehensive, perceptive, and deeply analytical, and its con-
tents have frequently been cited when insights into existing
practice were being discussed.
AAA’S A STATEMENT OF BASIC ACCOUNTING THEORY
While the CAP and the APB, which were composed mostly
of accounting practitioners, were unable or unwilling to de-
velop a normative set of underlying concepts and basic prin-
ciples, committees of accounting academics had no such reluc-
tance. In 1966, a committee of the American Accounting
Association published a pioneering monograph, entitled A
Statement of Basic Accounting Theory (ASOBAT), which redi-
rected attention away from the inherent virtues of asset valua-
tion models and toward the “decision usefulness” of financial
statements.3  It defined accounting as “the process of identify-
ing, measuring, and communicating economic information to
permit informed judgments and decisions by users of the infor-
mation” [AAA, 1966, p. 1]. While that definition would hardly
be exceptional today, in the 1960s, when theorists were actively
debating the superiority of alternative asset valuation models
[see, for example, Nelson, 1973; Henderson and Peirson, 1983,
chs. 8 and 9; Lee, 1996], an explicit orientation toward the
users of information was a breath of fresh air. The committee
[AAA, 1966, pp. 23-24] also placed emphasis on futurity:
The committee suggests that accounting information
for external users should reflect their needs by report-
ing measurements and formulations thought to be rel-
evant in the making of forecasts without implying that
the information supplied is wholly adequate for such
prediction.
Almost all external users of financial information re-
ported by a profit-oriented firm are involved in efforts
to predict the earnings of the firm for some future pe-
riod. Such predictions are most crucial in the case of
present and prospective equity investors and their rep-
resentatives — considered by many to be the most im-
portant of the user groups. . . . The past earnings of the
3For a discussion of the “decision usefulness” approach, see the AAA’s
Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance [AAA, 1977, pp. 10-21];
much fuller coverage appears in Staubus [forthcoming].
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firm are considered to be the most important single
item of information relevant to the prediction of
future earnings. It follows from this that past earnings
should be measured and disclosed in such a manner as
to give a user as much aid as practicable in efforts to
make this prediction with a minimum of uncertainty
[pp. 23-24].4
The committee identified and elaborated upon “four basic
standards for accounting information . . . that provide criteria
to be used in evaluating potential accounting information”: rel-
evance, verifiability, freedom from bias, and quantifiability [p.
8]. It then judged a number of accounting problem areas
against those standards [pp. 27-36]. In one of its more impor-
tant judgments, on historical cost v. current value, the commit-
tee [pp. 30-31] concluded, after weighing verifiability against
relevance, that financial reporting should display information
drawn from both models (which was a radical recommendation
at the time):
The presentation of historical [transaction-based] in-
formation alone excludes the full impact of the envi-
ronment on the firm; presentation of current cost in-
formation alone obscures the record of consummated
market transactions. The committee recommends that
both kinds of information be presented in a multi-val-
ued report, in which the two kinds of information ap-
pear in adjacent columns.
In a little-noticed section of the report, the committee
[p. 29] suggested that “accountants usually have required too
narrow a view of compliance with the standard of quantifi-
ability” and that, in the light of the uncertainty surrounding
accounting measurements, “there is no compelling reason why
the accountant should not report in terms of interval estimates
or probability distributions.”
Robert R. Sterling [1967a, pp. 99-100], an important ac-
counting theorist of the day, assessed ASOBAT as follows:
The committee has invited us to view accounting as a
measurement-information system. This new view pre-
cludes some questions but poses others. In their refer-
4In 1969, another AAA committee issued a major report on the extent to
which current financial reporting practices satisfy the needs of investors and
creditors in the light of ASOBAT’s suggested standards for accounting informa-
tion [AAA, 1969].
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ence frame, it is no longer appropriate to argue about
which convention or assumption comes closest to the
‘actual’ cost or income; it is not appropriate to assume
that if we carefully describe (fully disclose) the meth-
ods used, then the figures will be meaningful, or that
only invested costs or transaction data are the subject
matter of accounting or that by its very name account-
ing reflects costs. Under the new view, measurements
in accounting are a function of some end.
This is a change in ‘world-view’ and is the stuff that
revolutions are made of [footnote omitted].
A BIG EIGHT FIRM ANNOUNCES ITS OWN
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
In 1972, the Big Eight firm of Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA)
issued a 130-page booklet entitled Objectives of Financial State-
ments for Business Enterprises. The development of this unique
publication grew out of the firm’s frustration with the failure of
the APB to agree on a normative statement of concepts and
principles in its Statement No. 4 in 1970 [Wyatt, 1999, p. 161].
The firm focused on “objectives” because the Institute’s
Trueblood Committee was then engaged in a major study of the
objectives of financial statements (see the next section). AA’s
booklet was critical of existing accounting practice, especially
its emphasis on conservatism and historical cost as a goal in-
stead of as a method toward a goal [pp. 34-38]. It emphasized
instead that “financial statements must be fair to all users and
should provide the basis for resolving [their] conflicting inter-
ests…” [p. 8], a view that the firm’s former managing partner
and chairman, Leonard Spacek, had been advocating in
speeches since the 1950s [see A Search for Fairness…, 1969].
The firm [p. 116] concluded that the overall purpose of finan-
cial statements:
. . . is to communicate information concerning the na-
ture and value of the economic resources of a business
enterprise, the interests of creditors and the equity of
owners in the economic resources, and the changes in
the nature and value of those resources from period to
period.
One implication of this objective was that assets should be
measured at current value, and the firm recommended that
unrealized holding gains and losses be disclosed in the income
statement [chs. 7 and 8].
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AA’s proposal was a bold one, and it was the only account-
ing firm to issue such an elaborate statement of its views.
THE TRUEBLOOD REPORT:
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The decision usefulness approach that found acceptance in
ASOBAT was carried forward into a major report issued in 1973
by a special committee of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA)5  on the objectives of financial
statements. The committee was formed in 1971, after three of
the Big Eight firms (including AA) had made known their con-
cerns over the ineffectiveness of the APB, including its inability
to resist pressures from special interests, especially preparers
[see Zeff, 1984, pp. 463-464]. The AICPA formed two special
committees in this crisis setting. The first, known as the Study
Group on the Establishment of Accounting Principles, or the
Wheat Committee, met to recommend improvements in the
process of establishing those principles. In its report [Establish-
ing Financial Accounting Standards, 1972], the committee pro-
posed a full-time, independent body known as the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) under the wing of a new
Financial Accounting Foundation. The AICPA promptly ap-
proved the Wheat Committee’s report and created the FASB to
succeed the APB in July 1973. The second special committee,
the Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements, or
the Trueblood Committee, was composed of leading practi-
tioners, academics, and users of accounting information, and
was charged with proposing the fundamental objectives of fi-
nancial statements to guide the improvement of financial re-
porting. It was to produce a normative statement, not an infer-
ence drawn from practice. Importantly, the research director of
the Trueblood Committee, George H. Sorter, an accounting
professor at the University of Chicago, had been one of the
most influential members of the AAA committee that had devel-
oped ASOBAT.6  Sorter also played a major role in the drafting
of the Trueblood Committee’s report.7
5In 1957, the American Institute of Accountants changed its name to the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
6Telephone interview with Charles T. Zlatkovich, chairman of the ASOBAT
Committee, April 3, 1999.
7Telephone interview with Oscar S. Gellein, a member of the Trueblood
Committee, March 19, 1999. See Sorter [1973] for a discussion of the main
points in the Trueblood report and of the approach used by the committee.
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The Trueblood Committee’s report, Objectives of Financial
Statements, which was issued in October 1973, embraced
ASOBAT’s decision usefulness approach and focused even more
specifically on future cash flows [p. 20]:
An objective of financial statements is to provide infor-
mation useful to investors and creditors for predicting,
comparing, and evaluating potential cash flows to
them in terms of amount, timing, and related uncer-
tainty.
The committee said that financial statements should “serve
primarily those users who have limited authority, ability, or
resources to obtain information and who rely on financial state-
ments as their principal source of information about an
enterprise’s economic activities” [p. 17]. While the committee
devoted primary attention to investors and creditors, it also
regarded managers and employees as coming within the set of
financial statement users, and it concluded, “While users may
differ, their economic decisions are similar. Each user meas-
ures sacrifices and benefits in terms of the actual or prospective
disbursement or receipt of cash” [p. 18].
Following in the steps of ASOBAT, the committee thought
it desirable to enumerate several “qualitative characteristics of
reporting”: relevance and materiality, form and substance, reli-
ability, freedom from bias, comparability, consistency, and un-
derstandability [ch. 10]. The committee concluded, much as
had the AAA committee that had prepared ASOBAT, that “the
objectives of financial statements cannot be best served by the
exclusive use of a single valuation basis” [p. 41]. The Trueblood
Committee considered an even broader array of valuation bases
than did the AAA committee: historical cost, exit values, current
replacement cost, and discounted cash flows, and it counseled
that “the specific combination of valuation bases to be used is
an implementation issue” [p. 42]. The committee helpfully sug-
gested how each of the valuation bases could be fitted to the
information requirements they most likely would fulfill.
In two sections of the Trueblood report that are often
overlooked, the committee commented on the fallibility of
single numbers in financial statements as well as on the use of
financial statements to help achieve social goals. As to the
former, the committee followed ASOBAT by observing that
“measurements in terms of single numbers that do not indicate
possible ranges and dispersions pose problems in describing
events subject to uncertainty” [p. 39]. This is a point that has
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seldom been raised explicitly in policy-making circles. The com-
mittee concluded by suggesting [p. 40]:
To satisfy the individual preferences of users for pre-
dicting and controlling the impact of current events on
enterprise earning power, some apparently simple
quantifications should be supplemented to represent
their actual complexities by disclosing ranges of preci-
sion, reliability, and uncertainty.
In a broader societal context, the Trueblood Committee stated
that the social goals of enterprise are no less important than the
economic goals. Citing pollution as an example, the committee
drew attention to “those enterprise activities which require sac-
rifices from those who do not benefit” [p. 54]. It concluded that
[p. 55]:
An objective of financial statements is to report on
those activities of the enterprise affecting society which
can be determined and described or measured and
which are important to the role of the enterprise in its
social environment.
The Trueblood report was remarkable for the freshness of
its approach. It did much to refocus discussions in the account-
ing policy arena from stewardship reporting to providing infor-
mation useful for decision makers. The report became a kind of
blueprint for the conceptual framework project that the newly
established FASB was just beginning.8
ERA OF THE FASB: EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
The Wheat Committee, in its report which recommended
the establishment of the FASB, did not envision that the board
would undertake to develop a conceptual framework. In its re-
port, the committee [1972, pp. 19, 78] wrote as follows:
The need for a fundamental conceptual foundation
has been much debated in accounting circles for many
years. We believe this debate may have produced more
heat than light. Financial accounting and reporting are
8The transcript of proceedings from the Trueblood Committee’s public
hearing held in May 1972 was published in a two-volume typescript. In addi-
tion, significant research, reference, and resource materials that were consid-
ered by the Trueblood Committee during the development of its report were
reproduced in Objectives of Financial Statements: Selected Papers [1974]. For a
discussion of the Trueblood report, see “Studies on Financial Accounting Ob-
jectives: 1974” [1974].
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not grounded in natural laws as are the physical sci-
ences, but must rest on a set of conventions or stand-
ards designed to achieve what are perceived to be the
desired objectives of financial accounting and report-
ing. We understand the primary work of the [True-
blood Committee] to be the development of such objec-
tives and some guidelines for their achievement.
The work of the ongoing standard-setting body
should be to develop standards for preparing financial
accounting information that will be consistent with
these objectives.
and
We do not believe that the [FASB’s] staff should be
expected to conduct a broad, fundamental research
program dealing with basic concepts on an ongoing
basis, since we believe that this type of research is best
left to those in the academic field.
Nonetheless, in November 1973, five months into its first year
of operation as successor to the APB, the FASB [“Board Meets
with Trueblood Study Group,” 1973] reported that it would be
tackling “the entire hierarchy of financial accounting theory,”
beginning with the Trueblood report:
Once objectives are agreed upon, the Board intends to
address itself to the entire hierarchy of financial ac-
counting theory, including qualitative characteristics,
the types of information needed by users of financial
statements, and basic accounting concepts.
A month later, in December 1973, the board announced
that its project on “Broad Qualitative Standards for Financial
Reporting,” which had been set the previous April, was being
enlarged under a new and more impressive title, “Conceptual
Framework for Accounting and Reporting: Objectives, Qualita-
tive Characteristics and Information” [“Task Force Appointed,”
1973, p. 1]. There was thus no doubt that the board intended to
develop a full-fledged conceptual framework, and the board’s
term, “conceptual framework,” came to be widely used for such
an undertaking.9
9Gore [1992] has provided a critical analysis of the development of the
board’s conceptual framework project. See Agrawal [1987] for an analysis of
the logical structure of the conceptual framework. For insights into the dy-
namic within the board and the politics affecting its decisions on the concep-
tual framework, see Miller et al. [1998, ch. 4].
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Robert T. Sprouse, an original member of the board who
served as its vice chairman from 1975 to 1985, has said that two
factors drove the board to embark on a conceptual framework.
First, the board felt obliged to carry on the work of the
Trueblood Committee [Sprouse, 1988, p. 124]. Second, the
board required a framework of concepts to help it address the
six technical projects on its initial agenda: research and devel-
opment, contingencies, leases, foreign currency translation,
business segments, and materiality. Sprouse [1984/85, p. 25]10
has written:
Almost immediately the board recognized the need
to develop certain fundamental concepts that it could
look to for rational and consistent guidance in analyz-
ing and resolving issues. The absence of an established
concept of something as basic as an asset was a handi-
cap in addressing accounting for research and develop-
ment costs; the absence of an established concept of
something equally as basic as a liability made resolving
the issues in accounting for contingencies more diffi-
cult. Those first experiences strengthened the new
board’s recognition of the importance of establishing a
conceptual framework for analyzing issues and relating
its decisions to that framework.
The following year, in June 1974, the board issued its first
discussion memorandum in the “Conceptual Framework for Ac-
counting and Reporting” project, dealing with the objectives
and qualitative characteristics recommended by the Trueblood
Committee [FASB, 1974]. Discussion memoranda are objective
analyses of issues facing the board, without any indication of
the board’s views or preferences. The board held a public hear-
ing on the discussion memorandum in September 1974.
In December 1976, the board issued two important docu-
ments relating to the conceptual framework project. One was
Tentative Conclusions on Objectives of Financial Statements of
Business Enterprises [FASB, 1976], based on an analysis of the
written comments received and oral testimony at the public
hearing held on the June 1974 discussion memorandum. The
other document was a 360-page discussion memorandum sub-
titled Elements of Financial Statements and Their Measurement.
The discussion memorandum on elements also included an
extensive treatment of both the qualitative characteristics of
10See also Kirk [1989, pp. 89-90].
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financial information and the measurement of the elements.
Both the board’s tentative conclusions on objectives and the
contents of its lengthy discussion memorandum on the rest of
the conceptual framework were the subject of a public hearing
set for June 1977.
The board’s tentative conclusions on objectives were note-
worthy for the inclusion of an appendix on modern capital mar-
ket theory, which represented the first acknowledgment by a
U.S. standard setter of this important stream of research in the
finance literature. The December 1976 discussion memoran-
dum devoted an important section to the choice to be made
between the “asset and liability view” and the more traditional
“revenue and expense view” (associated with the Paton and
Littleton monograph) for defining earnings [paras. 32-70 and
ch. 5]. Under the “asset and liability view,” which the board
eventually came to favor, the definition of earnings depends on
the definitions of assets and liabilities, so that a balance sheet
test must be invoked to validate the existence of earnings, rev-
enues, and expenses.11 The discussion memorandum also con-
tained a chapter on the important distinction between “finan-
cial capital maintenance” and “physical capital maintenance”
[ch. 6], which had not received much explicit attention in the
U.S. accounting literature. It also presented an extensive discus-
sion of the “attributes of assets”: historical cost, current cost,
exit value, and present value [ch. 8].
Between 1974 and 1985, the FASB issued 30 publications
(eight discussion memoranda, seven research reports, eight ex-
posure drafts, one invitation to comment, and six concepts
statements) in its massive conceptual framework project, total-
ing over 3,000 pages.12 In addition, the board received more
11Storey and Storey [1998] have written that the board’s adoption of the
primacy of the asset and liability view “still is undoubtedly the most controver-
sial, and the most misunderstood and misrepresented, concept in the entire
conceptual framework” [p. 76], chiefly because the asset and liability view was
seen by many as a device to “impose some kind of current value accounting on
an unwilling world” [p. 83]. They discussed the controversy at some length [pp.
47-66, 76-85].
Robert T. Sprouse believed that the asset and liability view would rid
balance sheets of “what-you-may-call-its,” which were the unintelligible resi-
dues produced by the matching convention [Sprouse, 1966]. Also see Sprouse
[1977, pp. 12-13; 1988, pp. 126-127].
12For a complete list of the publications, see Gore [1992, Appendix 2]. One
discussion memorandum, two research reports, two exposure drafts, and two
concepts statements (4 and 6) constituted the adaptation of the conceptual
framework to nonbusiness entities, which is not discussed in this paper. Two
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than 1,000 letters of comment in response to its discussion
memoranda and exposure drafts, and it held eight public hear-
ings covering 20 days of oral testimony, which was transcribed
and placed on the public record. The written record and the
amount of board member and staff time dedicated to the
project were immense. It was estimated that, in the early 1980s,
the conceptual framework project accounted for as much as 40
percent of the board’s technical staff time [Van Riper, 1994, p.
81].
ERA OF THE FASB: THE CONCEPTS STATEMENTS13
The FASB issued six Statements of Financial Accounting
Concepts, known as concepts statements, of which two (Nos. 4
and 6) represented adaptations to nonbusiness entities. The
FASB [Concepts Statement 2, pp. i-ii] stated the purpose of the
concepts statements as follows:
Statements in the series are intended to set forth objec-
tives and fundamentals that will be the basis for devel-
opment of financial accounting and reporting stand-
ards. . . .
The conceptual framework is a coherent system of
interrelated objectives and fundamentals that is ex-
pected to lead to consistent standards and that pre-
scribes the nature, function, and limits of financial ac-
counting and reporting. It is expected to serve the
public interest by providing structure and direction to
financial accounting and reporting to facilitate the pro-
vision of evenhanded financial and related information
that is useful in assisting capital and other markets to
function efficiently in allocating scarce resources in the
economy. . . .
discussion memoranda and the invitation to comment, which dealt with mat-
ters of the display of accounting information, treated subjects that were in-
cluded in the exposure draft entitled Reporting Income, Cash Flows, and Finan-
cial Position of Business Enterprises [FASB, 1981] but which did not eventually
mature into a concepts statement. Included in the above enumeration of FASB
documents is the discussion memorandum on Criteria for Determining Materi-
ality, issued on March 21, 1975, which was not formally part of the conceptual
framework project. Nonetheless, the conceptual aspects of the materiality
project were incorporated into the qualitative characteristics project in 1978.
13For more extensive discussion of the board’s concepts statements, see
Davies et al. [1997, pp. 46-63], Pacter [1983], Solomons [1986], Wolk et al.
[1992, ch. 6], and Miller et al. [1998, pp. 105-115].
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Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts do not
establish standards prescribing accounting procedures
or disclosure practices for particular items or events,
which are issued by the Board as Statements of Finan-
cial Accounting Standards. Rather, Statements in this
series describe concepts and relations that will underlie
future financial accounting standards and practices
and in due course serve as a basis for evaluating exist-
ing standards and practices.
Objectives: The comments received on the discussion memoran-
dum on objectives proved to be an education for board mem-
bers. In 1975, the board conducted a survey of opinion on the
Trueblood recommendations. Marshall S. Armstrong [1977, p.
77], the board chairman, reported one finding that disturbed
him:
In our first discussion memorandum on the conceptual
framework of accounting, the most important project
on our agenda, we sought an expression of opinion
from respondents on the following as a basic objective
of financial statements; it is taken directly from the
Trueblood report:
‘The basic objective of financial statements is to pro-
vide information useful for making economic deci-
sions.’
Could there be disagreement with a statement such
as this? I am sure you will be astounded to learn that
only 37 percent of our respondents were able to recom-
mend the adoption of this objective. Twenty-two per-
cent recommended that it be rejected out of hand; and
10 percent insisted that it needed further study. It is
difficult to believe that only 37 percent can agree that
the basic objective of financial statements is to provide
information useful for making economic decisions. I
think this suggests the problem quite clearly.
Those who disagreed took the position that the basic
function of financial statements was to report on
management’s stewardship of corporate assets and that
the informational needs of readers was of secondary
importance. It follows from this line of thinking that
management can best determine the principles to be
employed in reporting on their firms, and that stand-
ards — standards almost of any sort — can only im-
pede management in its effort to fulfill this responsibil-
ity.
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Two accounting academics observed that the respondents to
the FASB survey probably thought of furthering their own per-
sonal interests rather than promoting the interests of readers
generally. Reflecting on Armstrong’s expression of concern,
Dopuch and Sunder [1980, p. 13]14 wrote:
Why should we believe all groups of interested parties
would adopt the provision of information useful for
making economic decisions as their motivation for
being involved in the financial reporting process? For
example, we should not be surprised if auditors, like
everyone else, seek to maximize their own wealth
through participation in the accounting process. If the
provision of economically useful information implies
greater exposure to the risk of being sued without cor-
responding benefits of higher compensation, they will
not see the provision of economically useful informa-
tion (however defined) as their objective of the finan-
cial accounting process.
One might have added that most auditors had probably been
educated to believe that accounting serves primarily a steward-
ship function, and that they would find it somewhat threaten-
ing to contemplate that accounting should have a more activist
function in economic society. Such preconceptions and predis-
positions made it difficult for the board to impose a decision
usefulness objective on a profession that had been accustomed
to view accounting as basically a passive record-keeping activ-
ity.
Concepts Statement 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by
Business Enterprises, issued in November 1978, closely followed
Trueblood’s emphasis on futurity, as indicated by the following
key passage [para. 37]:
Financial reporting should provide information to help
present and potential investors and creditors and other
users in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncer-
tainty of prospective cash receipts from dividends or
interest and the proceeds from the sale, redemption, or
maturity of securities or loans.
In Statement 1, the board preferred the broader term, fi-
nancial reporting, over the narrower term, financial statements,
14For further discussion of the “politics” of developing a conceptual frame-
work, see Rappaport [1977], Horngren [1981], Miller [1990], and Van Riper
[1994, pp. 20-22, 75-82].
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used in the Trueblood report. Donald J. Kirk [1988, p. 13], the
FASB chairman when all of the concepts statements were ap-
proved, later explained how this decision “blunted” some of the
opposition to the evolving conceptual framework, which
seemed to many to raise the specter of current value account-
ing:
It was thought by this broadening that, as under the
securities laws, the needs of users could be satisfied
through disclosures, possibly even separate from the
financial statements, and, therefore, not require the
type of income measurement changes that opponents
feared [that is, current value accounting].
David Solomons, an accounting professor at the University
of Pennsylvania and the principal draftsman of the Wheat re-
port, wrote a critique of the board’s Concepts Statements 1-4 in
which he gave the statement on objectives a grade of C, be-
cause, he said, “the purposes that the board has defined for
financial reporting are excessively narrow” [Solomons, 1986, p.
118]. He wrote [p. 118]:
. . . while the Trueblood report recognized, however
briefly, that business enterprises had a responsibility to
society and not just to their stockholders, the board’s
statement on objectives substantially confines its atten-
tion to the needs of investors and creditors, barely rec-
ognizes the needs of managers, and ignores altogether
the interests of other groups with an interest in enter-
prise productivity, such as labor and the tax authori-
ties.
To this writer, Solomons’ overall evaluation of the state-
ment seems to be more critical than necessary.
Qualitative Characteristics: Concepts Statement 2, Qualitative
Characteristics of Accounting Information, was issued in May
1980.15 Donald Kirk [1988, p.13] has written that “defining the
characteristics of useful financial information was the least
controversial of the conceptual framework projects, in part be-
cause readers did not see implications that portended current
value accounting.”
Statement 2 followed in the tradition of ASOBAT and
the Trueblood report and, in the decision usefulness mode,
15For an analysis of Statement 2, see Storey and Storey [1998, pp. 98-119].
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enumerated and explained a hierarchy of qualities of account-
ing information. David Solomons, who drafted the statement at
the invitation of the board, rectified the overemphasis on inves-
tors and creditors in Statement 1 [see para. 26 of Statement 2],
which he was later to criticize. “Relevance” and “reliability”
were the two pillars, and at several places the inevitable
tradeoffs between the two were discussed. “Reliability” was
supported by “representational faithfulness” (a term coined by
Solomons) and “verifiability.” Representational faithfulness,
which was defined as “correspondence or agreement between a
measure or description and the phenomenon it purports to rep-
resent” [para. 63], was a more elegant and comprehensive con-
cept than “freedom from bias” in ASOBAT and the Trueblood
report. In the discussion of verifiability, the term “objectivity”
was nowhere to be found, probably to allow for the admissibil-
ity of departures from historical cost accounting. “Objectivity”
was similarly absent in ASOBAT and the Trueblood report.
“Verifiability,” it was stated, “implies consensus. Verifiability
can be measured by looking at the dispersion of a number of
independent measurements of some particular phenomenon”
[para. 84].
In contrast to ASOBAT and the Trueblood report, the board
envisioned a role for “conservatism,” albeit constrained: “There
is a place for a convention such as conservatism — meaning
prudence — in financial accounting and reporting, because
business and economic activities are surrounded by uncer-
tainty, but it needs to be applied with care” [para. 92]. But the
board made clear that “conservatism in financial reporting
should no longer connote deliberate, consistent understatement
of net assets and profits” [para. 93].16 The board carefully lim-
ited the use of conservatism as follows [para. 95]:
Conservatism is a prudent reaction to uncertainty to
try to ensure that uncertainties and risks inherent in
business situations are adequately considered. Thus, if
two estimates of amounts to be received or paid in the
future are about equally likely, conservatism dictates
using the less optimistic estimate; however, if two
amounts are not equally likely, conservatism does not
necessarily dictate using the more pessimistic amount
rather than the more likely one.
16Sterling [1967b] has reported finding considerable support for the hy-
pothesis that conservatism is the fundamental principle of valuation in tradi-
tional accounting.
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The board’s discussion of “neutrality” very much followed
from Solomons [1978] and alerted readers to the proper pos-
ture of the standard setter in a politicized world [see Kirk, 1988,
pp. 13-14]. The essential position set forth in the statement was
[para. 106]:
While rejecting the view that financial accounting
standards should be slanted for political reasons or to
favor one economic interest or another, the Board rec-
ognizes that a standard-setting authority must be alert
to the economic impact of the standards that it pro-
mulgates.
Finally, “comparability” was introduced as a desideratum
[paras. 111-122], and it was stated that accounting decisions
must satisfy a materiality screen or threshold [paras. 123-132].
Invoking a variant on a passage that has been used since the
1960s to characterize “comparability,” the board asserted that
greater comparability “is not to be attained by making unlike
things look alike any more than by making like things look
different” [para. 119].
Statement 2 is perhaps the most admired and most emu-
lated of the board’s concepts statements. The analysis is logi-
cally and sensibly ordered, it is well explained (reflecting
Solomons’ penchant for metaphors), and the terms are carefully
defined. Miller et al. [1998, p. 110] have written that Statement
2 “provides a set of definitions that the Board and its constitu-
ents can and do use to communicate with each other. The defi-
nitions bring more rigor to the due process, and possibly to the
thought processes of the participants.” Former chairman Kirk
[1988, p. 13] has written that Statement 2 “has contributed
greatly to the understanding of the need for and purpose of
standards.” Davies et al. [1997, p. 63], three partners in the U.K.
firm of Ernst & Young who have studied the FASB’s conceptual
framework in depth, praised Statement 2 as “outstanding
work.”
An empirical study of the views of 26 former members of
the APB and of the FASB, however, yielded an opposite finding.
The subjects were tested for their views on whether the 11
qualitative characteristics were operational, comprehensive,
and parsimonious (i.e., free of significant redundancies in
meaning). The researchers [Joyce et al., 1982, p. 670] concluded
as follows:
Many of the results reported here are not favorable
to the Statement. Nine of the 11 qualitative characteris-
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tics clearly fail the tests of operationality. Not only is
there considerable disagreement among experienced
policy makers on what the qualitative characteristics
mean in the context of particular accounting policy is-
sues, there is also considerable disagreement on their
relative importance. While the qualitative characteris-
tics appear to comprise a comprehensive set for choos-
ing among accounting alternatives, the set is not a par-
simonious one. Thus the Statement fails to meet two
out of its three desired criteria.
This casts doubt on the ability of the qualitative
characteristics defined in the Statement to facilitate ac-
counting policy making.
Elements: Concepts Statement 3, Elements of Financial State-
ments for Business Enterprises, was issued in December 1980,
seven months after Statement 2. It sets forth the definitions of
assets, liabilities, equity, investments by and distributions to
owners, and comprehensive income and its components (rev-
enues, expenses, gains, and losses) that are collectively the “ele-
ments” of financial statements. As motivation, former board
chairman Kirk [1988, p. 15] wrote that the need for workable
definitions of assets and liabilities on such projects as research
and development costs and accounting for contingencies, both
of which were on the board’s initial agenda, “served as a cata-
lyst” for the elements project.
This is the statement in which the board made known its
preference for the “asset and liability view” over the “revenue
and expense view” for defining earnings. While the board did
not actually discuss the two views in the statement, one notices
that revenues, expenses, and gains and losses were defined in
terms of assets and liabilities. Hence, revenues were defined as
“inflows or other enhancements of assets of an entity or settle-
ments of its liabilities (or a combination of both) during a
period from delivering or producing goods, rendering services,
or other activities that constitute the entity’s ongoing major or
central operations” [emphasis supplied, footnote omitted; para.
63]. By contrast, the definition of revenues propounded 25
years earlier in the Institute’s Accounting Terminology Bulletin
No. 2 reflected the traditional “revenue and expense view,”
without a reference to assets or liabilities. It was: “Revenue
results from the sale of goods and the rendering of services and
is measured by the charge made to customers, clients, or ten-
ants for goods and services furnished to them” [Proceeds,
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Revenue, Income, Profit, and Earnings, 1955, p. 34].
It was in this statement (presaged in the exposure draft of
December 28, 1979) that the board unveiled its new terminol-
ogy, “comprehensive income,” to describe “the change in equity
(net assets) of an entity during a period from transactions and
other events and circumstances from nonowner sources” [para.
56]. In the context of the choice between financial capital main-
tenance and physical capital maintenance, on which the board
deferred a decision until a later statement, comprehensive in-
come was viewed as “a return on financial capital” [para. 58].17
Comprehensive income would thus include unrealized holding
gains and losses, if they were adjudged to be recognizable ac-
cruals.
Two facets of Statement 3 caused trepidation, especially
among practitioners and financial executives — that the board’s
adoption of the “asset and liability view,” together with its com-
prehensive income proposal, would inevitably lead to some
form of current value accounting [see, e.g., Way, 1977, pp. 40-
41; Schuetze, 1983, p. 260; Beresford, 1983, p. 67; Pacter, 1983,
p. 84; Gore, 1992, pp. 94-95; Van Riper, 1994, p. 75].18 Expres-
sions emanating from the board and elsewhere that this impli-
cation was unfounded may not have allayed many fears. And a
forthright statement by Reed K. Storey [1981, pp. 94-96], a
senior member of the FASB’s research staff, may have added to
the anxiety:
I think the handwriting is already on the wall for the
present model (which is often mislabeled ‘historical
cost accounting’) because, among other things, it can’t
cope with everyday complications, such as changing
prices and fluctuating foreign exchange rates. . . .
Those who feel threatened by the conceptual frame-
work or hope that it will maintain the status quo will
be disappointed. Change is coming, even if the concep-
17For an extensive treatment of financial v. physical capital maintenance,
see Sterling and Lemke [1982].
18In fact, as early as 1977, one of the Big Eight accounting firms, Ernst &
Ernst, was alarmed that the “asset and liability view” would lead inevitably to
current value accounting, which it opposed. Its concern that the board had not
clearly explained the implications of its thinking led the firm “to mount a
campaign to educate financial executives about the conceptual framework and
the potential dangers it presented” [Beresford, 1983, p. 66]. By July of that
year, the firm had presented more than 50 conceptual framework seminars
around the country to over 5,000 people [Ernst & Ernst, 1977, p. 1].
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tual framework is never adopted, because of weak-
nesses in the existing accounting model.
Solomons, in his critique of the concepts statements,
gave Statement 3 a B-. Although he regarded the board’s defini-
tions as “a distinct improvement on the earlier definitions in
APB Statement no. 4” [1986, p. 120], he nonetheless believed
that the definitions were not sufficiently robust to deal with the
most difficult accounting problems. He illustrated this point by
attempting to apply the definition of liabilities to pensions, and
he found it wanting. Yet Solomons, who was an advocate of the
“asset and liability view,” noted with satisfaction that “the defi-
nitions have been formulated in such a way as to leave no room
for reasonable doubt about the primacy of assets and liabilities
and the dependency of the other elements on these two” [pp.
120-121].
It is of interest that Dennis R. Beresford, who would be-
come FASB chairman in 1987, wrote in 1981, while he was still
a partner in Ernst & Whinney (and chairman of the Institute’s
Accounting Standards Executive Committee), that he found
Statements 1, 2, and 3 (and 4) to be “broad, abstract statements
or proposals which in my opinion have provided little, if any,
help in deciding the accounting issues of the day” [Beresford,
1981, p. 66]. He described himself as a pragmatist, and he was,
from the start, a skeptic of the conceptual framework project
[see Beresford, 1983].
Recognition and Measurement: In December 1984, a full four
years after the issuance of the statement on elements,19 the
board issued Concepts Statement 5 on Recognition and Meas-
urement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises.20 This
was the long-awaited statement that would announce the
board’s position on the most controversial issues in the concep-
tual framework project, including its view on which measure-
ment attribute(s) were to be central to the framework. On this
statement, the board equivocated badly, which led Solomons
[1986, p. 124] to give it a grade of F and “require the board to
take the course over again — that is, to scrap the statement and
start afresh.” It was also the first concepts statement in which a
board member dissented.
19Miller [1990] and Gore [1992, pp. 105-109] have explained the delay: the
board was divided both on how to proceed and on what to conclude.
20For an analysis of Statement 5, see Storey and Storey [1988, pp. 145-
160].
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Early in the statement, the board gave notice that it would
not be advancing the literature in a way so as to alter practice
[para. 2]:
The recognition criteria and guidance in this State-
ment are generally consistent with current practice and
do not imply radical change. Nor do they foreclose the
possibility of future changes in practice. The Board in-
tends future change to occur in the gradual, evolution-
ary way that has characterized past change.
The major disappointment to many readers was the board’s
disinclination in Statement 5 to make a decision on the pre-
ferred measurement attribute. The board enumerated the at-
tributes that are “used in present practice”: historical cost, cur-
rent cost, current market value, net realizable value, and
present value of future cash flows [para. 67], but could only
conclude the following [para 70]:
Rather than attempt to select a single attribute and
force changes in practice so that all classes of assets
and liabilities use that attribute, this concepts State-
ment suggests that use of different attributes will con-
tinue, and discusses how the Board may select the ap-
propriate attribute in particular cases [footnote
omitted].
The Trueblood report at least undertook to suggest how differ-
ent measurement attributes might be more or less helpful in
fulfilling certain information requirements [Objectives of Finan-
cial Statements, 1973, ch. 6]. But the board, after ten years of
unrelenting work on the conceptual framework project, could
not achieve as much on measurement attributes as the part-
time Trueblood Committee had done in 30 months.
On recognition, the board was clearly reluctant to innovate.
It did not, for example, undertake to discuss whether to accord
recognition to the “firm” commitments under wholly executory
contracts, that is, those on which no party has yet performed
any of its promises [para. 107]. Yuji Ijiri [1980] argued the case
eloquently in a research report written at the invitation of the
board, and the subject was again treated in another research
report by L. Todd Johnson and Reed K. Storey [1982, ch. 11].
In the section on recognition, Statement 5 did contain a
carefully worded proposition that “information based on cur-
rent prices should be recognized if it is sufficiently relevant and
reliable to justify the costs involved and more relevant than
alternative information” [para. 90], which Storey and Storey
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[1998, p. 159] criticized as “extremely weak guidance.” Miller et
al. [1998, p. 115] complained that the criteria of “relevant” and
“reliable” in this proposition “are too broad to provide helpful
guidance either to standards setters or to individual account-
ants who are attempting to resolve a new issue.” David Mosso
[1998, p. 7], a member of the board from 1978 to 1987 who
continued as a member of the board’s senior staff until 1996,
has said that this proposition “may sound like a weak endorse-
ment but at the time it was extremely contentious and a major
concession to the Board members who favored more market
value accounting.” He added that “it is the concept that under-
lies the progress that has been made in marking financial
instruments to market.” As Kirk has pointed out, the board’s
assent even to this proposition, hedged as it was, was contin-
gent on how the unrealized holding gains and losses were to be
reported. Preparers felt strongly that any unrealized holding
gains and losses should not affect earnings. In the end, the
board settled on a compromise presentation by which both con-
ventional net income (retitled “earnings” in Statement 5) and
comprehensive income, which would essentially consist of
earnings plus or minus unrealized holding gains and losses,
should be reported. As the choice of measurement attribute
could not be disengaged from the income-reporting implica-
tions of unrealized holding gains and losses, this compromise
was necessary for Statement 5 to survive [Kirk, 1989, pp. 100-
103].
As will be seen, one advance that did have future ramifica-
tions was the board’s focus on comprehensive income. In State-
ment 5, the board proposed the preparation of both a statement
of earnings and a statement of comprehensive income, and it
said that the “full set of articulated financial statements dis-
cussed in this Statement is based on the concept of financial
capital maintenance” [para. 45]. In this somewhat indirect way,
it signified that financial capital maintenance had won its
favor.21 The dissenter to Statement 5, John W. March, who was
a former partner of Arthur Andersen, objected to comprehen-
sive income “as a concept of income because it includes all
recognized changes (including price changes) in assets and
liabilities . . . ” [p. 32]. March was a partisan of the physical
capital maintenance concept [pp. 32-33].
21Robert T. Sprouse [1988, p. 126], the board’s vice chairman, later wrote
that Concepts Statement 5 “comes down solidly on the side of financial capital
maintenance.”
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Although the board was not prepared in the 1980s to issue
a standard requiring that comprehensive income should be re-
ported in the basic financial statements, it returned to the issue
vigorously in the mid-1990s. It was then that the board built on
the definition of comprehensive income in Statement 3 and on
paragraphs 13 and 39-44 of Statement 5 to issue an exposure
draft proposing a requirement that net income and comprehen-
sive income be accorded equal prominence in either one or two
statements of financial performance [FASB, 1996]. But strong
resistance from preparers forced the board to accept a compro-
mise, permitting a third option — to display comprehensive
income in the statement of changes in equity [FASB, 1997].
Thus, the board enabled preparers to exclude such items as
unrealized gains and losses from a statement of financial per-
formance.22
At several places in Statement 5, including two quoted
above, the board left change to a process of evolution [also see
para. 35]. Solomons [1986, p. 122], in his critique, skewered
this approach:
These appeals to evolution should be seen as what
they are — a cop-out. If all that is needed to improve
our accounting model is reliance on evolution and the
natural selection that results from the development of
standards, why was an expensive and protracted con-
ceptual framework project necessary in the first place?
It goes without saying that concepts and practices
should evolve as conditions change. But if the concep-
tual framework can do no more than point that out,
who needs it? And, for that matter, if progress is sim-
ply a matter of waiting for evolution, who needs the
FASB?
Solomons [p. 193] complained that the board’s non-committal
listing of measurement attributes in Statement 5 showed that it
had not progressed beyond its December 2, 1976 discussion
memorandum, which had done the same.
Oscar S. Gellein [1986, p. 14], who had served on the board
from 1975 to 1978, also was critical of the board’s failure to
provide conceptual guidance, without which, he said, “there is
the risk of reversion to ad hoc rules in determining accounting
methods.” Wolk et al. [1992, p. 177] wrote that Statement 5
22For further discussion of comprehensive income, see Johnson and
Reither [1995].
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“must be considered a distinct letdown, if not an outright fail-
ure.”
Storey and Storey [1998, p. 159], who have been staunch
supporters of the conceptual framework approach, criticized
the board for abdicating its responsibility in Statement 5:
Whereas a neutral exposition of alternatives was ap-
propriate for a Discussion Memorandum, a litany of
present measurement practices with neither concep-
tual analysis or evaluation nor guidance for making
choices was not proper for a Concepts Statement.
In merely describing current practice, Concepts
Statement 5 is a throwback to statements of account-
ing principles produced by the ‘distillation of experi-
ence’ school of thought [e.g., Paul Grady’s approach in
the APB’s Accounting Research Study No. 5] — an es-
sentially practical, not a conceptual, effort. Its pre-
scriptions for improving practice are reminiscent of
those of the Committee on Accounting Procedure or
the Accounting Principles Board; measurement prob-
lems will be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Unfortu-
nately, that approach worked only marginally well for
those now-defunct bodies.
One close observer of the board has written that the board’s
decision not to disturb the status quo on recognition and meas-
urement “was led by representatives of the preparer constitu-
ency, particularly members of the Financial Executives Insti-
tute, and was supported by three Board members [including
March]” [Miller, 1990, p. 28].
Role of Statement 33: No reference has previously been made to
the board’s Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 33,
Financial Reporting and Changing Prices, issued in September
1979, which required more than 1,300 large corporations to
disclose in an unaudited supplementary note certain general
price-level information and current cost accounting informa-
tion.23 Yet it is impossible to discuss the board’s recognition
23The current cost accounting portion of Statement 33 reflected the influ-
ence of the report of the Sandilands Committee [1975, ch. 12] in the U.K.,
which gave prominence to the “value to the business” (or “deprival value”)
approach to current value accounting. For a review of this and other intellec-
tual influences on the board’s thinking, including the interaction between
Statement 33 and the board’s conceptual framework project, see Tweedie and
Whittington [1984, ch. 7 and entries in their subject index under FAS33].
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and measurement project without taking into account the im-
pact on the board of preparers’ and users’ reactions to State-
ment 33. As former board chairman Kirk [1988, p. 16], who
previously was an audit partner in Price Waterhouse, has writ-
ten:
While not formally a part of the conceptual frame-
work project on recognition and measurement, State-
ment 33 was the laboratory for the conceptual project.
It was the testing ground for the application of the
current cost system to the most difficult of valuation
problems — fixed assets — and the testing ground for
the validity and utility of the concept of physical,
rather than financial, capital.
. . . the experience with Statement 33 by the time we
were debating Concepts Statement No. 5 told me that
use of the current cost information was very limited,
and that there were serious questions about its reliabil-
ity. I could find little reason to endorse on a conceptual
level a current value or current cost measurement sys-
tem for future standards when it appeared that the util-
ity of such a system in Statement 33 was going to be
seriously challenged.
In August 1984, just as the board was completing work on
Statement 5, it was disclosed in the board’s Status Report that:
. . . research studies and responses to the Invitation to
Comment [entitled Supplementary Disclosures about
the Effects of Changing Prices (FASB, 1983)] indicate
that Statement 33 information has not been widely
used. Both the number of users and extent of use have
been limited. A large number of responses to the Invi-
tation to Comment indicate that the costs of preparing
the disclosures have outweighed the benefits to date
[“Financial Reporting and Changing Prices,” 1984].
In November 1984, the board issued Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 82, in which it eliminated the re-
quirement for supplementary disclosure of the inflation ac-
counting information, and two years later, in December 1986, it
issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 89, in
which it eliminated altogether the requirement for the supple-
mentary disclosure on changing prices.
Present Value: In the late 1980s, the board, aware of the increas-
ing importance of present value as a decision-making tool and
sensitive to the widely differing approaches adopted over the
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years by the FASB and other U.S. standard setters for imple-
menting present value-based measurements, began to develop a
common framework for using present value and estimates of
future cash flows in accounting measurement.24 It issued a dis-
cussion memorandum in 1990 [Present Value-Based Measure-
ments in Accounting], held a public hearing in 1991, published
a special report [Upton, 1996], and issued an exposure draft for
a proposed standards statement [1997]. In the end, the board
concluded that the subject should form part of the conceptual
framework project, and it proceeded to issue an exposure draft
of a proposed concepts statement [1999]. The proposed state-
ment will not deal with the larger question of recognition but
will instead provide “a framework for using future cash flows as
the basis for an accounting measurement” [FASB exposure
draft, 1999, para. 10]. Publication of the concepts statement is
planned for early in the year 2000.
An Assessment: The many disappointments expressed about the
concepts statement on recognition and measurement meant
that the board’s conceptual framework project ended on a
“down” note. The hope, perhaps naïve, that the framework
might point a clear path toward improvement in financial re-
porting was not fulfilled.
Richard Macve, a British accounting academic who has
been a close student of the FASB’s conceptual framework, has
been skeptical of such claims. Macve [1997, p. xxii] wrote:
Given the inherent conceptual limitations of ‘income’
and ‘value’ measurement, it remains unrealistic to ex-
pect official attempts to develop ‘conceptual frame-
works’ for financial accounting and reporting to be
able to provide a coherent basis for the resolution of
accounting problems. . . . Moreover, standard setters’
major problems are more often political. A framework,
however technically correct, cannot solve the political
problems of different interests and needs at the level of
individual standards [footnote omitted].
Commentators have generally rendered a negative assess-
ment of the board’s conceptual framework. Solomons [1986, p.
122], who was a fervent supporter of the board’s project, regret-
24Miller and Bahnson [1996, pp. 94, 96, 98] have cited defects in the appli-
cation of present value in seven previous pronouncements.
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fully concluded that “my judgment of the project as a whole
must be that it has failed.” In particular, he regarded Statement
5 as a “dismal failure” [p. 118]. Miller et al. [1998, p. 105],
however, saw a silver lining in the dark clouds:
Although it is probably an overstatement to call the
project a complete failure, it is certainly a disappoint-
ment. On the other hand, it makes a significant contri-
bution to the accounting literature by establishing that
service to user needs is the primary objective of finan-
cial accounting. It has also contributed to the effi-
ciency of the due process procedures by defining a
number of key terms that are indeed used by the Board
and its constituents. These accomplishments may
bring more rigor and efficiency to the Board’s delibera-
tions, but that conclusion can be safely reached only in
the long run.
In regard to user needs, one could argue that the literature had
already been enriched by the Trueblood report.
Kenneth Most [1993, pp. 107, 109] saw the project as “seri-
ously flawed,” and he registered his “great surprise . . . that the
FASB’s conceptual framework has been imitated in other coun-
tries.” Davies et al. [1997, p. 63] opined that the weakness of the
board’s conceptual framework project was probably most at-
tributable to the “Board’s failure to deal with the fundamental
issues of recognition and measurement.” Archer [1993, p. 113]
has written that “the FASB’s attempt involved massive effort;
but, in terms of conveying an increased degree of either intel-
lectual or institutional authority upon the standard-setting
process, the mountains evidently brought forth a mouse.”
A favorable review was given by Kevin Stevenson [1987, p.
49], director of the Australian Accounting Research Founda-
tion, who said, “I must say I regard the work of the FASB on
their conceptual framework as extremely valuable.” His disap-
pointment with Statement 5 was that “it did not provide a full
analysis of the issues” [p. 51].
In late 1984, Arthur Andersen, once it had seen the board’s
exposure draft [1983] on recognition and measurement, issued
a second edition of its Objectives of Financial Statements for
Business Enterprises, in which it restated the importance it at-
tributed to value. The firm pointedly differentiated the refer-
ence to “economic resources” in its overall objective (see above)
from the board’s, arguing that there is a “vast difference . . .
since we specifically call for the ‘nature and value’ of economic
resources, while the FASB merely asks for information about
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them” [1984, p. 8n]. The firm reiterated its support for financial
capital maintenance, and it expanded its recommended cover-
age of current value accounting to include liabilities. As a con-
tribution to the dialogue, the firm’s revised booklet constituted
an implied criticism of the board’s noncommittal position on
measurement.
Reaction to the board’s conceptual framework necessarily
depended on one’s expectations. At one extreme, Sterling [1982,
p. 106] argued as follows:
In my view the next essential step [after Concepts
Statements 1-3] is to display replicable logical connec-
tions between the concepts and the conclusions about
specific practices. Provision of such connections is
likely to require honing the concepts to make them
logically fertile. . . . if the concepts aren’t honed to the
point where the logical connections are at least plau-
sible, preferably replicable, the framework is likely to
be at best useless and at worst used to rationalize pre-
conceived positions that are likely to be contradictory.
At the other extreme, Peasnell [1982, p. 255] suggested that the
conceptual framework:
. . . could be intended to do no more than provide very
broad general objectives for financial reporting to
which no one could take serious objection; the aim
would be to ‘raise the moral tone’ of the profession.
Perhaps closure on specific accounting standards was too much
to expect from a conceptual framework.
In 1977, an AAA committee composed of nine academics
pessimistically concluded, after three years of study, that
“theory closure cannot be dictated” and that “all theory ap-
proaches are flawed when viewed from the perspective of some
alternative approach” [AAA, 1977, pp. 49, 50]. Each conceptual
framework, it added, “implicitly incorporates individual beliefs
and premises that cannot be proved or disproved in a logical
sense” [p. 48]; hence, the committee concluded that it cannot be
demonstrated that one framework is superior to all others.25
Dopuch and Sunder [1980] were similarly pessimistic of
any attempt to impose a normative conceptual framework on
25Lawrence Revsine was chairman of the committee. For his views on the
implication of the report for the development of a conceptual framework, see
Revsine [1977, pp. 35-39].
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society, for the groups and individuals who are concerned with
financial reporting possess their own private motives and objec-
tives. In the end, they argued, standards will inevitably be com-
promises to appease these conflicting interests.
Storey and Storey [1998, p. 161], on the final page of their
comprehensive study, preferred to accentuate the achievements
of the board’s conceptual framework:
The FASB has used the completed parts of the frame-
work with considerable success. The Board’s constitu-
ents also have learned to use the framework, partly at
least because they have discovered that they are more
likely to influence the Board if they do. Both the Board
and the constituents have also found that at times the
concepts appear to work better than at other times,
and undoubtedly they sometimes could have been
more soundly applied. . . . some parts of the conceptual
framework are still controversial, partly at least be-
cause long-held views die hard. The framework re-
mains unfinished, although the Board gives no sign of
completing it in the near future.
Despite the fact that the Board has left it incomplete,
the FASB’s conceptual framework
• Is the first reasonably successful effort by a stand-
ards-setting body to formulate and use an inte-
grated set of financial accounting concepts
• Has fundamentally changed the way financial ac-
counting standards are set in the United States
• Has provided a model for the International Ac-
counting Standards Committee and several na-
tional standards-setting bodies in other English-
speaking countries, which not only have set out
their own concepts but also clearly have been in-
fluenced by the FASB’s Concepts Statements,
sometimes to the point of adopting the same or
virtually the same set of concepts.
This writer would interpose three reactions to the views ex-
pressed by Storey and Storey. (1) Without question, the board
has shown that it can bring an immense project of this kind to
completion, but whether the effort has been “reasonably suc-
cessful” is still an open question. (2) One doubts that the
board’s approach to setting standards has been “fundamentally
changed” by the conceptual framework — changed, yes, but not
fundamentally. (3) It is true that the board’s conceptual frame-
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work has been imitated in other countries and by the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). But the IASC’s
framework is no more helpful on measurement than is the
FASB’s Statement 5. The U.K. Accounting Standards Board
(ASB), in the 1999 redraft of its Statement of Principles, also
declined to choose between historical cost and current value as
the measurement basis [para. 6.4]. And the ASB, unlike the
FASB, is not constrained by a conservative securities commis-
sion or by an entrenched tradition of historical cost accounting.
The Australian Accounting Research Foundation, which began
the research for its conceptual framework in the 1970s, has yet
to issue even an exposure draft for a concepts statement on
recognition and measurement. So, the exportation of the
board’s conceptual framework has not led to marked success
overseas.
When judging the overall product of the FASB’s conceptual
framework, one can justifiably fault the board for not having
chosen, as a matter of principle, the relevant measurement at-
tribute or attributes that should govern the preparation of fi-
nancial statements. That was, after all, the raison d’être for the
entire exercise — everything pointed toward that end. What
reasons serve to explain the board’s indecisiveness? Resistance
to change — from preparers, practitioners, and the SEC, as well
as within the board — coupled with an indifference, at best, by
users constituted a high barrier for the board to surmount. The
SEC’s well-known antipathy toward departures from historical
cost accounting in the financial statements might have been
seen by some members of the board as an obstacle to a prin-
cipled choice. Memories were still fresh of the condemnation by
the APB (and by the SEC’s chief accountant) of Sprouse and
Moonitz’s advocacy of current value accounting in their ac-
counting research study published in 1962, resulting in the
APB’s decision to consign both the postulates and principles
studies to oblivion. Some FASB members may not have wanted
to risk having the board’s conceptual framework similarly
marginalized as “too radically different.” Furthermore, depar-
tures from historical cost accounting represented a potential
threat not only to the preparer community but also to account-
ing practitioners [see Revsine, 1991]. To preparers, the use of
current value raised the specter of including potentially volatile
unrealized holding gains and losses in the income statement. As
regards practitioners, few would have possessed any knowledge
of measurement attributes other than modified historical cost
accounting because of the monopoly that the latter had so long
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enjoyed in the U.S. Practitioners may have feared that their
expertise would become obsolete by the imposition of an unfa-
miliar system of accounting. Macve [1997, p. xxii] has charac-
terized these sources of resistance as “the political problems of
different interests and needs.” Even within the board, the mem-
bers differed intellectually and emotionally on the choice of
measurement attribute — reflecting what Horngren [1981, p.
90] has called their “individual conceptual frameworks.” This
built-in resistance to change on so many sides must have been a
brooding omnipresence in the board’s deliberations.
What has been the practical effect of the board’s conceptual
framework? Unless one is on the inside and listens to the board
deliberations — or, as a researcher, interviews the principals
and examines the board’s minutes and files — it is difficult to
know whether the evolving conceptual framework actually
changed minds or was cited in subsequent standards state-
ments to buttress a preconceived view. To be sure, Arthur R.
Wyatt [1987, p. 46], who joined the board just after the issuance
of Statement 5, has said that “the current FASB members and
staff refer to the framework constantly,” especially the qualita-
tive characteristics and the definitions of elements. Further, he
said that “constituents particularly refer to the conceptual
framework when they do not agree with a tentative conclusion
that we have reached on a practical issue and argue that it is
inappropriate because it does not follow logically from the con-
ceptual framework.” But it would be useful to have the findings
from an empirical research study.
Former board member Mosso [1998, p. 7] has said that
“Concepts Statement 5 laid the groundwork” for the board’s
decision in 1987 (Statement 95) to replace the funds statement
with the statement of cash flows “by further developing Con-
cept Statement 1’s emphasis on cash flows as a tool of invest-
ment decision making.”
To demonstrate impact, Miller [1990, p. 27] has claimed
that three subsequent standards statements incorporate the
board’s preference for the “asset and liability view”: Statement
76, on in-substance defeasance [1983]; Statement 87, on pen-
sions [1985]; and Statement 96, on deferred tax [1987]. He
noted as well that three of the board’s early standards state-
ments, issued between 1974 and 1976, also embraced the “asset
and liability view” [Miller, 1990, p. 27]. Evidently, the board did
not require a concepts statement in order to adopt this premise
in its standards.
As part of his major study of the conceptual framework
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project, Gore sought to discern the impact of the completed
conceptual framework on three standards statements: State-
ment 87, on pensions [1985]; Statement 95, on cash flow state-
ments [1987]; and Statement 96, on deferred tax [1987]. Gore
[1992, p. 124] concluded that the board’s conceptual framework
“can claim little effect on the various outcomes.”
Yet Daley and Tranter [1990, p. 15] have contended that it
is pointless to attempt to judge specific accounting standards in
terms of a conceptual framework that includes neutrality as a
desired characteristic of reliability. They argued that “the sig-
nificant role that economic and political pressures play in the
development of accounting standards” must be factored in to
the conceptual framework and therefore into any such analysis
of the conformity of standards to a framework.
To what extent have members who joined the board after
the conceptual framework was completed in 1985 “signed on”
to the conceptual framework? At the end of 1986, only 12
months after Statement 6 was issued, Chairman Kirk [1986, p.
8] wrote, “I have already noticed that board members who were
not involved in the lengthy debates preceding [the six] Concepts
Statements, especially No. 5 on recognition and measurement,
have less attachment or proprietary interest in them.” By 1993,
all of the members who voted on Statement 5 had left the
board. In a standard-setting body with rotating membership,
how long will an approved conceptual framework retain its au-
thoritativeness within the body? To its credit, the board has
taken steps to keep the conceptual framework on the table. At
some of the board’s professional development sessions that are
held for the benefit of members and the research staff, issues
relating to the conceptual framework are periodically scheduled
for discussion. Also, a number of recent agenda projects, espe-
cially the current one on present value, has led the board to
revisit the earlier concepts statements. Finally, the annual per-
formance review of board members can point up a lack of
knowledge of the concepts statements. But the question re-
mains, to what extent do the current board members subscribe
to the conceptual framework?
These are interesting questions on which, it is hoped, em-
pirical research will be conducted. Until then, we live with
opinions.
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Abstract: This study compares organized labor’s reactions to chang-
ing management rhetorics as these rhetorics surrounded account-
ing-based incentive plans, including profit sharing. Results suggest
that labor’s perceptions of profit sharing changed dramatically from
the 1900-1930 period to post-World War II. The shift, in turn,
prompts an exploration of two research questions: (1) how and why
did the national labor discourse around the management rhetoric
and its emphasis on accounting information change, and (2) how
did this change render unions more governable in their support for
accounting-based incentive plans?
INTRODUCTION
Enthusiasm for profit sharing and other accounting-based
incentive plans made a resurgence in the U.S. during the 1990s
[Labate, 1993]. Management promoted profit sharing and other
accounting-based incentive plans as solutions to cyclical macro-
economic problems [Weitzman, 1984; Florkowski, 1991; Krase,
1993] and as techniques to facilitate union concessions [Perry
and Kegley, 1990]. This resurgence represented only the latest
wave of interest in accounting-based incentive plans in the U.S.
Studies show that interest in and enthusiasm for profit sharing
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have ebbed and flowed throughout the 20th century despite  the
long-lived nature of some individual plans. The cyclical nature
of these accounting-based incentive plans, however, has been
ignored in some studies that have treated each profit-sharing
episode as unique and unrelated [Kubly, 1958; Jehring, 1960],
while other research treated  episodes of profit sharing as if
they were basically the same [Cheadle, 1989; Aktoul, 1992]. We
argue that despite striking similarities between waves of profit
sharing, the contextual details surrounding each episode differ
dramatically. Further, we suggest that the management rheto-
rics used in advancing profit sharing and, in turn, labor unions’
responses to these management techniques and related rheto-
rics [Abrahamson, 1997] illustrate that accounting-based incen-
tive plans are contextual, fluid phenomena, not unchanging and
instrumental management technologies.
Miller and O’Leary [1989], expressing this same concern as
to the interrelationship between management rhetoric and
management techniques in labor relations, emphasized the role
of language, rationales, and ideology in shaping social relations
among organizational and societal constituents. They argued
that it is necessary to examine the role of knowledge and exper-
tise in order to understand the transformation of social rela-
tions among organizational actors, as well as the struggles that
attend these transformations. Their historical analysis sug-
gested that society came to accept the hierarchies and manage-
rial authority that influenced everyday life because both had
been rendered visible and knowable to external constituents.
Our paper seeks to extend Miller and O’Leary’s [1989] micro-
analysis concerning the constitution of the worker and the or-
ganization as visible, knowable, and, hence, governable entities.
Specifically, we examine the transformation of organized
labor’s resistance to, and then support of, profit sharing as a
component of workers’ compensation. Our study compares two
waves of profit sharing. In the first period, circa 1900-1925,
labor often resisted a management rhetoric that emphasized
accounting information as an objective, passive measure of
profit in accounting-based incentive plans. By contrast, in the
period following World War II, several large unions actively
supported accounting-based incentive plans, not only accepting
but promoting a management rhetoric of value-neutral ac-
counting as unions demanded increased access to accounting
reports and relied increasingly on accounting information
within their own decision processes. This dramatic shift in
labor’s views pertaining to the management rhetoric of ac-
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counting-based incentive plans, and the resultant shift in views
related to the acceptance of accounting-based incentives, sug-
gests that it was not just the individual worker or organization
that was rendered governable [Miller and O’Leary, 1989].
Unions also became increasingly governable as they eventually
acquiesced to and took for granted the application of calcula-
tive regimes of accounting profit calculations.
THE MANAGEMENT RHETORIC OF PROFIT SHARING
Stryker [1990] argued that in arenas of frequent, inherent
conflict historical analysis can identify and elaborate upon the
selective institutional mechanisms that systematically contrib-
ute to the production, resistance to or acceptance of, and the
reproduction of organizational innovations such as accounting-
based incentive plans. Such a perspective is also necessary to
understand the diffusion of these institutional patterns, particu-
larly the manner in which social order is produced and repro-
duced in labor-management relations [Kolko, 1963; Stryker,
1990]. Stryker [1990] further suggested that because both func-
tional and dysfunctional outcomes are achieved through con-
flict and because selective mechanisms include political-institu-
tional dynamics, future research must provide comparative
historical perspectives on how, why, and in what context politi-
cal-institutional mechanisms systematically combine to pro-
duce outcomes.
Consistent with this theme, Miller and O’Leary [1989] have
examined the process by which the existence of bureaucratic
hierarchies was reconciled with the American ideal of indi-
vidual initiative. Their historical analysis suggested that indi-
viduals came to accept hierarchies and managerial authority
that influence everyday life as society became increasingly vis-
ible and knowable to external constituents. It is this quality of
knowability that became taken for granted or a fact of life in
contemporary society. Miller and O’Leary reasoned that the
interlinking of the corporation with the political culture was
essential to this process, such that the political culture provided
ideals favoring economy, efficiency, and science that were con-
verted into “facts” concerning what are appropriate corporate
structures and professional managerial behavior. This “fact”-
based status had in turn been achieved by codifying related
structures and behaviors into an analyzed body of knowledge.
As Miller and O’Leary argued, the large-scale, multi-unit corpo-
ration was not uncritically welcomed into North American soci-
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ety and neither was the authority of those who managed this
new economic form. They argued that new corporate manage-
rial structures were not derived from arbitrary decrees of a
managerial elite nor did managerial authority come from privi-
leged social positions. Instead, both managerial structures and
authority were both propagated by objective facts and tech-
niques. Accounting became a significant forum for expressing
facts as it too became taken for granted as creating a visibility
of each organization’s and individual member’s performance.
Miller and O’Leary [1989, pp. 262-263] concluded that:
The principal implication of this paper is the proposi-
tion that critical studies of the modem corporation can
benefit from a more microanalytic concern with the
conditions of possibility of hierarchies. This entails an
analysis of the elementary components — intellectual,
cultural, institutional and technical practices [such as
accounting techniques] — out of which that complex
entity called the modern corporation has been con-
structed. . . . This is, in effect, a call for critical studies
of the corporation to work upwards from specific
processes and their interrelations, rather than down-
wards from an assumption that the outworkings of
power can be detected and made intelligible by
reference to a broad historical postulate such as that of
capitalist domination.
More specifically concerning management rhetoric and la-
bor relations, Abrahamson [1997] argued that students of tech-
niques for managing employees are generally unable to explain
the prevalence of different types of management rhetoric.
Abrahamson emphasized the importance of understanding the
role of rhetoric because the emergence of a particular form of
rhetoric may influence long-term macroeconomic trends,
rather than being merely a consequence of those trends. Rheto-
ric is constitutive. Furthermore, he argued that since employee
management rhetoric may greatly influence what managers do,
an understanding of forces influencing its role is an important
objective for research. For Abrahamson, understanding these
forces meant seeking a more complex and holistic picture that
included examining the role of government intervention in the
evolution of managerial rhetorics. Finally, Abrahamson con-
ceded that his work represented a broad analysis of the role of
rhetoric over five periods in this century and urged a disaggre-
gation of these periods be undertaken in order to gain a more
“fine grain” understanding of evolving managerial rhetoric.
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Consistent with Abrahamson’s call, our study compares
two waves of profit sharing — an early episode that occurred in
the first decades of this century and a second wave following
World War II. Specifically, we examine labor unions’ reactions
to, and impact upon, the management rhetoric surrounding
profit sharing and related accounting-based incentive plans
during these two time periods. Particularly important to our
analysis is Abrahamson’s [1997] distinction between two classes
of management rhetorics — “rational rhetoric” and “normative
rhetoric.” The key assumption underlying normative rhetoric is
that employers can render employees more productive by shap-
ing their thoughts and capitalizing on their emotions. The key
assumption underlying rational rhetoric is that work processes
can be formalized and rationalized to optimize productivity, as
can the reward systems that guarantee recalcitrant employees’
adherence to these formal processes. Extending the work of
Jacoby [1985], Abrahamson identified the mid-1920s as the cul-
mination of a normative rhetoric period that promoted com-
pany welfare practices, including financial incentives such as
profit sharing and employee-stock-ownership programs, that
were intended to align the objectives of employees with their
organization. Abrahamson argued that normative management
rhetoric involving such discourses as profit sharing tend to pre-
dominate because they promised to forestall the discontent that
causes employees to join labor unions and strike. Therefore, he
argued, the prevalence of normative rhetoric will be directly
related to the rise and vigor of labor union activity.
While Abrahamson and Jacoby placed profit sharing in the
mid-1920s as one form of normative rhetoric, our study sug-
gests that these plans provide early glimpses of a shift to
rational managerial rhetoric as accounting is a central part of
rational management rhetoric. This focus places profit sharing
in a more complex light, evolving from the rational rhetoric of
the scientific management period prior to the mid-1920s.
Further, labor’s response to profit-sharing plans was a reaction
to both profit-sharing plans as normative techniques and
management’s appeal to accounting as a rational technique.
The critical point is that tools which have been interpreted
as either normative rhetoric or rational rhetoric are instead
evolving in their very nature. On this point, Baron et al.’s [1986]
study of the diffusion of scientific management indicated that
techniques associated with scientific management actually
fueled, rather than forestalled, unionization in many industries.
This argument is also consistent with the work of Barley and
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Kunda [1992], who concluded that the prevalence of rational
rhetoric managerial techniques was unsuccessful in early scien-
tific management because the normative promise of labor
peace was clearly discredited over most of this period. In short,
our closer examination of profit sharing and allied man-
agement rhetoric in the early decades of the century goes be-
yond classifying it as a normative rhetoric of the 1920s, but sees
it as evolving to this status from an earlier status as a form of
rational rhetoric.
The emergence of accounting as a rational managerial
technique toward the end of the early decades of U.S. labor
unrest was a preamble to labor’s responses in the second period
we study. The second period we examine is a period of perva-
sive profit sharing that emerged following World War II. In
both periods, management rhetoric advocated profit sharing
and other accounting-based incentive plans as a solution to la-
bor unrest. Furthermore, these plans were developed and
adopted in periods of “perceived” economic changes and crises.
Both periods are also marked by attempts to reconstitute work-
ers as “cooperative participants” in production. However,
whereas in the first decades of the century labor often resisted a
management rhetoric advocating accounting-based incentive
plans on normative terms, in the period following World War II
many large unions actively embraced and pursued them. Thus,
in this latter period, many unions not only accepted the man-
agement rhetoric surrounding profit-sharing plans but began
also to accept and promote accounting as part of that manage-
ment rhetoric. In this latter period, unions began to demand
increased access to accounting reports and relied increasingly
on accounting information for union decisions.
Indeed, our findings of a period of resistance followed by a
period of acceptance is consistent with Abrahamson’s recog-
nition that rhetorics sometimes persist and even resurge in
later periods. Abrahamson also argued that historical events
such as wars and government intervention are also important
for understanding the influence and changes in management
rhetorics [Jacoby, 1985; Shenhav, 1995] — the focus of our
analysis.
In summary, our study is prompted by two major research
questions: (1) how and why did the national labor discourse
around the management rhetorics of profit sharing with its em-
phasis on accounting information change, and (2) how did this
change affect union support for, or opposition to, accounting-
based incentive plans?
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To answer these research questions, we examined account-
ing-based incentive plans from each of the two major periods.
Our study relies on both primary and secondary sources, in-
cluding archival records, collective-bargaining agreements, let-
ters from unions to company officials, and minutes from na-
tional and local union meetings [Cook and Reichardt, 1979].
We also examined the labor press from 1900 to 1970 exten-
sively, reading selected labor papers in their entirety. The na-
tional labor press included journals and papers from the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor (AFL), the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO), the AFL-CIO in later years, and two na-
tional unions — the United Steel Workers of America (USWA)
and the United Rubber Workers (URW). In addition, we exam-
ined many newspapers published by the labor press of state or
union locals. We also documented what we did not find, for
example, where accounting was not mentioned [for a discus-
sion of examining newspaper coverage in organizational analy-
sis, see Allison, 1971; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Zelizer,
1992].
PROFIT SHARING IN THE EARLY PERIOD
According to Abrahamson [1997], the key assumption un-
derlying normative rhetoric is that employers can render em-
ployees more productive by shaping their thoughts and capital-
izing on their emotions. He characterized early normative
employee management rhetoric in the U.S. as evolving from
forms of industrial betterment, or welfare work, which was de-
signed to shape employees’ values, intellectual skills, and work
ethics. By the mid-1920s, a normative rhetoric emerged which
promoted the use of welfare work techniques that incorporated
financial incentives such as profit sharing and related account-
ing-based incentive plans as part of the management techniques
intended to align the objectives of employees with the organiza-
tion. The emphasis on cooperation in this period is illustrated
by the Spencer Wire Company plan of 1915:
The success or failure of the plan, therefore, is in your
hands. Our objective is several fold: The Company de-
sires to interest you in its financial result, and is will-
ing to share its profits. It hopes in return that the prof-
its will be increased by employees taking a personal
interest in the continued success of the business, lead-
ing them to exercise the greatest possible care to pre-
vent bad work and waste of time and material. Also to
encourage increased production and suggestions of im-
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provement of any nature [employment contract in
Burritt et al., 1918, p. 271].
This excerpt illustrates that cooperation was not seen as a de-
sired outcome for its own sake, but because it was expected to
increase productivity. Managers and owners of firms generally
cited four reasons for implementing accounting-based incentive
plans: 1) to make workers more concerned about costs and
careful about their work, 2) to increase efficiency, 3) to stabilize
the work force, and 4) to improve relations between manage-
ment and employees [Engen, 1967]. Burritt et al.’s [1918, p. 18]
study was more specific. It listed “industrial unrest and agita-
tion” as the major reason for growing interest in profit sharing,
stating: “Insurance against strikes is sought by limiting partici-
pation in profits to those who have been in continuous service
for a specified period, usually one year.”
During this early period, profit-sharing plans had other
common features, including the “continuous employment”
clauses. Plans were offered unilaterally by employers and could
be withdrawn at will or at the end of the fiscal year. Plans often
contained no language which specified how accounting profit
was to be computed (for example, how depreciation might be
handled). Most offered workers no recourse if they questioned
some aspect of the plan. Few gave employees the right to have
an outside auditor examine the profit figures. Furthermore,
these plans were often implemented as part of larger schemes
of “welfare capitalism,” as part of employers’ efforts to engineer
both the working and private lives of their workers [Jacoby,
1985]. Burritt et al. [1918] described over 50 profit-sharing
plans from that period. However, two of the most well-docu-
mented plans (Ford and McCormick) illustrate the role these
plans played in labor relations during the period.
For example, Henry Ford implemented his famous “Five
Dollar a Day” profit-sharing plan as part of a comprehensive
system of welfare capitalism introduced to reduce high levels of
absenteeism and turnover, to increase the pace of work, and to
counter threats of unionization. There were reasons to be con-
cerned. In 1913, the company experienced an average of 10%
absenteeism. Turnover was 380% annually, which meant that
Ford had to hire 52,000 workers per year to keep 13,000 posi-
tions filled [Meyer, 1981]. Both Ford and his management
cadre believed workers needed to change their way of working.
Norval A. Hawkins, a manager at Ford, created a list of bad
habits that he felt welfare capitalism might improve. Workers
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who needed improvement included “chronic strollers and time
killers,” “sulkers, grunters, backtalkers, mumblers,” “[those
with] antagonism to improved methods,” and “[those] doctor-
ing records to suit the boss” [cited in Meyer, 1981, p. 741].
Henry Ford himself stated: “More than half the trouble in the
world today is the ‘soldiering’ and dilution and inefficiency for
which people are paying good money” [cited in Meyer, 1981,
 p. 88).
Ford’s plan increased wages for all workers by 15% and
reduced the work day from nine hours to eight. Further, a por-
tion of some workers’ compensation was based on the
company’s reported profits. After including profit sharing, the
maximum pay for some skilled workers could be as high as $5
per day (thus, the name of the plan). Only workers who per-
formed well at work and who lived well at home could be rec-
ommended for participation in the plan. Floor supervisors
would decide who worked well, and inspectors from the firm’s
Sociology Department determined who lived well at home
[Benyon, 1973; Meyer, 1981].
Although the turnover and absenteeism decreased after the
introduction of welfare capitalism in 1913 and 1914, it does not
appear that profit sharing solved Ford’s labor problems or pre-
vented unionization. In April 1919, the Auto Workers Union
struck Wadsworth Manufacturing who supplied Ford with auto
bodies. During the strike, over 700 Ford workers per day joined
the union. By 1920, 6,000 workers had quit working at Ford
Motor Company within a 90-day period [New York Times, No-
vember 25, 1920, p. 16]. In the same year, Ford distributed
bonuses to 94,000 workers which ranged from $50 to $270
[New York Times, December 31, 1920, p. 1]. In 1921, Ford can-
celed the plan entirely, stating that he was going to increase
wages instead, and that increased wages would make up for the
bonuses that workers were not going to receive [New York
Times, May 7, 1921, May 23, 1921]. Reverend Marquis, who
headed the welfare projects at Ford Motor Company, resigned.
His explanation demonstrates the normative rhetoric under-
lying these plans:
I resigned from the Ford Motor Company in 1921. The
old group of executives, who at times set justice and
humanity above profits and production, were gone.
With them, it seemed to me, had gone an era of coop-
eration and goodwill in the company. There came to
the front those whose theory was that men are more
profitable to an industry when driven than led, that
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fear is a greater incentive to work than loyalty [quoted
in Benyon, 1973, p. 39].
Similar to Ford Motor, difficult labor-management rela-
tions also preceded profit sharing at the McCormick Company
[Ozanne, 1967]. In 1903, McCormick introduced the company’s
first accounting-based incentive plan following a strike that oc-
curred at a major division, the Chicago Deering Works. The
company tailored that plan so that workers needed one year
of “faithful employee” status to participate. The plan resulted
in stock distributions of around $300 to 700 production work-
ers; in some cases, the $300 bonus equaled the employee’s
annual wages. Ozanne [1967] argued that the profit-sharing
plan slowed unionizing activity, especially after 20 union
activists, largely the organizers of the Chicago Deering Works
strike, were disqualified from the plan because they did not
satisfy McCormick’s “faithful employee” requirements. Cyrus
McCormick, Jr. stated that he believed that these types of plans
were a “very practical step toward removing any possible dan-
ger of Bolshevism” [Paper Series 4C, Box 6, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin]. However, as in the Ford Motor plan, the
stock distribution did not end labor-management problems at
McCormick. Union organizing continued at the plants. As the
wage agreement of 1903 approached expiration in 1904,
McCormick decided to lock the workers out rather than in-
crease wages. Following a strike in 1913, a revised incentive
plan was implemented. This time, 63% of employees signed up,
but the plan did not solve McCormick’s labor problems. Work-
ers went out on strike for 30 days in May 1916. The company
further revised this plan in 1920, but in the following year, the
company made so little profit that nothing was paid out. Even-
tually, all of the plans were destroyed by the low profits of the
1920s and, in particular, by the Great Depression, when
McCormick’s stock price dropped from $75 to below $16
[Ozanne, 1967, pp. 86-94].
Management Rhetoric and Union Resistance: Many union lead-
ers opposed accounting-based incentive plans during this early
period [Kubley, 1958; Cheadle, 1989]. Throughout the labor
press, we found arguments against profit sharing that con-
tended that profit sharing was introduced to prevent unioniza-
tion. For example, the Detroit Labor News [August 29, 1919, p.
16] described profit-sharing plans as setting worker against
worker:
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Shops that have unions do not have profit-sharing
plans. Most profit-sharing concerns pay lower wages
than prevailing union rates for the same work, and
profit sharing is adopted in most cases to prevent an
organization in the shop and to discourage agitation
for better conditions and lower hours.
The Wisconsin Labor Bulletin [May 26, 1916, p. 2] noted
that the McCormick Company had introduced its profit-sharing
plan two days before Christmas, reflecting a “paternalistic, be-
nevolent despotism” that lay behind the plan. The paper stated,
“profit sharing schemes are a deception. They do not benefit
the great bulk of workers.” Similarly, the Cleveland Citizen
[January 10, 1914, p. 1] said that the Ford Motor Company’s
profit-sharing plan “vindicates the most radical union de-
mands.” The article added:
While Ford’s scheme will be denounced as utopian, so-
cialistic, etc. by other great capitalists and their news-
papers, the general public will nevertheless be taught a
valuable lesson respecting the unequal distribution of
wealth now flowing into the coffers of the great corpo-
rations.
The Illinois State Federation of Labor [1918, p. 283] con-
demned profit sharing during its annual meeting, stating:
Many are the agencies that keep labor divided; politics
and religion, prejudice and selfishness, preferment and
flattery, are all ready weapons in their inexorable
grasp. But capital uses no more vicious agency against
the workers than the bonus system when used to pre-
vent [union] organization.
As these quotations suggest, organized labor viewed ac-
counting-based incentive plans as divisive measures used to
weaken union organizing activities. Throughout this early pe-
riod, labor leaders also articulated multiple concerns about the
accounting basis of these plans. Three major themes emerged:
1) that accounting was not an objective, neutral activity and
was therefore not trustworthy; 2) that accounting was not rel-
evant; and 3) that the assumptions underlying accounting were
debatable. In short, the critical point of resistance seemed to
hinge upon labor’s belief that accounting numbers could not be
trusted because these numbers were produced by companies
that could not be trusted. The Detroit Labor News [April 29,
1921, p. 2] observed:
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Dividing profits has a brotherly sound, but it means
nothing to those who know that the trust retains the
power to decide what constitutes profits, and the
skilled accountants can pile up the ‘debit’ side of the
ledger to any height desired.. Workers who accept the
trust’s bonus system play with loaded dice, because
corporation profits is a matter of figure jugglery in
which they have no part.
Articles explicitly cautioned workers not to believe the “fig-
ures” provided by owners and managers. The Detroit Labor
News [February 14, 1930, p. 6] stated:
When a corporation figures profits this does not mean
the total amount received, as with wages. Often skilled
accountants exhaust their ingenuity in disposing of in-
come. There is only one way to secure a higher wage.
To win that, objective workers must organize and do
their own thinking. They would not accept the views of
the so-called economists who strive to maintain the
status quo. If these profits go unchallenged, a greater
concentration of wealth and pauperization of addi-
tional workers is inevitable.
The labor press criticized the way accounting profits were
calculated. For example, the Reading Labor Advocate com-
plained about recording depletion as an expense. Instead, the
paper argued that both depletion and depreciation should be
deducted directly from the stockholders’ equity account. Fur-
ther, the paper [March 6, 1926, p. 5] complained that compa-
nies used stock splits to hide profit. The Cleveland Citizen [De-
cember 29, 1923, p. 4] stated that it was impossible to police
the coal industry because there were so many changes in own-
ership that really represented only “bookkeeping transactions
which in many cases involve no physical possession.” The De-
troit Labor News [August 17, 1923, p. 2] pointed out that the big
profits shown by the U. S. Steel Corporation were “after all
charges have been met and money set aside for improvement.”
This paper also noted that profits were “after fancy salaries and
the storing away of vast sums” [September 7, 1923, p. 2] and
that:
The fully sophisticated corporation ordinarily hides the
nature of this double charge [depreciation] by the
bookkeeping methods of capitalizing the surplus. Com-
mercial methods of accounting are not capable of de-
tecting the idleness of machinery. Bookkeepers,
whether dignified with resonant titles or not, are no
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more than money clerks for men of money. They have
the dollar bias. They cannot think back from the dollar
to the man-machine combination [Detroit Labor News,
August 19, 1918, p. 4].
A second argument prominent in the press was that ac-
counting reports and measures were not relevant to the impor-
tant issues of the day. They argued that accounting numbers
could play no significant role in social debates that involved
issues of fairness, morality, and ethics. Some segments of labor
viewed the use of accounting calculations as incompatible with,
or at least inadequate for, dealing with (normative) issues of
fairness. For example, the Cleveland Citizen [May 8, 1920, p. 3]
questioned the extensive use of such metrics as accounting
numbers in the debates over railroad strikes. “The whole ques-
tion of work and wages has a political as well as an economic
aspect, and it is quite likely that this fact will become fully
understood by American Labor.” Other segments of labor ar-
gued that workers deserved a “living wage” not a wage based on
a company’s profits. For example, the Detroit Labor News [Sep-
tember 7, 1923, p. 2] commented that a “just and reasonable
wage” should not be based purely on profit:
On the basis of a living wage workers have something
to figure from. The cost of supporting an average fam-
ily in average comfort can be determined with a fair
degree of accuracy. But a just and reasonable wage,
what is it? From past action of the [coal] board, we
would be justified in assuming that it is one that is
entirely satisfactory to the railroad owners.
The arguments of the labor press often stressed the moral
and ethical issues that organized labor felt were more impor-
tant than the measure of accounting profit. The United Auto-
mobile, Aircraft, and Vehicle Workers of America asked in an
article entitled “What is a Fair Wage?”:
A decision always proves to be a truce, a compromise.
In fact, no final and permanent decision can be
reached because there is no finality in the worker’s
ethical standard. And there is no finality to the opposi-
tion to concessions made by the capitalist. For this rea-
son, these struggles will always be camouflaged with
an ethical appeal. The capitalist cannot resort to the
ethical argument unless he is on the average of bank-
ruptcy, and can thus resort to the feelings of his advi-
sors. As a rule, he seldom has this argument and is
forced by the very nature of things to discuss book-
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keeping, profits, interest, loans, new equipment and
dividends. He thus appears heartless and callous, im-
mune from higher appeal. The fact is that he would
resort to the ethical appeal if he could and he does so
when the conditions of business are such that he can
do so without detection. The ethics of this whole mat-
ter can never be square with economic conditions until
society becomes organized on a basis of equitable pro-
duction [Auto Worker, October 19, 1919, p. 9].
In this period of struggle and conflict, the mutable nature
of accounting information appears to have been clear to some
segments of organized labor, who challenged both the basic
assumptions underlying the use of accounting measurements
and the accounting measurements themselves. Importantly, the
economic information which provides the foundation for ac-
counting-based incentive plans was not being viewed as an ac-
ceptable form of discourse; thus, its power to transform social
values was limited [Edelman, 1977; Clegg, 1987]. In a particu-
larly vehement example of this, the Federation of Labor Press
of Detroit argued that labor should never accept the rules and
arguments of capital:
When the purchased chattel of capital strangles his
honest conviction to become defenders of the rules and
terms established by employers to enslave labor and to
raise barriers against the worker entrenching himself
behind breast-works of the labor movement, he dips
his prostituted pen into the repulsive slime of calumny
[Detroit Labor News, January 9, 1918, p. 4].
Finally, some of labor’s resistance centered on the assump-
tions underlying “accounting” as it had been conceptualized
and practiced. These critiques focused on the use of exchange
value rather than labor production values as the only accept-
able representation of value. New Solidarity, the paper of the
International Workers of the World (IWW), often made this
point, but the issue was also discussed in the papers of the
Detroit Federation of Labor [Detroit Labor News, August 17,
1923, p. 2, January 21, 1921, p. 21; Labor Compendium of St.
Louis, February, 1905, p. 2].
The strongest challenge to the accounting assumptions
came from the most radical newspapers. The IWW often en-
couraged workers to gather their own information about pro-
ductive processes so that they would be ready to run the
economy after capitalism had been destroyed. When they ac-
complished this, it was argued, the existing accounting system
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would also be destroyed. In its place, buying and selling would
be on the basis of labor involved. Each worker would receive a
“labor” passbook. In this way, the IWW believed that no “capi-
talist robbery based on wage labor would be possible [One Big
Union Monthly, June 1919, p. 25].
In addition, the IWW seemed to recognize how deeply cer-
tain structures of business interest were embedded within exist-
ing accounting practices (e.g., the use of market-based ex-
change values). The union argued that is was dangerous to
account for things in a way inconsistent with the social struc-
tures they were trying to build. During the early 1920s, the
union tried to implement an accounting system that would not
“give a false nature” to the organizational structure that would
be in place and working when the IWW succeeded in over-
throwing capitalism. In addition, the IWW believed that ac-
counting should be done by everyone, and not be an exercise of
knowledge of just a few. ‘Therefore, the union recommended
that thousands of workers be trained to do accounting in a new
way; that is, based on labor values [New Solidarity, April 19,
1920, p. 1].
More Moderate Union Reaction: While accounting-based incen-
tive plans were frequently rejected by labor groups during the
early 1900s, there were other more reformist union groups
which were competing with the more radical federations of la-
bor [Galenson, 1960; see also Michael and Nelson, 1998]. This
more reformist discussion of capitalism and labor-management
relations began to focus on the Progressive movement discourse
of expertise, rationalization, and quantitative measurement
[Kolko, 1963; Larson, 1977; Stryker, 1990; Covaleski and
Dirsmith, 1995]. For example, the American Federationist, the
monthly journal of the AFL, reflected the more moderate views
of labor-management relations of Samuel Gompers, William
Green, and the editors of the journal. Because the major goal of
the AFL was to obtain a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work,”
the AFL’s struggles became focused on defining a “fair day’s
work.” Gompers stated in an interview that organized labor
“demanded no special favors, no old-age pensions, no socialistic
legislation. They only want justice” [American Federationist, De-
cember 1908, p. 1057], and this “justice” now meant fair wages
instead of a living wage. Furthermore, the AFL used the lan-
guage of the Progressive movement, stressing education, both
industrial and physical, and cooperation between labor and
management as social solutions to industrial problems. For ex-
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ample, William Green restated the AFL’s support for coopera-
tion in an editorial entitled “Team Play” which noted that the
United States Chamber of Commerce’s annual conference
stressed industrial peace:
The newer idea is that profits are due to superior man-
agement and that cooperation of all concerned in a
producing establishment is necessary to make better
management effective. The former president of the
Chamber of Commerce, Lewis Pierson, made a most
powerful appeal for ‘Team Play’ for ‘Prosperity,’ look-
ing to a not distant day when organized business,
organized labor and a comprehending government
shall unite for the intelligent team work that alone can
solve our newer problems [American Federationist, July
1928, p. 32].
In short, the AFL argued for industrial cooperation based on
effective and efficient participation of citizens who were well
educated and in good health. Expertise and science would play
a role, as would a progressive government. In this context, the
battle over efficiency was often reduced to a discussion of
measurement. An explicit discussion of this came in 1925 in an
editorial entitled “The Industrial Measuring Rod.” The editorial
stated:
How difficult it was to convince, even in industry that
is in advance of many in keeping records as steel, of
the superior efficiency of the shorter workday indicates
how few standards for measuring the result of personal
policies have thus been developed. By promoting a
stable personnel organization, not only are the turn-
over costs eliminated, but the economies of more effi-
cient production become a very considerable factor. It
is difficult for a business management to visualize such
results and for the trade unions to supply factual data.
But it is important that such data and measuring rods
be available to not only the industry but the public to
evaluate policies. To develop such standards is pri-
marily the function of management and engineers.
Workers can and would be glad to help under proper
provisions [Cleveland Citizen, August 19, 1925, p. 1].
The labor press in the 1920s illustrated the tensions emerg-
ing between those who sought to fundamentally change or
eliminate capitalism and those primarily interested in securing
a share of the growing industrial wealth by invoking expertise,
science, and the search for efficiency which characterized the
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Progressive movement [Hays, 1959; Haber, 1964; Miller and
O’Leary, 1989]. The Detroit Labor News, one of the presses most
critical of accounting and profit sharing a few years earlier,
provided an excellent example of this tension. In 1929, the pa-
per ran several front-page articles promoting industrial peace
through cooperation and advocating the use of expertise, calcu-
lation, and science. Yet, on this same page an article entitled
“Trade Unionism Fits into American Ideal” [December 20, 1929,
p. 1] warned:
This historic opposition to trade unionism takes a new
form as old methods are exposed. This opposition can
be expected because trade unionism rejects man’s con-
trol of man. The crude opposition of by-gone-days —
Pinkerton detectives, militia and regimented armies of
strikebreakers — has been replaced by cunning and
stealth. Our present day opponents have discovered
that the most effective way to control workers is to
control the mind.
In summary, in this period of labor unrest, labor viewed
accounting as neither immutable nor neutral. While many busi-
nesses and some levels of government turned to arguments
couched in accounting and other administrative language, la-
bor challenged both the morality of underlying institutions of
capitalism and the representations of these institutions pro-
vided by management or its accounting vassals (specifically,
their representations of profit). As demonstrated in the above
excerpts, the early decades of the century were a time of pro-
nounced struggle over accounting as discourse, as well as over
wages and working conditions. Accounting was described as
the province of owners and managers who could not be trusted.
Further, the labor press described the accounting reports as
representing the perspectives and interest of owners and man-
agers.
PROFIT SHARING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II
The second wave of accounting-based incentive plans be-
gan before World War II, increasing dramatically after the war.
Studies usually list two legislative and one managerial reasons
for the increased usage of these incentive systems. First, tax
laws were changed, creating a more hospitable climate for
profit sharing. Second, most profit-sharing and gain-sharing
plans were exempted from the U.S. government’s wage stabili-
zation policies following World War II [Thompson, 1949;
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American Federationist, July 1950; Knowlton, 1954a,b] Third,
studies have suggested that management wanted to create in-
centives to tie workers’ interests to the firm, sometimes phrased
as “making our people capitalists” [Council on Profit Sharing
Industries, 1954; Knowlton, 1954a,b; Jehring, 1960]. As with
the earlier wave, managers sometimes described accounting-
based incentive plans as means of improving the flaws and
shortcomings of workers. For example, a manager from the
Quality Casting Company, which introduced profit sharing in
1945, stated:
One example of getting people to assume responsibility
is one of which we are very proud. We have a lot of
colored boys [sic] working for us. Several years ago we
were able to encourage a couple of them to take the
money that they had received from profit sharing and
start building or providing a home for themselves. Of
course, it changed their outlook on many things, and
particularly at work, it made them far more respon-
sible. That was what we wanted to do. [Council on
Profit Sharing Industries, 1954, p. 106].
Worker loyalty and responsibility was valued because man-
agers thought these incentives would create workers who were
attentive to costs, efficient, and willing to accept new technol-
ogy [Thompson, 1949; Knowlton, 1954a,b; Jehring, 1960]. In
particular, accounting-based incentive plans were often imple-
mented to decrease labor conflict over engineering-based piece
rates and work rules [Oakes and Covaleski, 1994] as evidenced
in such places as a gain-sharing plan at Kaiser Steel’s Fontana,
Califonia plant [Monthly Labor Review, April 1964; Steel Labor,
July 1964]; at Quality Castings Company [Jehring, 1960]; at
LaPointe Machine Tool Company [Schultz and Crisara, 1948];
at Parker Pen [“Parker Pen Memoranda,” 1954]; and at Ameri-
can Motors Corporation [Kenosha Labor, August 3, 1961, Octo-
ber 6, 1961, October 12, 1961].
These post-World War II profit-sharing and gain-sharing
plans differed from their counterparts in the early decades of
the century. Many plans were implemented as part of collective
bargaining rather than being unilaterally implemented by man-
agement as in the prior era. Further, most allowed at least some
redress over accounting issues. Most gain-sharing plans and
many profit-sharing plans instituted specific means for union/
management cooperation. These mechanisms often took the
form of committees (e.g., the Progress Sharing Committees at
Kaiser and the Scanlon Committee at Parker Pen). Further,
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these plans often used the rhetoric of “teamwork” to advocate
their agendas [Thompson, 1949; Knowlton, 1954a,b; Jehring,
1960].
The second wave of profit sharing received union support
which was widely accomplished by favorable commentary in
the labor press [American Federationist, July 1950; Zalusky,
1991]. In addition, the labor press of the post-World War II
period reflected a change in labor’s views of accounting. These
changes are illustrated both directly and indirectly. For ex-
ample, organized labor no longer resisted the use of measure-
ment, regulation, and formalistic solutions to labor/manage-
ment disputes. In fact, union discussions of “productivity” and
labor’s “fair share of its fruits” promoted the use of formula-
based bargaining [c.f., American Federationist, November 1949,
p. 16; Voice of Local 212, January 1951, p. 4]. The AFL press
continued to argue that it was important to end antagonistic
relationships between labor and management and to bargain
cooperatively. The American Federationist [July 1950, p. 18], for
example, stated: “The practical use of union-management coop-
eration is, we think, indispensable to best results.” The monthly
journal of the USWA also editorialized favorably about coop-
eration, noting:
Something new in the field of labor-management rela-
tions is taking place in steel communities around the
country. The president of the nation’s largest union
and the chairman of the biggest steel producer in the
world are digging into labor problems at the plant level
[Steel Labor, December 1959, p. 18].
Other labor leaders also began to express similar views; for
example, the URW executive committee called for “careful co-
operation” with the Big Four rubber companies [URW Conven-
tion Proceedings, February 1948, p. 29].
The labor press also began to discuss accounting earnings
more frequently to advocate for labor. Local and national labor
newspapers began reporting accounting-based profit figures
routinely. These reports included sales figures in dollars, and
annual and quarterly earnings statements taken directly from
the business press. Many reports were taken verbatim from the
Wall Street Journal. Union leaders appealed to these earnings
figures to justify wage demands. For example, Philip Murray of
the CIO stated:
Demands of this union for a wage increase and other
improvements in our basic steel contracts are economi-
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cally right, economically feasible and entirely justifi-
able. No propaganda appeals by the steel companies to
the public can hide the fact that the present profit mar-
gin of the steel industry is so great it could easily grant
the union’s demands without raising prices at all [Steel
Labor, February 1952, p. 1].
In another example, Walter P. Reuther of the United Auto
Workers of America (UAW) sent a letter to Chrysler following a
99-day strike in 1950 that said:
Despite the 1949 record profits of $213 million, the
Chrysler Corporation was unwilling to grant its work-
ers the same reasonable demands which other compa-
nies granted.
Chrysler lacked the simple, common decency to
share the profits with workers [Voice of Local 212, May
1950, p. 3].
During this period unions often called for more accounting
information. This increased use of accounting came from both
labor’s demands to see the books and from management’s insis-
tence that labor take financial arguments seriously. For ex-
ample, during the 113-day strike at General Motors during
1955-1956, one of the UAW’s central demands was for the com-
pany to “open the books” to determine if a raise was feasible.
When General Motors refused, President Harry Truman set up
a “fact-finding committee” which found that a wage increase
was reasonable. General Motors still refused to grant a raise,
and the strike went on two months after the committee’s report
was issued. Workers on the picket line carried signs that called
on General Motors to let the public “see the facts.” [UAW, 1985,
p. 50]. This call for accounting information was echoed by
union leaders in the May 1949 edition of the Journal of
Accountancy.
The most prominent union figure calling for profit sharing
was Walter P. Reuther, head of the UAW. In early 1958, the
Executive Board of the UAW added profit sharing to its list of
bargaining demands. The UAW membership was divided and
ultimately dropped this demand at its 1958 convention, decid-
ing to focus on decreasing the work week in order to solve
mounting unemployment [Voice of Local 212, February 1958,
December 1958]. However, Reuther continued to push for
profit sharing as a “way to solve serious and growing economic
problems.” In an interview on the CBS [March 23, 1958] pro-
gram, “Face the Nation,” Reuther stated that:
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The prime economic motivation behind our profit
sharing plan is our desire to find a way by which wage
earners at the bargaining table can achieve their eq-
uity, their measure of economic and social justice, on a
basis that will be absolutely, positively non-inflationary
in character.
When asked how serious the UAW was in its demand for profit
sharing, Reuther answered, “We are dead serious.” Addition-
ally, Reuther called for profit sharing again in 1963 when he
stated: “Profit sharing is rational because it shares a pie that’s
already baked.” He called on industry to get “emotionally ad-
justed” to the idea. Reuther’s argument that profit-sharing
plans are a reasonable way to divide up the fruits of labor
reflects his acceptance of accounting as a measure of productiv-
ity and as a basis for determining labor’s “fair share” [Solidar-
ity, February 1963, p. 3].
In some sense, what was not said in the labor press reflects
organized labor’s views as much as what was said. There were
few examples of labor’s earlier criticisms of accounting in terms
of its being untrustworthy, irrelevant, or political. Gone was the
critique of accounting numbers based on market-based ex-
change values rather than labor theory values to represent eco-
nomic reality. Further, the labor press contained no discussions
of the morality of using numbers to discuss social issues.
With few exceptions, the labor press did not question the
manner in which financial reports were prepared. We found
only two explicit complaints about accounting, both in the
Voice of Local 212. In the first example, the union complained
that the annual financial statements of Briggs Manufacturing
did not give the union credit for the improved working condi-
tions [November 1949, p. 2]. In the second example, the paper
[May 1951, p. 2] stated: “Companies try to make profit look
smaller by sometimes talking about net profit and other times
about gross profits. This confuses people.” When asked to speak
to accountants, labor leaders did complain about some ac-
counting practices [Gomberg, 1947], but these concerns were
no longer part of labor’s own press.
On the other hand, both profit-sharing and gain-sharing
plans involved increasingly complicated formulas and calcula-
tions. For example, the profit-sharing plan at American Motors
involved problematic financial reporting issues including, at
one point, removing extraordinary gains and losses and deduct-
ing earnings from foreign investments and licenses [New York
Times, October 13, 1964, p. 23]. The plan at Kaiser Steel
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required that “actual costs” be compared to a baseline measure
of costs established in 1961. The difference between the two
would be multiplied by the tons of steel finished that month,
and then any new equipment that “improved productivity” was
subtracted at a rate of 1/6 of the cost per month. At Parker Pen,
the Scanlon plan allowed the bonus ratio to be adjusted for
changes in product mix, subcontracting, or technology — all
items which created significant measurement problems
[“Parker Pen Memorandum,” 1954]. In other words, plans often
involved particular accounting issues that could be points of
conflict, even if unions accepted the basic premises underlying
the accounting system.
In summary, this second period reveals the extent to which
debates had shifted from moral issues (including the appropri-
ate definition and boundaries of labor conflict) to debates of
fact (how do we measure productivity, what are true profits).
This shift reflects, in large part, the way that the rhetoric of
organized labor was subsumed by the rhetoric of rationality
[Zucker, 1977; Gordon et al., 1982; Jacoby, 1985]. It also re-
flects the widespread trend toward specialization of expertise
and knowledge in which unions came to depend on the ac-
counting measures and the expertise of nonunion sources like
the Wall Street Journal, in which union leaders spoke about
accounting issues with accountants but not with the rank and
file. The structural changes in the relationship between labor
and management, reflected in both the labor press and in
organized labor’s discussion of cooperation, were rapidly con-
solidated in the post-war period. Gordon et al. [1982, p. 188]
remarked on the rate of this transformation in this way:
In retrospect, the speed and comprehensiveness of
unions’ postwar accommodation with management in
the new system of labor management appear quite re-
markable. By the early 1950’s, large corporations had
succeeded in shaping and applying an essentially new
structure of labor management.
DISCUSSION
The two waves of accounting-based incentive plans exam-
ined in this study shared a number of important features. In
both periods, employers instituted these plans to deal with la-
bor problems. Plans in both periods were couched in terms of
“cooperation” and in terms of creating responsible, efficient,
loyal employees. They were intended to relocate or recreate the
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employee into a governable working subject [Townley, 1994].
Significant differences existed, however, including organized
labor’s changing views of the plans. As accounting measure-
ment is an integral part of these plans, labor’s changing views
of accounting are reflected in their altered stance toward profit
sharing and other incentive plans.
The labor press of the first era examined offers many ex-
amples where labor writers and leaders felt confident in criti-
cally commenting on the nature and practice of accounting.
Labor papers also discussed relatively complex business trans-
actions (e.g., stock splits) with little hesitancy. Further, these
conversations occurred within the labor press itself, suggesting
that union organizers and leaders expected this critique to be
understandable and important to union members. Often ac-
counting was described in terms of the biased reports of owners
whose interests opposed the interests of workers. In addition,
the more radical presses argued that union members must
learn to do accounting themselves. Following World War II,
however, the labor press seldom commented on accounting as a
practice. Further, when it reported accounting profits, the press
frequently attributed its information to the Wall Street Journal
and other sources from the business press that were ostensibly
independent of employers. Accounting information began to
fall outside the focus and core competencies of unions and the
labor press.
Impact of Government Intervention and the Triumph of Rational-
ity: As noted earlier, the seeds of transition from normative
management rhetorics to rhetorics of rationality were planted
early in the 20th century. The change did not come to fruition,
however, until organized labor’s normative resistance to man-
agement technologies was overcome. This happened, in large
part, because of the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. This
legislation instituted a broad federal bureaucracy that affected
labor relations in a number of ways. Authors, including Stryker
[1990], Jacoby [1985], and Gordon et al. [1982], have discussed
the role of the Wagner Act and the National Labor Relations
Board at length. For this study, federal labor legislation was
important for several reasons. The legislation institutionalized
and legislated the right to bargain collectively. As a result, it
diminished one of labor’s primary reasons for opposing profit
sharing; namely, that these plans prevented organizing. Perhaps
more importantly, this legislation rationalized the arena of
bargaining, giving rise to several important implications. This
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legislation normalized and bureaucratized the employee and
employer relationship. The relationship of worker and boss was
no longer seen as fraught with the “moral” and “ethical” con-
flicts featured so prominently in the earlier labor press [Jacoby,
1985]. Following the New Deal, this relationship was legislated
into one relationship to be accepted, managed, and negotiated,
but not overthrown. In other words, the relationship became
technical. Labor debates moved from issues of substantive ra-
tionality (the proper goals to pursue) to issues of instrumental
rationality (how to obtain higher wages and better working
conditions). As such, the moral discourse underlying labor op-
position to both profit sharing and accounting was preempted.
In addition, the New Deal legislation may have influenced
labor’s views of accounting by standardizing and formalizing
accounting and other issues of corporate government through
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. The formation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formalized ac-
counting in such a way that the rules for accounting were relo-
cated outside of the firm, seemingly away from the manipula-
tion of owners or managers. Furthermore, “professionalization”
meant that accounting increasingly became the bailiwick of
“experts” who were located outside the corporation and who
appeared to be independent. The effects of both events were
reflected in the labor press’ reports of accounting in the 1940s
and 1950s, when unions actively gathered accounting informa-
tion and reported that information, implying that this informa-
tion was uncontested. As we noted previously, the labor press in
the early period often described accounting as representing the
vested interests of owners, rather than being the disinterested,
value-neutral reports of professionals. For example, accounting
professionals were described by the press as “the money clerks
for men of money” [Detroit Labor News, August 19, 1918]. The
legislation of corporate financial reporting practices, along with
the growing professionalization of accounting, created an im-
age of impartiality for accountants [Larson, 1977; Miranti,
1990]. Just as the New Deal labor legislation changed the rela-
tionship between employees and employers, the professionali-
zation of accounting relocated labor in terms of accounting.
Increasingly, the labor press did not describe accounting as the
biased reports of an enemy, nor even the prerogative of labor,
but as “authorless” information.
We are not, however, arguing that organized labor believed
every accounting report presented to them in this later period.
As Stryker [1990] pointed out, bureaucratic information can be
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used to manage conflict even if there is disagreement about the
information and even if the information is seen as politicized.
In order to reduce conflict, the administrative use of informa-
tion expertise need only be seen as not systematically and uni-
versally biased. For Stryker, this meant that information may
not illuminate class conflict; it cannot appear to be class-domi-
nated or inherently interest-based. In our study, this means that
labor must not see accounting information as inherently biased
in favor of management or, ironically, biased in favor of unions.
In other words, many people including labor came to believe
that while accounting reports could be wrong (that is, reports
could be manipulated if management did not follow the rules),
accounting reports, prepared by rules established by the SEC
and the profession, could also be trustworthy or, more impor-
tantly, useful.
It is difficult to differentiate the growth of accounting and
auditing regulation and professionalization from a similar
trend that occurred in the regulation and bureaucratization of
labor unions. These two trends happened in tandem and, we
argue, are part of the same push for rationalization that was
embraced by managers and unions. It is equally important to
note that neither trend began in the 1930s with the New Deal
legislation. As noted earlier in this paper, management rheto-
rics of rationalization and labor’s acceptance of these rhetorics
appear and disappear in the first decades of the 20th century.
However, these rhetorics did not predominate. In the same
sense, although accounting was growing in importance
(Hawkins, 1986; Vangermeersch, 1986), accounting was not
viewed by labor as a body of expertise that should be automati-
cally rejected.
In many ways, this accommodation reflects organized
labor’s acquiescence to the tenets of the Progressive movement,
tenets that large segments of labor had rejected in the early
decades of the century. During the period of rejection, labor
argued that the labor/management relationship was an issue of
moral, and not technological debate. As such, accounting meas-
ures neither reduced conflict nor created the stability and pre-
dictability that Kolko [1963] and others argued lay at the heart
of the Progressive movement [Hays, 1959; Haber, 1964]. Nor
did the use of accounting measurement shift political and
moral conflicts into arguments about fact, a goal central to the
Progressives of the period and to the New Deal legislative solu-
tions that were to follow. In other words, the use of administra-
tive techniques like accounting-based incentive plans in the
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early period did not reduce or change the nature of labor con-
flict [Stryker, 1990].
Following the New Deal, however, the opposite was true.
Legislative solutions provided a political culture and context
that viewed accounting-based incentive plans as objective and
immutable, thus appearing more legitimate. Within this con-
text, profit sharing came to be supported and perpetuated by
organized labor itself, thus establishing shared meanings of or-
ganizational behavior and changing the structure of labor-man-
agement conflict. With this complicity of organized labor,
unions themselves were rendered governable as were labor-
management relations as the calculative regime of accounting
was increasingly accepted and applied.
Closing Comments: It is difficult to determine the effects of
organized labor’s call for and participation in profit sharing
even after almost half a century. Some labor historians suggest
that the decisions made by organized labor during this period
profoundly affected the future of industrial unions as a force in
the U.S. For example, Kessler-Harris and Silverman [1992, p.
62] stated:
Continuing to seek a middle-class lifestyle for their
members, unions tried to achieve the appearance of
upward economic mobility within a job context that
was still circumscribed. In the skilled craft unions the
result was a job protectionism that subjected them to
attack by a growing civil rights movement and reduced
the credibility of the labor movement as a moral voice
for less privileged workers.
Although those promoting the 1990’s wave of accounting-
based incentive plans often couched these plans in terms of
cooperation, participation, and team work, the plans also ap-
peared in plants facing imminent closure [Perry and Kegley,
1990]. In the uncertain and complex environment in which
these plans were implemented, it seemed increasingly impor-
tant that unions be able to question the accounting reports of
falling profits that often underlie calls for organizational re-
structuring. However, the ability of unions to confront increas-
ingly complex and difficult accounting and other technical is-
sues has been called into question. For example, Craypo and
Nissen [1993, p. 234] contended that unions have sometimes
been unable to anticipate or understand corporate strategies for
reorganization. They noted: “It is revealing that the first person
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other than a manager or investment specialist to know that
White Consolidated planned to divest the Balw-Knox foundry
was neither a local nor an international union official but a
Calumet Project researcher who had read about the plan in the
business press.”
Some labor leaders agreed that unions often lack informa-
tion about corporate plans or alternative solutions to economic
problems. They note that the labor press has been weakened,
and that the general media provides little coverage of union
issues [Pizzigati and Soloway, 1992]. In the end, organized
labor’s acceptance of financial accounting and other rational-
ized management practices may have limited the ability of
workers to respond imaginatively and critically to the norma-
tive challenges of global economic restructuring.
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C.J. McNair and Richard Vangermeersch, Total Capacity Man-
agement: Optimizing at the Operational, Tactical, and Strategic
Levels (Boca Raton: IMA Foundation for Applied Research, St.
Lucie Press, 1998, 324 pp., $50)
Reviewed by
Gloria L. Vollmers
University of Maine
McNair and Vangermeersch combine forces and expand on
their prior work for the Society of Management Accountants of
Canada and the Institute of Management Accountants (Measur-
ing the Cost of Capacity: Management Accounting Guideline #42)
as well as on their individual efforts in both the area of capacity
management and cost accounting history. The book takes ad-
vantage of McNair’s extensive work as a consultant and
Vangermeersch’s encyclopedic historical knowledge of cost ac-
counting in an unusual presentation of the issues surrounding
capacity, “the value creating ability of an organization” [p. 1],
which defies attempts to measure it. The crux of the story is,
that because of continually increasing global competition, effec-
tive usage and management of capacity is key to profitability,
and effectiveness requires that capacity be measured despite
difficulties doing so. The firm unable to make increasingly bet-
ter use of its capacity is likely to be swallowed by its consider-
able cost.
The authors divide the book into three parts. The first part
contains six chapters that introduce capacity terminology and
discuss capacity management in the short term (operational),
in the intermediate term (tactical), and in the long term (strate-
gic). The second part, with five chapters, examines the capacity
literature in the U.S. during five periods (1900-1919, 1920-1932,
1933-1952, 1953-1978, and 1979-present). The final part is an
annotated bibliography of literature emerging from those peri-
ods. Some of the literature is used extensively in the second
part of the book. Though these divisions are structural, there is
a considerable integration of history and current capacity infor-
mation throughout. It is worth noting that the literature used is
not confined to accounting sources.
The definitions or categories of capacity use are eye-
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opening. Total capacity assumes 24 hours, seven days a week of
production. Productive capacity is the only use of that capacity
that creates value. The rest is waste. Excess capacity is capacity
idle because there is no current market for potential output.
Planned idle capacity arises from a temporary lack of demand,
routine maintenance, etc. Unplanned idle capacity occurs be-
cause of a lack of materials, breakdowns, rework, etc. [pp. 30-
31]. What the authors claim is that firms use less than 30% of
their total capacity [p. 78]. They also argue that theoretical
capacity is the only justifiable baseline from which managers
should think about capacity because only by understanding the
extent of its potential and assigning it a cost, can they begin to
manage it effectively. What is not measured is not seen.
The chapter on operational perspectives reviews models of
capacity measurement currently used by firms. These include
various materials requirements planning (MRP) models, as well
as just-in-time or cellular manufacturing and the theory of con-
straints. These models emphasize throughput while minimizing
other costs. The short-term perspective, assuming a market for
goods, says that since capacity costs are largely fixed, and direct
costs fixed per unit, the profitability of the firm lies completely
in its ability to produce to cover capacity costs. To compete on
price in a free market, production must be maximized.
The intermediate term, or tactical perspective, recognizes
that while capacity costs cannot be reduced, they can be man-
aged over multiple time periods by looking at how work is done
(effectiveness) and what type of work is done. The models for
this level of management vary greatly in their complexity, in-
cluding normalized costing, activity-based costing, capacity
variance analysis, the resource effectiveness model, the cost
containment model, and elementary analysis within the CAM-I
and CUBES approaches. The keys here appear to be the willing-
ness and effort to identify and measure the sources of nonpro-
ductive time (waste) and to translate these measurements into
dollars. A cost seen is a cost that may be controlled through
process or other design changes.
On the strategic, long-term level, all costs are controllable.
The models available at this level are CUBES, CAM-I, and re-
source effectiveness. The variety of decisions made at this level
include: make or buy, buy or lease, expansion of capacity, re-
duction of capacity, outsourcing, joint ventures, alliances with
suppliers (and others), and major product-mix change deci-
sions. Here planning must be done carefully because the deci-
sions made at this level can lock the firm into cost structures
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for long periods of time. The authors warn that it is far easier to
expand a plant and add costs than to reduce it and eliminate
costs. For example, assets made redundant by outsourcing may
take a long time to sell.
Although the authors integrate history throughout the
book, the historical chapters provide for a considerable review
of the major capacity discussions that occurred during the cen-
tury and the economic and political influences on the discus-
sions. They seek to explain when and why capacity was a major
topic, how authors recommended handling it, why it disap-
peared from the literature, and why it has reappeared in the last
decade or so. For example, early in the century, substantial
investments in machinery led engineers and accountants to rec-
ommend tracking the idle time of machines and expensing it as
a line item on the income statement as a management tool.
Probably the most controversial part of the book is the
conclusion that the New Deal’s National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA), with its emphasis on full cost recovery as a basis
for setting prices, doomed thoughtful and useful capacity man-
agement for decades to come. While intriguing, there are mul-
tiple alternative and/or correlated explanations of why this oc-
curred. One cannot conclude that the NIRA was the primary
reason. McNair and Vangermeersch do not ignore the other
reasons (e.g., financial accounting’s growing prominence and
its reliance on full absorption costing and the matching prin-
ciple) but place primary responsibility on the NIRA. Neverthe-
less, their arguments deserve discussion.
Global competition, demanding continual cost reductions,
has driven the reemergence of interest in capacity and capacity
reporting in the 1980s and 90s. The rush to lean production
(just-in-time/cellular manufacturing) led to a focus on quality
and the reduction of waste as well as the rebirth of activity-
based costing and the theory of constraints. All are interrelated
in that understanding one’s costs and sources of waste should
lead to control and greater profitability. The authors would like
modern management to know that these issues are not new and
that much can be learned from the writers of the past. Perhaps
their solutions can be applied to the present.
This book is enjoyable and potentially an excellent source
for educators who want to discuss capacity and who welcome
an opportunity to integrate historical perspectives. The anno-
tated bibliography can easily be used for class assignments —
comparing an article from the 1910s to one written today.
Some examples casually put forward may prompt argument,
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such as the Lucent Technologies and Babson College partner-
ship to provide an educational program Lucent wants. Is it
possible that such linkages might damage the academic cred-
ibility of the college? The insistence that theoretical capacity be
the basis for measurement, and likely the denominator volume
for certain overhead costs, will prompt lively discussions about
its impact on performance and performance measurement as
well as theoretical arguments about what to do with the mas-
sive underabsorbed overhead. This enjoyable and unique book
could be the capstone of a cost accounting course because of its
integration of ABC, TOC, overhead allocation, waste, quality,
and many others topics that have entered the curriculum. The
many examples of real companies enrich the book and fill the
practical needs frequently expressed by students.
T. E. Cooke and C.W. Nobes (eds.), The Development of Ac-
counting in an International Context: A Festschrift in Honour of
R.H. Parker (London: Routledge, 1997, 261 pp., $85)
Reviewed by
Bob R. C. J. Van den Brand
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
The Development of Accounting in an International Context,
a tribute to R.H. Parker and the second book in the Routledge
International Studies in Business History, contains a collection
of interesting papers including a foreword by Sir Bryan
Carsberg, an introductory chapter detailing the book’s contents
by editors Cooke and Nobes, and ten chapters of international
accounting history. A biographical sketch of Robert Henry
Parker and a discussion of his books and articles are also in-
cluded in the introductory chapter.
Chapter two contains Basil Yamey’s notable contribution
on the diversity of bookkeeping practices. Yamey begins by
discussing “bookkeeping without written records.” Later, in the
1490s, some attempts were made to regulate bookkeeping. The
first, ordered in 1491 by Ferdinand and Isabella, made little
sense because it did not stipulate which books were to be kept.
Conversely, the best known attempt to legislate business
accounts was the French Code of Commerce of 1673, a project
associated with the names of Colbert and Savary. The Code of
1673 served as a basis for the Code de Napoleon (1807) from
which many 19th century European commercial codes
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originated. Yamey attributes the causes of diversity in book-
keeping practices to training of the young abroad, pressures of
their other work, shortages of support staff, and incompetence.
In chapter three, Tom Lee points out the influence of the
individual on professionalization by presenting the case of Ri-
chard Brown and the Society of Accountants in Edinburgh.
This paper demonstrates the validity of the profesionalization
proposition.
In chapter four, Edwards, Carnegie, and Cauberg discuss
the backgrounds of the founders of the Incorporated Institute
of Accountants in Victoria, Australia. Detailed information such
as the founders’ occupation, as well as those of their fathers and
fathers-in-law, and their religious affiliations is provided.
Chapter five offers practitioner perspectives on the per-
sonal conduct of accountants. Lee D. Parker points out the con-
ventional expectations of the accountant’s behavior during the
first half of the 20th century — honesty, integerity, indepen-
dence, leadership, efficiency, and swank.
In chapter six, Richard D. Morris discusses the origins of
the no-liability company, an organizational form unique to
Australia and New Zealand. The no-liability company in the
Colony Victoria evolved from the British Cost Book Mining
Company (BCBMC) located in Devon and Cornwall, U.K. This
paper tests Parker’s theory on 19th century accounting regu-
lation in the U.K., a practice associated with issues of monopo-
listic powers, state-granted privileges, and financial safety. Mor-
ris concludes that Parker’s concerns, coupled with Crouch’s
idea of establishing and enforcing the law, explain the existence
of BCBMC. Athough Parker’s explanation is not complete,
neither agency theory, investor theory, nor capture theory
provides an explanation for the popularity of the no-liability
company in Victoria and New South Wales during the gold
rush (1850-1870).
Chapter seven offers another view of the deprival value ap-
proach to depreciation. Philip W. Bell and Ken Peasnell have
four goals: to draw a new generation’s attention to the deprival
value depreciation model, to clarify certain difficult issues, to
highlight interesting facts of deprival value, and to explain why
the deprival value approach is relevant to financial reporting.
In chapter eight, David Tweedie and Geoffrey Whittington
examine the evolution and decline of the current cost account-
ing revolution in the U.K., U.S., Australasia, Canada, The Neth-
erlands, and Latin America. They distinguish between constant
purchasing power and current cost accounting, as well as
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provide information on accounting from perspectives other
than historical cost.
In chapter nine, Stephen A. Zeff deals with the U.S. lobby
on employee stock options. In the nineties, the media drew
attention to long-term incentive schemes and stock option
plans offered to key executives. Zeff describes how one U.S.
senator organized a hearing and pressed the FASB and the SEC
for regulations concerning employee stock options. Zeff de-
scribes the complete process of lobbying as well as Senate and
House of Representatives pressure on the FASB.
Chapter ten authors Sidney Gray and Clare B. Roberts dis-
cuss foreign company listings on the London Stock Exchange,
focusing primarly on listing patterns and influential factors.
They give an overview of worldwide company listings at the end
of 1994 and analyze the foreign listings on the London Stock
Exchange by country. Listing patterns are split into temporal,
geographical, and industrial patterns. The appendix provides an
overview of foreign nonfinancial company listings on the Lon-
don Stock Exchange between 1937 and 1994.
In the final chapter, R.S. Olusegun Wallace describes the
development of accounting research in the U.K. In this chapter,
subtitled “The Need to put ‘Accounting’ back into Accounting
Research,” the author interprets the research shift away from
the core content of accounting and gives his ideas on good,
published accounting research.
I found this book interesting, exciting, and very readable.
The most charming aspect was the variety of topics in interna-
tional accounting history, and I accord the book my highest
recommondation. It is worth remembering Parker’s words
[1971] that modern accounting is not the invention of any one
country.
REFERENCES
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Kees Camfferman, Voluntary Annual Report Disclosure by Listed
Dutch Companies 1945-1983 (New York: Garland Publishing,
Inc., 1997, 392 pp., $68)
Reviewed by
Peter J. Clarke
University College Dublin
During the decades following World War II, the informa-
tion content of company annual reports increased significantly
in many developed countries, resulting mainly from the need to
provide information for investors and other interested parties.
For teaching and research purposes, this information can be
classified as either mandatory or voluntary, and several coun-
try-specific studies detail how financial reporting practices
evolved over time.
This book is concerned with voluntary, or nonmandatory,
disclosure in annual reports of companies in The Netherlands.
The book, originally a Ph.D. thesis, is based on a sample of
about 30% of the companies (excluding financial and colonial
companies) listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the
period 1945 to 1983. For logical reasons, nonquoted companies
were not investigated. In 1984, the adoption of the Fourth Di-
rective on Company Law within the European Community
ended the period during which Dutch financial reporting regu-
lation was free to develop under the influence of national fac-
tors. This longitudinal study is concerned with a total of 13
disclosure items; namely, sales (or turnover), comparative fig-
ures, tax costs, tax liabilities, labor cost data, number of em-
ployees, consolidated financial statements, funds statements,
current cost income, current cost balance sheets, earnings per
share, industry sales/income, and geographical sales/income. In
turn, these 13 disclosure items are grouped into nine disclosure
areas.
Chapter two considers the theoretical views on voluntary
disclosure, particularly in relation to economics-based models
of disclosure behavior. The next chapter considers voluntary
financial reporting in The Netherlands specifically and docu-
ments the rise and the fall of financial reporting in terms of the
“Dutch systems” of financial reporting and regulation. Develop-
ments are traced from the French Code de Commerce of 1807 to
the present. This chapter establishes that there was a wide-
spread perception in The Netherlands of the importance of
voluntary improvements in disclosure. Chapter four provides a
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literature review of the main approaches to empirical disclo-
sure research and discusses the disclosure items selected and
companies studied.
Chapters five and six are concerned with analysis of the
data gathered. At a most elementary level, it was found that
there was, in fact, a rather substantial extent of voluntary dis-
closure in the Dutch annual reports studied, and that the 1970
Act on Annual Financial Statements had a significant influence
on increasing those disclosures. The 1970 Act codified a num-
ber of practices, including consolidations, and spurred further
voluntary disclosures such as employee numbers, earnings per
share, and geographical segmentation of operating income. In
terms of association between firm-specific factors and the ex-
tent of disclosure, size was found to be the most important
explanatory variable. This result was established using multiple
regression.
Despite the limitations recognized by the author; e.g., a
focus on listed companies and the selection of disclosure items,
this Ph.D. thesis contributes significantly to our understanding
of both voluntary and mandatory financial disclosure practice
in The Netherlands. It is unlikely that the book will become a
recommended text, but it is an invaluable source of reference
for those investigating corporate disclosure practices. Over 400
references are cited. It also contains important material for
those with an interest in accounting history since some refer-
ence is made to development both in the U.K. and the U.S. Also,
the book highlights that certain aspects of financial reporting
are of relatively recent origin. For example, before World War
II the practice of disclosing comparative figures in the profit
and loss account and balance sheet was rare, while the inclu-
sion of funds flow statements did not appear in the Netherlands
until the late 1950s.
Hiroshi Okano, Japanese Management Accounting: A Historical
and Institutional Perspective (Tokyo: Chuokeizaisha, 1995, 183
pp., $25, 2,800 yen)
Reviewed by
Hideki Murai
Nihon University
This book is unique in that it contains abundant quotations
from Foucault’s philosophy. Accordingly, it may be classified as
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belonging to the critical school of accounting as found most
prominently in the U.K. The reader, however, may find this
approach to understanding Japanese management accounting a
bitter pill to swallow. Okano, honored by the Japanese Institute
of Certified Public Accountants in 1996, first aims to identify
the fundamental characteristics of the Japanese management
system; e.g., TQC (Total Quality Control), JIT (Just-In-Time)
and CIM (Computer-Integrated Manufacturing). Second, he in-
tends to construct that management accounting system in light
of global standards and social theory. He has divided the study
into two parts: an historical approach to management account-
ing (chapters 1-4) and a structural analysis of Japanese man-
agement accounting (chapters 5-7).
In his introduction, Okano develops his fundamental idea
that the gap between theory and practice should be overcome
by building “management accounting as a social theory”
(MAST). Chapter 1 outlines his basic premise that a strict chro-
nology of accounting history is not desirable. Instead, account-
ing should be examined against the social, economic, and cul-
tural backgrounds prevailing at the time. As well, the relation of
theory and practice in management accounting history is con-
tinuous, and change should be sought after synthetically (chap-
ter 2). Chapter 3 covers Foucault’s theory as a background for
subsequent discussion. In chapter 4 Okano maintains that
Emerson’s standard costing theory needs to be reexamined as
analyses of it have been not adequate from the standpoint of
MAST.
In the second part of the book, Okano discusses whether
Japanese management accounting can exist irrespective of such
superficial management techniques as TQC, “kaizen,” etc. In
chapters 6 and 7, he reviews the development of target costing
(TC) at Toyota Motors. Born from value-added and value-engi-
neering philosophy, TC became the overall management tech-
nique there. An emphasis is laid on the integrated target costing
method through absorption of cost information from suppliers’
records, especially in the automobile industry. We know that
almost 70% of manufacturing costs are the value of goods deliv-
ered from suppliers and to check their prices is vital in the
automobile industry. The final chapter concludes, in only four
pages, that the study of management accounting needs ongoing
dialogue between theory and practice.
In short, we wish to congratulate the author on the birth of
this epoch-making study on Japanese management accounting.
Despite his passionate efforts to build a theoretical structure in
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this field, we regret to say that the integration of Foucault’s
philosophy and Okano’s accounting theory seems unattainable.
For example, how can the author explain the essential charac-
ter of target costing from his own viewpoint? We expect Okano
will expand and clarify his understanding of MAST in the fu-
ture. C.A. Sprague published his Philosophy of Accounts in
1907, and H. Okano made public his philosophy of manage-
ment accounting in Japan 88 years later.
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173Announcements
NEW AHJ EDITORIAL
APPOINTMENTS
AHJ is pleased to announce that Professor Stephen Walker
of the University of Edinburgh has accepted the invitation of
the Academy of Accounting Historians to serve as the journal’s
next editor for a three-year term running from 2001-2004. New
manuscripts should be sent to Professor Walker at the Depart-
ment of Accounting and Business Method, University of
Edinburgh, 50 George Square, Edinburgh E48 9J4, United
Kingdom after July 1, 2000.
Professor Walker and the current editor are pleased to an-
nounce that Professor Cheryl McWatters of McGill University
will assume the position of AHJ book review editor, effective
with the June 2000 issue.
Professor McWatters will be replacing Professor Victoria
Beard of the University of North Dakota who has performed
admirably in that position since 1994. Many thanks to Victoria
for her many years of devoted service.
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ACCOUNTING
HISTORIANS
JOURNAL
The Academy of Accounting Historians
is pleased to announce the institution of
annual prizes for the best manuscripts
published in the Accounting Historians
Journal as determined by its editorial board,
commencing with Volume 26 (1999). The
prize for best manuscript will be in the
amount of $500, with two additional awards
for excellence of $200 each.
Submissions may be sent to Professor
Richard Fleischman, John Carroll University,
University Heights, OH  44118.
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